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THE PORTALS OF DOUBT

A great deal of contemporary thought has been vitiated by what may be called a see-saw complex. By this is meant the tendency of mind characteristic of many modern philosophers and scientists to completely unbalance, and even to turn upside down, the natural and necessary order existing among things and persons. This inversion is particularly evident in that group of relations which are neither totally real, nor solely logical, but mixed. Among Scholastics such a relation is termed non-mutual and is listed among those which have as their foundation the exercise of causality so ordering two terms to one another that one depends upon the other for its being. But "whenever two terms are so related to one another, that one depends upon the other, but not conversely, there is a real relation in that which depends upon the other. But in that upon which it depends there is only a relation of reason. The reason for this is that it is impossible to consider one thing as being referred to another without understanding

also that there is an opposite relation on the part of the other term." [1]

Non-mutual relations occur whenever " a relation in one extreme is a reality; while in the other extreme it is an idea only, and this happens when two extremes are not of the same order . . . for instance, the term ' on the right ' is not applied to a column, unless it stands on the right side of an animal. Such a relation is not really in the column, but in the animal." [2]

Saint Thomas teaches that non-mutual relations exist between the object as it exists in a cognitive faculty and as it exists in reality and between the Creator and creatures. Thus there is a real relation of dependence in sense and intellectual knowledge upon the realities existing in nature, for knowledge is measured by reality. But since the things themselves are outside this order of sensible and intellectual existence, there is no real relation in them to knowledge, but only one of reason in so far as they are apprehended as terms by the intellect. So too, " as God is outside the whole order of creation, and all creatures are ordered to Him and not conversely, it is clear that creatures are really related to God Himself. On the other hand there is no real relation in God to creatures, but it is so only in the mind in so far as creatures are referred to Him." [3]

Thus traditional thought maintains that the human intellect is measured by things and does not measure them in knowing them; hence mind is dependent upon reality. Likewise it teaches that the Divine Intellect is a measure, not a thing measured; and, consequently, the relation existing between God and things is one of dependence of things upon God.

Modern thought completely inverts these relations. It asserts that the human intellect in knowing things causes their being, goodness, and beauty. Thus the human mind is endowed with the divine power of creation. Nor is there any reluctance to extend this stolen power even to creating God Himself. As one author puts it: " We also help to maintain and sustain

[1] *De Veritate*, q. 4, a. 6; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 28, a. 1.
[2] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 13, a. 7; *Comm. in Meta.*, V, L. 17.
[3] *Ibid.*

the nature of God and are not merely His subjects . . . God Himself is involved in our acts and their issues . . . not only does He matter to us but we matter to Him. He is in the strictest sense not a creator but a creature." [4]

This attitude of mind did not mushroom into being overnight. Rather, it is but one phase of a historical process which has endured for more than six centuries. The theme and driving force of this process has been the exaltation of man and the humiliation of God. John the Baptist's pointed summary of the motion of sanctity: "I must decrease; He must increase," [5] has suffered a radical alteration.

Now it is an obvious fact that the closer we bring an object to a powerful light the more its imperfectons are made manifest. Just so "the closer one approaches to God and knows Him more, to that extent one sees Him as greater and oneself as less, indeed almost nothing in comparison to God." [5a] Thus the saint is not aware of his perfections but deeply conscious of his imperfections, for he measures himself by Infinity.

On the other hand the more a man exalts himself the less God becomes in his estimation. Such a man is certain of his perfections and ready to excuse, or even to forget, his imperfections. Certainly, the reversal of God's position has no effect in the real, concrete order, for God never changes. Neither does the stark, rugged reality of human dependence lose any of its force because it is denied. Any change that occurs is limited to the depths of inner consciousness, and unfortunately, some men have convinced themselves that they are divine.

It is easy enough to stop measuring man by God and to exalt him by pointing out his evident superiority over the rest of the visible universe. But when the basis of the exaltation, the power of the human mind, is itself obviously a combination of perfection and imperfection, grave difficulties are encountered by those who have dedicated themselves to the mission of

[4] S. Alexander, *Space, Time, Deity*, Macmillan, New York, 1922, pp. 388 ff.
[5] *John*, III, 30.
[5a] St. Thomas, *In Ephes.*, c. 5, L. 7.

making men gods. Regal robes do not make an urchin a king; neither can the human intellect be made anything more than a puppet god by decking it out in the garb of divine attributes. Something has to be done to give imperfection the appearance of perfection; weakness must disguise itself as strength.

Shouting from the housetops that the human intellect creates truth has a meager effect on men who realize through reflection that the mind's grasp on truth is tenuous. Doubts and opinions have always been more man's heritage than eternal truths and certainties, and the pages of history are clouded more with the gloomy despair of sceptics than they are brightened with the joyful hopes of dogmatists. It is this tendency of the human mind to doubt that had to be put into the crucible and remolded into a perfection.

Historically doubt has played an important role in the development of a truly great synthesis, the philosophy of Aristotle and Saint Thomas. In this system doubt served as an instrument to be employed in the search for truth, and like every other instrument it was proportioned to, and measured by, its end. Truth did not depend upon doubt; rather, doubt depended upon truth and was subject to it. Apply the fallacy of inverted relations and doubt emerges from the experiment with all the attributes and perfections of truth.

The process of glorifying doubt was begun by Descartes. In his hands doubt became a battering ram pummelling the citadels of truth and certainty which for centuries had been deemed impregnable. The senses, reason, first principles, testimony of witnesses, all were shattered. Consciousness alone survived to hurl back the advances of doubt. In fact it was in the consciousness of a doubting mind that Descartes found his first certain principle.

> While we thus reject all of which we can entertain the smallest doubt, and even imagine that it is false, we easily, indeed, suppose that there is neither God, nor sky, nor bodies, and that we ourselves have neither hands nor feet, nor finally a body; but we cannot in the same way suppose that we are not, while we doubt of the truth of those things; for there is a repugnance in conceiving

that what doubts does not exist at the very time that it doubts.... Accordingly, the knowledge, "I doubt, therefore I exist (Cogito, ergo sum)" is the first and most important certain principle that occurs to me, who philosophize orderly.[6]

What was before an instrument for the mind to use in its search for truth became now the source and guarantee of truth. Doubt for Descartes was so pregnant with truth that even God Himself was extracted from its womb. "I doubt, therefore I exist" gave him his first unshakable principle. "I doubt, therefore God exists" was equally certain.

A glorified doubt gradually pushed truth out of human life without doing violence to the purloined creative power of mind. For the pragmatists of the nineteenth century utility, not truth, became the criterion of knowledge. Philosophy, like science, was considered to be nothing more than a collection of probable hypotheses, commodious conventions destined for use. Today, idealists are quite sure that, wherever science has progressed the farthest, the mind has but regained from nature that which the mind has put into nature. Philosophy is nothing more than a method of constructing doubtful rational formulae to interpret some aspects of a mentally created world. Professor Eddington explains the shadow land of a dubious reality as follows:

To put the conclusion crudely—the stuff of the world is mind-stuff. As is often the way with crude statements, I shall have to explain that by "mind" I do not here exactly mean mind and by "stuff" I do not at all mean stuff. Still this is about as near as we can get to the idea in a simple phrase.[7]

Bertrand Russell, spokesman of instrumentalism, insists:

The practical man may be pardoned, if he comes to the conclusion that truth is unattainable except when it is unimportant. Since many philosophers are practical men in disguise, they have drawn

[6] René Descartes, *Principia VII* (quoted in *Cartesianism*, M. J. Mahony, S. J., Fordham Univ. Press, New York, 1925, p. 44).

[7] A. S. Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World*, The Gifford Lectures, 1927, New York: The Macmillan Company, Cambridge, England: At the University Press, p. 276.

the inference that philosophy should not seek truth but should concoct plausible reasons for useful error. Much modern philosophy has been inspired by this thought.

On the other hand, science, which also professes to pursue truth, has proved itself extraordinarily useful. . . . Consequently some philosophers have attached themselves to science, and have endeavoured to win some of its prestige for their own studies.

These two tendencies to make philosophy useful by the propagation of error, or respectable by incorporation in science—have determined the main cleavage in twentieth century philosophy. Adherents of the former tendency have discovered nothing true; adherents of the latter, nothing useful. Perhaps the pursuit of truth, like art, may be justified independently of utility; but no eminent person would suscribe to such a doctrine.[8]

Russell is well aware of the dangers involved in a scientific methodology which projects probable concepts of utility upon things. He writes:

Science has more and more substituted power-knowledge for love-knowledge, and as this substitution becomes completed, science tends more and more to become sadistic. . . . The power conferred by science as a technique is only obtainable by something analogous to the worship of Satan, that is to say by the renunciation of love.[9]

As is the case with every instrument, doubt may be used for edification or for destruction. Of late its use has been predominantly destructive to the extent of causing havoc in the lives of men. Concentration on meeting the challenge of the dangerous use of doubt has tended to obscure in the minds of Scholastics its constructive features and legitimate applications. Consequently, a review of the teachings of Saint Thomas Aquinas on the role of doubt in the philosophical disciplines and in faith, where its results have been most fruitful and also

[8] Bertrand Russell, "Philosophy of the Twentieth Century," an essay appearing in *Twentieth Century Philosophy*, edited by D. D. Runes, Philosophical Library, New York, 1943, pp. 227-228.

[9] Bertrand Russell, *Scientific Outlook*, p. 273, (quoted in *The Modern Dilemma*, Christopher Dawson, Sheed & Ward, New York, 1933, p. 77).

most disastrous, will not be without interest to those who have lost sight of the good uses of a valuable instrument.

St. Thomas did not devote any single work entirely to the consideration of doubt. Nevertheless, scattered throughout his philosophical and theological works are many passages, some brief, others somewhat extended, in which he treats of doubt under various aspects in so far as it is employed as a method of investigation both in particular problems and in the general and all-embracing question of the validity of human knowledge.

An examination of other texts reveals that the concept of doubt is truly analogical and one that is predicated primarily of a process of doubting which St. Thomas following Aristotle has called *dubitatio admirationis*. Such a doubt is natural and is distinguished from artificial or methodical doubt, *dubitatio discussionis*. Of this latter process the concept of doubt is predicated secondarily by reason of the fact that it is ordained to reinstate in consciousness the psychological reactions involved in the primary natural doubt.

Accordingly, the consideration of doubt is divided into two principal parts: I. The Natural Doubt of Admiration, and II. Methodical Doubt, or The Doubt of Discussion. Obviously, since the concept of doubt is analogical, this division lacks the perfect precision possible in univocal concepts. Consequently, there will always be a wide field of coincidence in which the considerations of natural and methodical doubts will overlap.

To avoid frequent and useless repetitions, several expedients have had to be adopted. The basic elements common to both processes of doubt are treated fully in the first part and are applied summarily in the second part. Other common elements, which play a more important role in methodical doubt than in natural doubt, are discussed in a general way in the first part and are considered more thoroughly in the second part, where the emphasis is placed upon their contributions to methodical doubt.

Moreover, since methodical doubt is an artificial device employed in the generation of intellectual knowledge, it was

deemed advisable to indicate the exact correspondence between the methodological elements and the psychological factors involved in the genesis of knowledge. Consequently, to avoid repetitions and to facilitate the handling of the matter, these psychological factors, which have an obvious bearing upon the understanding of the nature of natural doubt, have been considered under their most general aspects precisely as they are related to methodical doubt. This expedient required the reduction of many different factors to a basic common element, a process which is not always accomplished without some distortion. In each case, however, the ultimate reductions have been guided by the teaching of Aristotle and St. Thomas. The bases for the reductions have been indicated by incorporating into the article the principle Aristotelean-Thomistic texts concerned with the subject under discussion.

Besides expediency a second factor has influenced tremendously the general structure upon which this article has been constructed. In order to insure a faithful presentation of the Thomistic teaching on the role of doubt in faith and in philosophy, pertinent texts of Aristotle and St. Thomas have been incorporated into the article. Frequently the doctrinal contents of the texts employed are richer than the point under discussion demands, and it seemed advisable to the writer to drain off this surplus wealth immediately. Hence, the texts themselves have molded to a great extent the basic outline of this article; occasionally they have even determined the order of whole sections; and not infrequently they have borne the brunt of reporting and explaining the teaching they contain.

Thus, under the guiding light of Thomistic teaching and under the oppressive mailed fist of necessity the following outline was constructed:

I. The Natural Doubt of Admiration
   A. General Considerations
      1. Integral Parts
         a. Admiration
         b. Cogitation
      2. The Nature of the Doubt of Admiration

B. Particular Considerations
   1. The Doubt of Admiration in the Philosophical Disciplines
      a. The starting point of philosophical investigation
      b. Ordained to science
      c. A natural motion
   2. The Doubt of Admiration in Faith
   3. The Doubt of Admiration in Meditation
   4. The Doubt of Admiration in Theology

II. Methodical Doubt, or The Doubt of Discussion
   A. General Considerations
      1. The Necessity of Methodical Doubt
      2. The Nature of *Dubitatio Discussionis*
         a. The formal elements
         b. The material elements
            i. In general
               α. Opinions of others
               β. Probable premises and arguments
               γ. Likenesses and differences
               δ. Common intentions
            ii. In particular
               α. Experience and common opinions
               β. Probable reasonings and the perfection of knowledge
   B. Particular Considerations
      1. The Use of Methodical Doubt in Particular Problems
      2. The Use of Methodical Doubt in More Universal Matter
      3. The Use of Methodical Doubt in the Most Universal Matter
         a. Not a sceptical doubt
         b. Not a methodical positive doubt
         c. A methodical negative doubt

I. NATURAL DOUBT OF ADMIRATION

A. General Considerations:

Consider the psychological moment when the intellect is confronted with a new problem to be solved. For example, a

natural phenomenon has occurred which the intellect has not previously experienced. In a confused way the mind recognizes the phenomenon as a particular manifestation of the exercise of causality involving an obvious effect requiring an explanation. What is the cause? Memory is searched in vain, for there is nothing reserved in reason's storehouse which can serve as a medium to link this effect with its proper explicative cause. Similar phenomena and circumstances are recalled or imagined, but minute examination reveals that reason cannot interpret this new fact in terms of its already acquired synthesis of knowledge. Several more or less probable hypotheses based on previous experiences and bearing some relation to the present problem are constructed, and an attempt is made to determine which, if any, may offer a possible explanation for the experimental data furnished by the senses. A tentative rational formula combining and synthesizing the common features of the various hypotheses may be formed and in the light of rational principles applied to the phenomenon. Perhaps too, a process of defining, dividing, or even reasoning from common principles may be begun. In its search for the cause the intellect will start from the effect considered under one of many aspects, carry on a line of reasoning until it is evident that the solution does not lie in this direction, and then discard this hypothesis in favor of a new approach. Confronted with these diverse views of its subject matter the mind hesitates; it wavers back and forth among the several possible contrary explanations, analyzing one, applying another, and combining many into one general formula. Anxious though it may be to arrive at a solution, the reason is content to remain in suspense rather than to decide on any one explanation as long as convincing objective evidence is lacking. This lack of decision or indetermination of the intellect constitutes a doubt of a particular nature called by Saint Thomas "*the doubt of admiration.*" [10]

[10] The terminology employed, *dubitatio admirationis* and *dubitatio discussionis*, has been taken from *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 27, a. 4, ad 2um and III, q. 30, a. 4, ad 2um, where these intellectual doubts are distinguished from the doubts of infidelity and incredulity.

1. *Integral Parts: admiration and cogitation*

a. Admiration

This doubt of admiration is composed integrally of a state of mind, admiration, and a motion of mind, cogitation. Admiration in its simplest manifestation is an act of mind characterized by curiosity and provoked by knowledge of an effect whose cause is unknown to the intellect. St. Thomas defines it thus: "Admiration is a kind of desire for knowledge; a desire which comes to man when he sees an effect of which the cause either is unknown to him, or surpasses his faculty of understanding." [11] It is to be noted that admiration presupposes both in time and by nature the actual attainment of some truth by the intellect. Likewise, it presupposes the capacity of the mind to perfect its general and confused knowledge, and in this regard admiration stimulates the intellect to undertake a process of intellectual development. Thus admiration is not the knowledge of a strange phenomenon, rather it is an act following upon this knowledge applying the attention of reason to the examination of the unknown or unusual elements.

It is upon the fact of the existence of admiration in the mind, a fact of internal consciousness evident to all through reflection, that the following dictum is based: All men desire to know.[12] In this regard admiration is to be viewed as the psychological manifestation of the human intellect's ordination to truth, a reaction of the natural appetite of the intellect, the very nature of the intellect, seeking to attain its proper perfection. Moreover, admiration is an indication of the radical imperfection of the human mind, which "considered in itself is all things potentially, but is not reduced into act except through science of these things, because it is actually none of these things previous to the act of understanding them." [13] Analysis indicates that this note of imperfection is also inherent in the

[11] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 32, a. 8; see also I, q. 12, a. 1; I, q. 105. a. 7; II *Sent.* d. 18, q. 1, a. 3; *Cont. Gentes* III, c. 101.

[12] St. Thomas, *Comm. in Meta.*, I, L. 1.

[13] *Ibid.*

nature of admiration. A sign of this is the fact that men have signified events which surpass their powers of comprehension by the word "miracle," a derivative of admiration.[14]

Admiration is a distinctly human property, an act connatural to the human intellect according to its state in this life, and to it alone. For this reason St. Thomas used it as an argument against the heresy of Apollinaris, who taught that Christ lacked a rational soul. Because the argument of St. Thomas contains a summary of all the essential notes of admiration, it is quoted in full:

> Since, according to Apollinaris, the Word of God is the True God, admiration can not belong to Him; for we wonder at those things whose causes are unknown to us. Likewise admiration does not belong to the sensitive soul, since it does not pertain to the sensitive soul to be solicitous concerning the cognition of causes. But admiration was in Christ, as is evident from the Gospels. For it is said that "Jesus hearing the words of the centurion wondered" (*Matt.* VIII, 10). Consequently besides the divinity of the Word and the sensitive soul it is necessary to place in Christ some principle through which Christ could admire, namely the human mind.[15]

The reasons assigned in this argument for the exclusion of admiration from the Word and the sensitive soul of Christ have a wider extension than merely to Christ Himself. Thus, because of its imperfection arising from the fact that its source is ignorance, admiration is not attributed to God; because of its perfection, namely, that it is concerned with knowledge through causes, it is denied to the brutes. What of those, however, whose intellectual knowledge is in a state of perfection and yet in some way imperfect? The angels and blessed in heaven have perfect knowledge of those things which pertain essentially to beatitude; nevertheless they are ignorant of certain phases of the divine plan of governing the universe. Hence it seems that the angels and blessed are apt subjects for admiration. St. Thomas considered this difficulty when he treated the question of the existence of counsel in the blessed. Admiration demands

[14] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 105, a. 7; II-II, q. 180, a. 3; III, q. 15, a. 8.
[15] *Contra Gentes*, IV, c. 33.

that the intellect be ignorant of some truth, that is, that it be in act but imperfectly so,[16] whereas " there is simple nescience (i. e. lack of act) in the mind of the blessed as regards the things they do not know. From this nescience the mind of the angel is cleansed . . . nor does there precede in them any research of doubt, for they simply turn to God." [17] It is clear, then, that admiration is man's natural inheritance rooted in the imperfection of the human intellect and springing from ignorance as from an accidental cause. Any perfection it has is tendential, accruing to it by reason of its ordination to knowledge through causes.

St. Thomas was not content to indicate the presence of admiration in Christ; he pressed the question to its roots seeking the cause. Why did Christ permit Himself to wonder at the words of the centurion? One may ask another question. If admiration is a human property, and so far the analysis indicates that it is, why be concerned with discovering a cause when it is already present in the human nature of Christ? The reason for asking the question is the fact that the state of Christ's knowledge presents an obvious difficulty to maintaining that He wondered. Christ's plentitude of science excluded ignorance, the source from which admiration flows. Attacking the problem from the point of view of the object of admiration St. Thomas answered:

> There could be nothing new and unaccustomed in regard to Christ's divine knowledge, whereby He saw things in the Word; nor as regards His human knowledge whereby He saw things through infused species. Yet things could be new and unwonted with regard to His experimental knowledge, in regard to which new things could occur to Him daily. Hence . . . if we speak of Christ's experimental knowledge wonder could be in Him. And He assumed this affection for our instruction—that is, in order to teach us to wonder at the fact that He Himself wondered." [18]

[16] Constat autem quod dubitatio et admiratio ex ignorantia provenit. Cum enim aliquos manifestos effectus videamus quorum causa nos latet, eorum tunc causam admiramur. *Comm. in Meta.* I, L. 2. Ille qui quaerit scientiam non omnino ignorat; sed secundum aliquid eam praecognoscit, vel in universali, vel in aliquo eius effectu, vel per hoc quod audit eam laudari . . . *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 27, a. 2.

[17] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 76, a. 2. [18] *Ibid.*, III, q. 15, a. 8.

Confirmation of St. Thomas' conclusion is found in the words of Saint Augustine: "Our Lord wondered in order to show us that we, who still need to be so affected, must wonder. Hence all these acts are not signs of a disturbed mind, but of a master teaching." [19]

This response raises a difficulty. Ignorance, the source of admiration, is expelled from the reason only through certain knowledge. Admiration, then, necessarily accompanies an act of intellect lacking the objective evidence of first principles or of scientific demonstrations. Consequently, since first principles are few and demonstrations are acquired with difficulty, admiration should be a normal experience for men, and Christ's efforts to teach us the necessity of wonder were unnecessary. No one needs urging to perform an act which cannot be avoided.

The answer to this objection requires the formulation of a distinction (implicit in the teaching of St. Thomas and a fact of experience) between admiration as an *act* of the intellect and admiration as a *state* of mind. The consideration thus far has been limited to an analysis of the act, a distinctive property of the human intellect's imperfect knowledge. The endurance of this act, however, depends upon the dispositions of the subject; and like every act of a faculty, once it has been stated in consciousness, its exercise may be impeded or curtailed by an act of will. In many cases admiration is stifled immediately upon its appearance on the surface of the soul and with its demise the natural impetus to intellectual development vanishes.

[19] St. Augustine, *Super Genesim Contra Manichaeos*, cap. 8 (PL 34, 180). The conclusion of Saint Thomas is confirmed also by St. Albert the Great: Dominus certa nos dubitare permisit in via, ut mentes nostras alliciat ad concupiscendam perfectam cognitionem in patria. Unde, Exod. XII, 10: *Nec remanebit quidquam ex eo usque mane: si quid residuum fuerit, igne comburetis.* Glossa Gregorii: "Quod ex igne remanet, igne comburimus: quia quod de mysterio incarnationis eius penetrare vel intelligere non possumus, potestati Sancti Spiritus reservamus: ut non superbe audeat vel contemnere vel denuntiare quae non intelligit, sed igni tradat. Id est Spiritui Sancto relinquat, videlicet, donec omnia in futuro quolibet in quo cognitus sit et cognoscat." Nec tamen interim nostra devotio sine exercitatione torpescat, secundum illum quod praecedit, ibidem V. 9. St. Albertus

St. Thomas has listed several reasons why the natural desire of the intellect for science is not fulfilled:

> Man naturally desires science. That some men do not zealously seek this knowledge does not impugn this fact, since frequently those who desire a definite end are prevented from pursuing that end due to some cause, either on account of the difficulty of attaining the goal or because of other occupations. Thus even though all men desire science, nevertheless all do not expend their efforts to attain it because they are impeded by other things; either by pleasures, or by the necessities of the present life, or finally because their laziness induces them to avoid the arduous task of learning step by step.[20]

Christ's teaching, then, may be interpreted as an exhortation to us to permit admiration to endure by purging ourselves of its impediments. The reasons for the exhortation will be evident when the precise role of wonder in intellectual development has been determined.

b. Cogitation

While admiration is born to die an early death in some forcing its way into the consideration of the mind for a fleeting moment only to be driven back into the deeper recesses of consciousness, in others it will endure as a state of mind impelling its subject to consider the mysterious elements which have provoked wonder. A forceful word was employed by the ancients to signify the intellectual act brought into being under admiration's urgings, *cogitatio*. The word has been preserved in modern English as cogitation, and present usage applies it to the act of thinking or reflecting and permits as a secondary signification the act of meditating. Strictly speaking the word is synonymous with none of these acts but is applied to them by derivation to signify an act integral to all of them.

Etymologically cogitation is derived from *cum-agitare*, to put many things in constant motion simultaneously, to hunt

Magnus, *Mariale sive Questiones super Evangelium*, Quest. XLIII, in *Opera Omnia*, Borgnet, Paris, 1898, vol. 37, p. 83.

[20] *Comm. in Meta.*, I, L. 1.

for several things at the same time. Applied to the acts of man its widest signification is inquisition and its primary use is to signify the act of the sensitive cogitative faculty.[21] Due to the unique position of this faculty at the summit of sensitive activity it participates somewhat in the lowest perfection of intellectual life, that is, in the discursive power of mind, and for this reason it has been denominated particular reason. On the other hand the inquisition of reason has been denominated from the highest operation of this faculty, cogitation.[22] As the word is used to designate intellectual operations, St. Thomas indicates that it has a twofold signification: commonly to signify any sort of consideration of the intellect; more properly to indicate that consideration of the intellect which is accompanied by inquisition, before the intellect attains to the certitude of vision. Thus cogitation properly denominates the motion of a deliberating mind, not yet perfected by the full vision of truth.[23]

The truth referred to in the definition is logical truth, the term of the intellect's act of composing and dividing by affirming or denying. Cogitation takes place when the intellect has been put into act either by its own proper object or by the will, but has not yet been totally determined to one part of a contradiction. Consequently a motion toward the opposite remains and the intellect fluctuates between the two extremes until sufficient rational evidence, if possible, has been acquired to elicit assent. Cogitation, accordingly, like admiration, is a

[21] Cogitatio importat quamdam inquisitionem; dicitur enim cogitare quasi co agitare, id est discurrere, et conferre unum cum altero. *De Veritate*, q. XIV, a. 1, 2nd obj. See also *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 2, a. 1, 1st obj. and resp.

[22] Potentia cogitativa est quod est altissimum in parte sensitiva, ubi attingit quodammodo ad partem intellectivam ut aliquid participet ejus quod est in intellectiva parte infirmum, scilicet discursum rationis. . . . Unde ipsa vis cogitativa vocatur particularis ratio . . . nec est nisi in homine, loco eius in aliis brutis est aestimatio naturalis. Et ideo ipsa etiam universalis ratio, quae est in parte intellectiva, propter similitudinem operationis, a cogitatione nominatur. *De Veritate*, q. XIV, a. 1, ad 9um.

[23] Cogitatio proprie dicitur motus animi deliberantis, nondum perfecti per plenam visionem veritatis. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 2, a. 1.

sign of the intellect's lack of determination, an inherent weakness which St. Thomas compares to the complete potency of prime matter.[24]

The presence or absence of cogitation and assent in those acts of intellect concerned with composition and division serves as a basis to distinguish one from the other. Thus, understanding of first principles and scientific knowledge of conclusions demand a total intellectual adherence to one part of a contradiction on the basis of evidence proportioned to the nature of the intellect, and consequently cogitation or discourse is impossible in these acts.[25] In the generation of understanding of the most general first principles cogitation is likewise impossible, for at the very enunciation of such principles the mind grasps the relation existing between subject and predicate and assents to their conjunction.[26] The evidence required for intellectual assent is discovered in the terms of the propositions themselves inasmuch as the mind recognizes that the predicate is contained within the definition of the subject. For this reason these principles are called immediate, to signify that there is no prior principle which may be employed as a medium demonstrating the inherence of the predicate in the subject.[27]

Among immediates, however, the terms of some propositions concerned with the most general notions of being, unity, etc. are known to all and assent follows upon their enunciation. These principles are called "Dignities" or "Axioms" and demand immediate assent without cogitation. The terms in other immediate propositions, "Suppositions" or "Hypotheses," are not known to all and consequently are not assented to when they are first affirmed.[28] With the exception of pro-

[24] *Comm. in Meta.*, I, L. 1; *De Veritate*, q. 14, a. 1; *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 50, a. 6.

[25] Actuum enim ad intellectum pertinentium quidam habent firmam assensionem absque tali cogitatione; sicut cum aliquis considerat ea quae scit vel intelligit. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 2, a. 1.

[26] *Ibid.* Cum cogitatio discursum rationis importet, intelligens assensum sine cogitatione habet; quia intellectus principiorum est, quae quisque statim probat audita. III *Sent.* d. 23, q. 2, a. 2.

[27] *Posterior Analytics* I, L. 4.

[28] *Ibid.*

positions which are immediate in one science but have a medium in a superior science, hypotheses, because they are immediate, cannot be demonstrated. Assent follows upon declaration of the definition of terms, a process which may involve rational discourse. Such discourse, however, does not constitute cogitation strictly taken, which by its nature is ordained to the attainment of logical truth, the term of judgment, and not to the discovery of definition, the term of the understanding of simple or incomplex essences.[29] The cogitation which occurs in this case does not terminate; rather, it is terminated when the intellect grasps the fact that the predicate falls within the subject's defining formula. Further, it is the natural light of the intellect itself which is the cause of its assent; any cogitation which may occur serves only as a disposition, a condition, not a cause, permitting the intellect to exercise its own causality by removing impediments.[30]

In the generation of science, however, cogitation has an important role to play in causing assent to the conclusion of a demonstrative syllogism. The exercise of its causality is found in the resolution of conclusions to prior and ultimately to immediate principles, thus establishing as certain a rational medium truly representative of real causes existing in the thing on the basis of which the intellect assents to a proposition affirming the existence of an attribute in its subject.[31]

[29] Cogitation may be involved in the attainment of a definition. This will occur when the process of defining involves a definition through one cause serving as a medium of demonstration manifesting a definition through another cause. See *Post. Anal.*, II, ll. 8 and 9. For the use of this mode of defining, see *De Anima*, I, 2.

[30] The relation of cogitation to the intellect's understanding of definitions has an important analogue in the relation of cogitation in theology to the formulation of real definitions from scriptural descriptions and nominal definitions, a point to be considered later.

[31] Sciens habet et cogitationem et assensum; sed cogitationem causantem assensum, et assensum terminantem cogitationem. Ex ipsa enim collatione (cogitatione) principiorum ad conclusiones assentit conclusionibus resolvendo eas in principia, et ibi figitur motus cogitantis et quietatur. In scientia enim motus rationis incipit ab intellectu principiorum, et ad eumdem terminatur per viam resolutionis; et sic non habet assensum et cogitationem ex aequo; sed cogitatio inducit ad assensum, et assensus quietat. *De Veritate*, q. 14, a. 1, c.; cf. III *Sent.* d. 23, q. 2, a. 2.

Faith occupies a unique role among the acts of intellect involving a judgment, for cogitation exists both previous to and simultaneously with a firm assent to revealed truths. Unlike science, the assent of faith is not caused through cogitation but by the will determining the intellect to adhere to a truth which is neither evident to the mind nor capable of resolution to immediate principles by the human reason. Thus the cogitation preceding faith does not touch the substance of faith but is limited to inclining a man to believe.[32] Because the revealed truth exceeds the limits of the proper object of the intellect, the essence of a corporeal thing, the intellect cannot assent of itself. In so far, however, as the truth falls within the adequate object, being, the intellect illumined by divine faith and under the imperium of the will gives its assent. Since the vision of evident truth by which the intellect connaturally is determined is lacking, " its motion is not yet quieted, but it still has cogitation and inquisition concerning the things believed, even though it most firmly assents to them. The reason for this is the fact that the intellect is not satisfied nor determined to one of itself, but rather it is terminated by an extrinsic force." [33] Thus, in understanding and science assent terminates cogitation; in the act of faith, however, a motion to the contrary may exist simultaneously with a most firm assent.

[32] Fides dicitur non inquisitus assensus, inquantum assensus fidei vel consensus non causatur ex inquisitione rationis; tamen non excluditur per hoc quin in intellectu credentis remaneat aliqua cogitatio vel collatio de his quae credit. *Ibid.*, ad 2um.

Fides habet aliquid perfectionis, et aliquid imperfectionis; perfectio quidem est ipsa firmitas, quae pertinet ad assensum; sed imperfectionis est carentia visionis, ex qua remanet adhuc motus cogitationis in mente credentis. Ex lumine igitur simplici, quod est fides, causatur id quod perfectionis est, scilicet assentire; sed inquantum illud non perfecte participatur, non totaliter tollitur imperfectio intellectus; et sic motus cogitationis in ipso remanet inquietus. *Ibid.*, ad 5um. Fides non habet inquisitionem rationis naturalis demonstrantis id quod creditur; habet tamen inquisitionem eorum per quae inducitur homo ad credendum . . . *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1um.

Fides consistit media inter duas cogitationes; quarum una voluntatem inclinat ad credendum, et haec praecedit fidem; illa vero tendit ad intellectum eorum quae iam credit; et haec est simul cum assensu fidei. III *Sent.*, d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2um.

[33] *De Veritate*, q. 14, a. 1, c.; cf. III *Sent.*, d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, c.

This analysis of admiration and cogitation, the integral parts of the doubt of admiration, though incomplete, is sufficient to establish the major presuppositions essential to the understanding of St. Thomas' doctrine on the constructive uses of doubt in the philosophical disciplines and in faith. Because philosophy and faith, in themselves essentially different, may be considered as one in so far as they have the common feature of bearing a similar relation to admiration and cogitation, it is possible to restate the full Thomistic teaching by emphasizing the role of doubt in philosophy and by indicating in a general way the application of St. Thomas' principles and conclusions to the act of faith. However, since the relation is only similar and not identical, it will be necessary from time to time to concentrate on the differences and not on the similarities to insure that a proper applicaton has been made.

2. *Nature of the Doubt of Admiration*

As has been indicated, admiration, considered as a simple act of an intellect not yet determined to one part of a contradiction, is elicited by cognition of an effect of which the cause is hidden. Admiration in turn calls forth cogitation, a motion of reason deliberating on the evidence available in order to discover sufficient reasons for the intellect to assent. A reciprocal action occurs whenever cogitation uncovers some partial evidence which the intellect has not previously considered. This discovery results in further stimulation of admiration, the action of which is completely dependent upon the intellectual content at any given moment. If reason's investigations are sufficiently fruitful, wonder becomes a continued state of mind, a thirst for certain knowledge constantly urging on the discourse of mind. It is in this last stage of the exercise of mutual causality that the natural doubt of admiration formally exists. Thus, indetermination of the intellect and a sustained motion of rational inquiry ordained to the discovery of certain objective evidence constitute the essential nature of the doubt of admiration.

B. Particular Considerations

1. *The Doubt of Admiration in the Philosophical Disciplines*

a. Starting point of philosophy

This doubt of admiration has the remarkable property of being the point of departure in every new scientific inquiry. Consequently, it is an indispensable condition to the genesis and progress of intellectual growth and to the development of organized bodies of scientific knowledge. St. Thomas and Aristotle view it as the psychological source from which philosophy and science have taken their origin.

> It is due to their wonder that men at the very beginning began and at the present time begin to philosophize. There is a difference, however, in the methodology of the ancient philosophers and those of the present day. In the beginning they wondered at a few obvious difficulties which were immediately at hand in order that they might come to a knowledge of their causes; afterwards they advanced little by little from knowledge of the obvious to a search for the hidden causes. Then they began to doubt about more mysterious things, for example the phenomena of the moon, its eclipse, and phases. . . . Likewise they doubted about the eclipse of the sun, its motion, and its size. Concerning the stars they doubted about their number and quantity; and finally they doubted about the generation of the universe. Some have attempted to explain this fact as having happened by chance; others attribute it to the intellect and some even to love. But it is clear that the process of doubting and admiring spring from ignorance, for when we see obvious effects, the causes of which are unknown to us, then we wonder about their causes. . . . Because admiration springs from ignorance, it is clear that the ancients were moved to philosophize in order to escape their ignorance. And hence it is that they zealously pursued science in order to know and not for the sake of any utility.[34]

b. Ordained to science

This text is part of a historical proof that knowledge through first causes is sought for itself rather than for any practical advantages. Our concern at the present moment is centered

[34] *Comm. in Meta.*, I, L. 2. In Saint Thomas' text and in the text upon which he commented the word "difficulties" is "dubitabilia."

upon the latter part of the text which contains a summary of St. Thomas' teaching on the principle and goal of the doubt of admiration. The source from which it flows is conscious ignorance, that is, a lack of complete or perfect knowledge; the term to which it is ordained is science, or knowledge through causes. Just as no natural motion reflects upon its principle nor denies its term, so too the doubt of admiration does not fall upon the already acquired partial truth nor upon the possibility of the attainment of science. The mind's capacity to know and to acquire scientific knowledge is presupposed to the exercise of admiration. The precise function of this doubt is to focus the attention of the mind upon the search for the existence of a hidden cause and for an as yet unknown demonstrative medium linking an apparent effect with its proper cause. In this regard it serves as an impelling force influencing the reason to consider the difficulties surrounding a problem by stating them as questions to be answered, to check and to analyze all possible solutions, and finally to decide on the proper medium when sufficient evidence has been acquired. When this has been done and when the mind has checked its conclusions by reducing them to immediate principles, the doubt of admiration ceases. Its revival demands a restatement of the problem which will include additional new or unaccustomed elements. For example, a problem that has been solved in terms of second causes may be considered again in order to determine the action of principal causes, an addition which is sufficient to set into play once more admiration and cogitation.

Following Aristotle, St. Thomas has reduced the questions proposed by the doubt of admiration to four, corresponding to the kinds of things we know.

> The reason for this is that science is knowledge acquired through demonstration. But demonstrative knowledge is acquired of those things which were previously unknown, and concerning which we state questions, because we are ignorant. Hence, it follows that those things which are questioned are equal in number to the things of which scientific knowledge is possible. But there are four things to be questioned, namely, whether a fact is true, why it is true,

whether a thing is, and what it is; to these four can be reduced whatever is questionable or subject to scientific knowledge.[35]

Continuing, St. Thomas points out that, since science is concerned solely with logical truth which is signified in an enunciation, consequently only enunciations are questionable. " Enunciations, however, are formed in a twofold manner; from a noun and verb without an attribute, for example, man is; in another way when an attribute is added, as when it is said, man is white." [36] Thus when the doubt of admiration falls upon a complex proposition, " whether the sun suffers eclipse or not, then we are inquiring about the fact of a connection. That our questioning ceases with the discovery that the sun does suffer eclipse is an indication of this; and if we know from the start that the sun suffers eclipse, we do not inquire (question) whether it does so or not. On the other hand, when we know the fact, we ask the reason for the fact." [37] Questions concerned with simple propositions seek to ascertain the existence of a thing, and following this " we inquire into its nature." [38]

Following this consideration is the reduction of each of the four questions to a search for the knowledge of the existence and nature of a possible medium of demonstration. " We conclude that in all our inquiries we are asking whether there is a ' middle ' or what the ' middle ' is; for the ' middle ' here is precisely the cause, and it is the cause that we seek in all our inquiries." [38a]

These texts of Aristotle and St. Thomas indicate the following properties of the doubt of admiration:

1. Its principle is ignorance.
2. Its term is scientific knowledge, hence it exists only in the second and third acts of the mind.
3. It ceases when science is acquired.

[35] *Comm. in Post. Anal.*, II, L. 1.
[36] *Ibid.*
[37] Aristotle, *Post. Anal.*, II, ch. 1, 89b 27-30.
[38] *Ibid.*, ch. 1, 89b 34. [38a] *Ibid.*, ch. 2, 90a 5-7.

4. It is not concerned with previously acquired knowledge; nor does it question reason's ability to know truth.
5. Its precise role is to focus the mind's attention upon the search for a demonstrative medium.

c. Doubt of admiration a natural motion

The latter part of the text containing St. Thomas' argument that knowledge of causes is sought for itself and not for the sake of utility includes another attribute of the doubt of admiration which must be considered. " Because admiration springs from ignorance, it is clear that the ancients were moved to philosophize in order to escape ignorance. And hence it is that they zealously pursued science in order to know and not for the sake of any utility." [39] In the generation of science the successive order of ignorance, admiration, cogitation, natural doubt, and finally knowledge through causes constitutes a natural motion from the imperfect to the perfect. An admiration which was not ordained to the " contrary and better state of science " [40] was an impossibility for Aristotle and St. Thomas. Thus, since the imperfect exists for the perfect and motion for its term, an admiration which terminated not in truth but in further admiration was unnatural:

> As happens in natural generation and motions, every motion is terminated in the contrary of that from which the motion begins. Hence, since inquisition is a certain motion to science it is necessary that it terminate in its contrary. . . . But since the inquisition of science begins with admiration, it is necessary that it end at its contrary which is of greater dignity, and according to a common proverb, a better state. That the contrary is more worthy is apparent in the fact that when men learn causes they cease to wonder.[41]

Contrast this view with a theory of liberal education gaining vogue today which places the emphasis not on truth itself but on the search for truth. It proposes to make free men out of students by means of instruction at the hands of the authors of

[39] *Comm. in Meta.*, I, L. 2. [40] *Ibid.* [41] *Ibid.*

" some hundred of the greatest books of European and American thought " [42] presenting every conceivable phase of philosophical, scientific, religious, and moral theory. A motto has been adopted, " No way is impassable to courage," to inspire the students to apply themselves diligently to the study of books which raise " the persistent and humanly unanswerable questions about the great themes in human experience." [43] A motto better adapted to the end of such education was phrased by Saint Paul: *Ever learning, and never attaining to the substance of the truth.* (2 Tim.: 3, 7), for the freedom this theory establishes as its end is an absolute indetermination of judgment. The product of this training is envisioned as performing in a democratic republic the highest functions. " These functions consist in the intelligent *free choice of the ends* and means of both our common and individual life." [44]

During the course of his instruction the young liberal artist is expected to construct " several distinct, complete, and independent meanings " of the great books, " each allowing the other to stand by its side and each supporting and complementing the other." [45] If a book does not permit such mangling, it cannot be a great book, for masterpieces must have many possible interpretations. The reason for this is that the books themselves are not didactic, rather they present the author's understanding and exposition of the truth only as he sees it.

This theory is by no means modern. Cicero stated its basic assumption as one of the tenets of the later Academicians: " The mere investigation of the things that are the most hidden and most important has its delight. If we meet with anything resembling truth, the mind is filled with a pleasure that wholly befits a man." [46] The best defense and refutation of this position was written by St. Augustine. In his *Contra Academicos* Licentius equates beatitude or living happily with living in search of the truth [47] and defends the position as follows:

[42] *Catalogue of St. John's College*, Annapolis, Md., 1939-1940, p. 24.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 25. [44] *Ibid.*, p. 21, italics mine. [45] *Ibid.*, p. 25.
[46] Cicero, *Academica*, Bk. II, ch. CLXI, No. 127.
[47] St. Augustine, *Contra Academicos*, Bk. I, ch. 2.

Man's happiness consists in seeking constantly for the truth; and when he does this, he is truly attaining his ultimate end. Consequently, one who does not seek truth as diligently as he should does not attain his end. On the other hand, whoever strives to the best of his ability, as every man should do, to discover truth, is happy even though he fails to find truth; for in doing this he fulfills all the demands which human nature imposes upon him. The fact that he does not discover truth is to be attributed to a defect in the gifts nature has bestowed upon him. Finally, would it not be sheer folly to call a man miserable, who day and night incessantly seeks truth as diligently as he can?

The review of this position indicates that the doubt of admiration, a means given by nature to insure intellectual development, has been elevated to the state rightfully belonging to doubt's end, truth. Truth itself has been forced to serve its instrument, for only the delights of truth attained and the hope of successful attainment in the future sustain man in his search. In fact, it is impossible to begin the search without possessing truth in some partial and imperfect way; thus alone is admiration provoked, an indispensable condition to the genesis of scientific knowledge.

There is a truth contained in the equating of living happily with the search for truth. In itself admiration offers two pleasures, the common pleasure which follows upon the good exercise of a faculty and a special delight found only in the search for knowledge. Considered formally as a desire for truth, " wonder is a cause of pleasure, in so far as it contains the hope of getting the knowledge one desires." [48] Moreover " wonder gives pleasure not because it implies ignorance but in so far as it includes the desire of learning the cause, and in so far as the wonderer learns something new." [49] As is evident, this pleasure pertains to admiration only by reason of its end. Consequently, to take away from man all hopes of acquiring truth by educating him to be a sceptic is to commit him to an inhuman quest for the impossible and to deprive him of the greatest pleasure of all, contemplation of the Truth.

[48] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 32, a. 7. [49] *Ibid.*, ad 1um.

2. The Doubt of Admiration in Faith

By depriving the doubt of admiration of its natural term this theory endows the search for an unattainable goal with a certain infinitude; an attribute which pertains only to the doubt of admiration peculiar to the act of faith. The element invoking admiration in faith is found in the very nature of faith, the non-evidence of the object believed, an element incorporated in Saint Paul's descriptive definition: Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things which appear not; [50]; and presupposed in Saint Augustine's formula: To believe is to cogitate with assent.[51]

In the presence of the mysteries of faith reason wonders and cogitates. It may even come to a deeper understanding of certain aspects of the mystery, but it will never penetrate to the hidden causes necessary for the full and perfect satisfaction of the mind's desire.[52] The darkness of faith cannot be dispelled by the light of human reason. Consequently, the indetermination of intellect which initiated the search for a better understanding still remains at the end of the search, demanding once more an act of faith. To this quest the text may be applied: " They who eat me hunger still and they who drink me still thirst." [53]

In order to pass from the general consideration of the doubt of admiration in faith to the determination of its particular role, it will be necessary to review the fundaments of St. Thomas' teaching on the object and the subject of faith. St. Thomas maintains that the object of faith considered from the aspect of the thing believed is something simple, for here the reality

[50] *Hebrews*, XI, 1.

[51] For an analysis of Saint Augustine's definition see Saint Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 2, a. 1. See also III *Sent.*, d. 23, q. 2, a. 2.

[52] Ac ratio quidem, fide illustrata, cum sedulo, pie, et sobrie quaerit, aliquam Deo dante mysteriorum intelligentiam eamque fructuosissimam assequitur tum ex eorum, quae naturaliter cognoscit, analogia, tum e mysterium ipsorum nexu inter se et cum fine hominis ultimo; nunquam tamen idonea redditur ad ea perspicienda instar veritatum, quae proprium ipsius objectum constituunt. . . . (Denziger, 1796).

[53] *Ecclesiasticus*, XXIV, 20.

involved is First Truth. On the other hand, he insists, and in this he departed from the opinion of his contemporaries, that on the part of the subject believing the object is something complex expressed in the manner of a proposition. Thus, faith exists in the individual according to the mode of cognition connatural to the human intellect. The foundation of this conclusion is stated by St. Thomas:

> The thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Now the mode proper to the human intellect is to know the truth by synthesis and analysis. . . . Hence things that are simple in themselves, are known by the intellect with a certain amount of complexity, just as on the other hand, the Divine Intellect knows, without any complexity, things that are complex in themselves. [Applied to faith] on the part of the believer, . . . the object of faith is something complex by way of a proposition.[54]

Although the object of faith exists in the subject as a mental proposition, our faith does not terminate in this sign or symbol but in the thing itself, " for as in science we do not form propositions except in order to have knowledge about things through their means, so it is in faith." [55] An indication of this is the fact that in our recitation of the Apostle's Creed we do not profess, " I believe that God is the Father," but rather, " I believe in God, etc." It is in faith's piercing through the formulae of revelation to the reality signified that the first, imperfect union of the human intellect to First Truth is accomplished. This union is capable of perfection in proportion to the subject's penetration of the meaning of the symbols, a process in which the doubt of admiration plays its most important role.

When St. Thomas maintains that the object of faith is simple he is speaking of the determining or specifying object, in the light of which all other revealed truths are known.[56]

[54] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 1, a. 2, c.

[55] *Ibid.*, ad 2um.

[56] Every cognitive habit and faculty has a twofold object: material, the things that are known, e. g., conclusions of a science; and formal, the light by which the material object is attained. Thus it is through the medium of demonstration that scientific conclusions are known.

This light is called the formal object; the truths attained by means of it, the material object.

Accordingly, if we consider in faith the formal aspect of the object, it is nothing else than the First Truth. For the faith of which we are speaking does not assent to anything unless it is revealed by God. Hence the medium on which faith is based is the Divine Truth. If, however, we consider materially the things to which faith assents, they include not only God, but also many other things, which nevertheless do not come under the assent of faith, except as bearing some relation to God.[57]

Thus First Truth bears to the truths materially believed a relation similar to that which exists in a demonstration between the middle term and the conclusions reached in virtue of the middle. There is a difference, however, between a probative medium and the formal motive of faith in regard to the manner in which each contains the derived truths. A demonstrative medium contains the conclusion virtually; First Truth in faith contains all others implicitly.[58] Thus, when one assents to the formal motive of faith, faith is professed explicitly in God revealing and in everything He has revealed in general. Consequently all particular revealed truths are assented to in this act of faith actually, but implicitly only.

St. Thomas insists that men are bound to have explicit faith in certain of the truths listed under the material object of faith but having an essential connection with the formal object in so far as through them men are directly ordained to eternal life.[59] This obligation differs from person to person according to the role each plays in the economy of salvation; thus "men of higher degree, whose business it is to teach others, are under

[57] *Ibid.*

[58] A thing is said to exist virtually when it is contained in something else of a higher rank, but not according to its proper formality or determination, so that it is really present according to the *virtue* or degree of perfection of its being, but not formally so. A thing contained implicitly in another is actually or formally present but in a confused way.

[59] For the distinction between truths which pertain to faith *per se* and others which pertain "solum in ordine ad alia" see *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 1, a. 6, ad 1um. For the obligation of explicit belief, see *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 2, aa. 5-8.

obligation to have fuller knowledge of matters of faith and to believe them more explicitly." [60] Again it differs from time to time according to the successive revelations by God making explicit what had been previously implicitly believed, and according to the definitions made by the Church since the death of Saint John.[61] This unfolding or uncovering of truths contained in the first revelations does not constitute a substantial increase of the original deposit, but rather an accidental one in so far as only the number of truths explicitly believed has been increased.[62] The Roman Pontiffs in exercising their right and duty to protect and order the deposit of faith [63] have defined propositions denied by heretics, indicating the exact sense in which these truths must be believed and frequently making explicit what previous ages had believed implicitly. To them belongs the duty of " repeating again and again an old, loved tale, savoring it, caressing it, allowing its perfume to permeate the remotest corners of our souls." [64]

The Church's pronouncements as well as the scriptural and traditional sources from which she draws her dogmas are expressed as propositions and they are apprehended and retained by the faithful according to the material complexity of subject, verb, and predicate. These symbols of the faith do not reveal the full reality of the intimate life of God; rather they may be likened to heavy veils which hide the splendor and clarity of God's beauty, but reveal enough of the ordered and proportioned contours to assure us that His beauty is ineffable. Faith is and must be obscure, for faith gives us truths which the human mind unaided can never comprehend. It is in the darkness of faith that St. Thomas places the formal reason of faith on the part of the one believing.

The formal aspect of the object of faith can be taken in two

[60] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 2, a. 6.
[61] *Ibid.*, q. 1, a. 7, a. 10; q. 2, a. 7.
[62] *Ibid.*, q. 1, a. 7.
[63] *Ibid.*, q. 1, a. 10.
[64] Walter Farrell, O.P., *A Companion to the Summa*, Sheed & Ward, New York, 1940, Vol. III, p. 9.

ways: first, on the part of the thing believed, and thus there is one formal aspect of all matters of faith, viz. First Truth. . . . Secondly, the formal aspect of matters of faith can be considered from our point of view; and thus the formal aspect of a matter of faith is that it is something unseen.[65]

In the presence of the unknown, admiration and cogitation, the integral parts of the doubt of admiration, arise impelling the mind to seek a better understanding of the object. The first principle, then, in the determination of the role of the doubt of admiration in faith is the fact that cogitation is not something extrinsic to the faith; it is intimately conjoined as a necessary condition of the diffusion, explication, and permanence of faith in man.

3. *The Doubt of Admiration in Meditation*

When the intellect considers the truth of faith under the aspect of good, or when it is recognized that rational investigation of the intimate life of God is itself a good, the driving and impelling force of a will informed by charity fixes the intellect's attention on the search for a deeper penetration of the revealed mystery.[66] In this way admiration and cogitation assume that permanence demanded by the doubt of admiration for the exercise of its causality. Faith in a cogitating intellect, charity in an imperating will—thus all the elements necessary for meditation are present. During the search the principle imparting the force and vigor is charity in the will, whose impulse is to the reality as it exists in itself. Nevertheless, the intellect proceeds according to its proper mode, considering its object, attempting to discern its hidden nature, seeking analogies in the created order, etc. Beginning in faith and sustained by charity, the act of meditation is ordained to contemplation, the grasping of God in a single act of intellect. Thus, just as in the philosophical disciplines the doubt of

[65] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 1, a. 6, ad 2um.

[66] *Ibid.*, q. 180, a. 1. For a detailed account of the interaction of will and intellect in meditation see, "Meditation and the Search for God," James M. Egan O.P., *The Thomist*, Vol. III, No. 3, pp. 450-466.

admiration terminates in a better state, so too in faith it leads to the most perfect form of human knowledge, an act of simple apprehension in which God is contemplated as the Good, and the motion of the mind ceases as charity embraces its object. The reason for this is the fact that

> although contemplation is essentially an act of the intellect, nevertheless it has its principle in the appetite, since it is through charity that one is urged to the contemplation of God. And since the end corresponds to the beginning, it follows that the term also and the end of the contemplative life has its being in the appetite, since one delights in seeing the object loved, and the very delight in the object seen arouses a yet greater love.[67]

Nevertheless, the object contemplated still remains beyond the comprehension of the intellect and the formal aspect of "something unseen" still endures. Consequently, lacking the termination of the act of the will, the cogitation of the mind is halted by an act of faith, a second termination in a superior, supernatural object. Admiration and cogitation in faith, precisely as they are natural intellectual motions and ordained to science, have no natural term. A brief consideration of theology's role in faith will make this point evident.

4. *The Doubt of Admiration in Theology*

When the cogitation in faith proceeds according to a scientific method aimed at explaining, defending, drawing out, or demonstrating the non-repugnance of the mysteries of faith, it is called theology. Like every other science theology must have certain principles in the light of which it judges its conclusions. Theology's principles are assumed from the superior science of God and the blessed in so far as through revelation these principles have been made known to the faithful. Hence, the light under which the theologian judges is derived from principles which, although evident in themselves, are non-evident to him.

Proceeding scientifically the theologian will accept the fact of

[67] *Summa Theol.*, II-II q. 180, a. 7, ad 1um.

the existence of his subject and the fact that certain attributes inhere in that subject, truths known only through faith. The questions provoked by the doubt of admiration will not fall upon these facts in the science of theology, for these are the truths presupposed to, and invoking, admiration which looks ahead to the perfection of knowledge already acquired. In the process of penetrating the meaning of these mysteries, the mysteries themselves are the light in terms of which the theologian will judge his progress and interpret his findings. Just as admiration in the philosophical disciplines does not reflect upon its source, the power of the human mind to know, so too in faith the doubt of admiration does not question its light. Such consideration pertains to the apologist, who judges of the credibility of these mysteries under the light of natural reason. Were the theologian to attempt to perform this task, he would have to assume what is to be proved, judge what was questioned by what was questioned.

The theologian's questions are limited to a consideration of the nature of the subject in propositions affirming simple existence, and in complex enunciations to the search for the proper cause or medium whereby a property exists in a subject. Employing the rules of definition (as stated in the *Posterior Analytics II*, lessons 7 and 8, and in *Metaphysics VIII*, lesson 4) he will seek, where possible, a demonstration manifesting the essence of his subject, or he will proceed from a nominal or descriptive definition as given in the theological sources to a real definition through a progressively descending division of superior genera and an ascending induction of specific differences known to him through a comparison of similar and dissimilar things. Likewise, the search for the proper cause will be regulated according to the requirements of a probative medium, namely, that it be universal, essential, and primary.[68]

In both cases the doubt of admiration will lead to a superior state of knowledge; the theologian will come to a fuller under-

[68] Aristotle, *Post. Anal.* I, ch. 4, for statement, and following chapters for explanation.

standing of the nature of the subject and he will discover a truly scientific medium. But when the mind reflects upon its knowledge it will be reminded that the transition from a nominal definition to a real definition presupposes the existence of its object, a fact known only through faith. Failure to return to the initial supposition reduces the whole elaborate process of definition to mere mechanical mental exercise, for there can be no science of non-being. Again, when an attempt is made to resolve a conclusion back to its principles in order to test the validity of the demonstrative medium, reason will also be reminded that it cannot do so without returning once more to faith from which it has assumed its principles. First Truth alone justifies and judges his conclusions.

Even though the doubt of admiration in faith has no natural term, still no exigency or spiritual crisis is occasioned by this lack. Throughout the search reason is sustained by the hope of ultimate vision when the darkness of the unseen will give way to the brilliance of full clarity, for faith is the substance of things to be hoped for.

II. METHODICAL DOUBT

A. General Considerations

1. *Necessity*

An abstract consideration of the nature of the doubt of admiration made possible the charting of the direct course of natural doubt from its inception in ignorance to its perfection in a higher and more worthy state. It is clear from experience, however, that doubt does not always run its natural course. Frequently its initial beckonings elicit an energetic response from the student who hastens to examine the details of the new problem. With more or less ease and precision he states the question. The terms are clear; the matter is tractable; an answer is possible. All the circumstances are favorable to an advancement in scientific knowledge. But unfortunately nothing of lasting value comes from this feverish dissipation of

energy. Like a forest fire that has spent its fury, the flames of admiration burn intensely for a fleeting moment and then slowly die out, leaving behind them the charred embers of an unsolved problem. The student has slammed the doors of his mind to the question and has plugged up his ears against the Sibylline coaxings of the doubt of admiration.

Natural doubt is constantly subjected to a deadly barrage from both the subject and the objects of knowledge. On the subjective side, laziness, desire for pleasure, and solicitude for the necessities of life have already been listed as the principal causes blasting admiration from the minds of men. The first two may be counteracted by discipline; the third demands a remedy somewhat more difficult to apply—the necessities of life must be provided.

There is another subjective obstacle which discipline of itself can partly neutralize but never totally remove, and which no amount of prosperity, however great it may be, will overcome. Basically, it consists in a struggle between the human and superhuman elements in us in which the doubt of admiration is allied to the superhuman.[69] Admiration is the well-beaten path that leads to science and wisdom, the towering peaks of the contemplative life. Contemplation, of course, is the operation of man's most noble faculty, the speculative intellect. Despite its nobility, however, this faculty is the weakest in man who possesses it not according to its full perfection but in a most imperfect way. Consequently, its exercise in the search for science and wisdom

> might be justly regarded as beyond human power, for in many ways human nature is in bondage, so that according to Simonides "God alone can have this privilege," and it is unfitting that man should not be content to seek the knowledge that is suited to him.[70]

Speculation is more superhuman than human; and consequently

[69] For the details of the struggle consult Chas. De Koninck, *Le Principe De L'Ordre Nouveau* in *De La Primauté Du Bien Commun*. Editions de L'Université Laval, Quebec, 1943, pp. 83 ff.

[70] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, I, c. 2, 982 b 28-983 a 10.

metaphysics, the way to wisdom, has been called divine by Aristotle and St. Thomas.

It is to the active life, the life of virtue and art, that man is inclined by natural forces more impelling and more powerful than the doubt of admiration, nature's goad to the contemplative life. In a remarkable passage St. Thomas has succinctly stated the elements of the conflict, and has accurately appraised the respective powers of the active and contemplative life to rule the destinies of men.

> The human life is that which is proportioned to man. In him is to be found first of all sensitive nature, which he shares with the brutes; practical reason, which is proper to him according to his state; and speculative intellect, which is not found perfectly in man as it is in the angels, but according to a certain participation of his soul. Therefore the contemplative life is not properly human, but superhuman. Likewise the life of pleasure which is concerned with sensible goods is not human but bestial. Consequently, the life properly human is the active life, which consists in the exercise of the moral virtues.[71]

In the face of this powerful opposition coming from the very nature of the knowing subject, the doubt of admiration frequently withers away and dies. Again, on the part of the object even more powerful opposition is encountered. Not even Aristotle's quick-witted man may expect to spot the proper cause with a breath-taking analysis of a situation in every scientific investigation.[72] Matter, motion, and time, to mention a few perplexing topics, will cause not a few headaches and perhaps even heartaches before they are mastered. And even though the least bit of knowledge of superior things is more lovable and desirable than all the science we may acquire of inferior things, still the prerequisite that we know them in some way before we can love them is not easily met.[73] To build a stronger case, real genius, not to mention sanctity, is demanded of one who aspires to be distinguished from his fellow

[71] *Quaes. Disp. De Virtut. Cardin.*, a. 1, corp.

[72] Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, I, c. 34.

[73] Aristotle, *Parts of Animals*, I, c. 5, 645 a; St. Thomas, *Contra Gen.* I, V.

men as a wise man, for whom the principle of his science is the most perfect Being, the principal subject is the most perfect Being, and the principle of his knowledge is the most imperfect of concepts. Finally, the truths of faith offer the greatest barrier of all. " Eye hath not seen nor ear heard " is applicable in all its rigor to this divine knowledge that God has granted to man. Human wisdom at its greatest does not even approach it; for, after all, faith is God's knowledge of Himself.

Little wonder, then, that Aristotle seems to have taken a special delight in making his readers and students aware of the difficulties encountered in the discovery of truth. At every new turn in his scientific inquiries he insists that they line up behind him and peer over his shoulder, while he busies himself with the task of disengaging the various problems to be analyzed. There is no mistaking the fact that there are difficulties to be encountered when he is the teacher, for he never lets anyone forget for a single moment that:

> The investigation of the truth is in one way hard, in another easy. An indication of this is found in the fact that no one is able to attain the truth adequately, while, on the other hand, we do not collectively fail, but everyone says something true about the nature of things, and while individually we contribute little or nothing to the truth, by the union of all a considerable amount is amassed. Therefore, since the truth seems to be like the proverbial door, which no one can fail to hit, in this respect it must be easy, but the fact that we can have a whole truth and not the particular truth we aim at shows the difficulty of it.[74]

The paragraph that follows has about it a definite air of " rubbing it in." When one is willing to concede that the investigation of truth has tremendous difficulties, subjective as well as objective, he has an opportunity to preserve a wee bit of his dignity by throwing the brunt of the difficulties back on the object. But Aristotle will not leave him even this small consolation:

> As difficulties are of two kinds, the cause of the difficulty in attaining truth is not in the facts but in us. For as the eyes of the bat

[74] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, II, c. 1, 993 b 1-6.

are to the blaze of the day, so is the reason in our soul to the things which are by nature most evident of all.[75]

Aristotle and St. Thomas, as was expected of them, joined the forces of the contemplative life, and among many services rendered by them to this feeble warrior not the least by any means was the discovery and development of reenforcements for the doubt of admiration. Had they failed to do so, future generations would be justified in suspecting that there was a bit of the blarney attached to the following:

If reason is divine in comparison with man, the life in accordance with it is divine in comparison with human life. But we must not follow those who advise us that, being men, we should think of human things, and being mortal of mortal things; but must, so far as we can, make ourselves immortal, and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us; for even if it be small in bulk, much more does it in power and worth surpass everything. . . . That which is proper to each thing is by nature best and most pleasant for each thing; for man, therefore, the life according to reason is best and most pleasant, since reason more than anything else is man. This life, therefore, is also the most happy.[76]

The reenforcement of the doubt of admiration was an artificial mode of inquiry molded according to the pattern of admiration. The purpose of this methodology is to reinstate the elements of natural doubt whenever necessary, and to sustain it during the intellectual search for truth by guiding rational discourse to its proper goal. Fundamentally this process is nothing more than a transformation of natural and spontaneous doubt into an artificial, voluntary doubt, one truly methodical, the doubt of discussion.[77]

2. *The Nature of Dubitatio Discussionis*

The essential notion of the nature of *dubitatio discussionis* may be reduced to two elements: (1) it induces and sustains

[75] *Ibid.*, 7-11.

[76] Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics* X, c. 7, 1177 b 30-1178 a 8.

[77] The terminology adopted was taken from St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.* III, q. 27 a. 4 ad 2um; III, q. 30 a. 4 ad 4um.

the natural doubt of admiration; (2) it is a work of art. Because it is an artefact the principle that art imitates nature completely and totally dominates the construction of this process of doubting. Inasmuch as artistic imitation is to be found in two orders of causality, namely, final and efficient, it is possible to consider this doubt in either order of causes separately from its consideration in the other order. This expedient of separate consideration has been adopted to facilitate the explanation of the essential nature of the doubt of discussion. The analysis of its final cause, namely, the inducing and sustaining of the doubt of admiration, will involve a statement of its formal elements; and the consideration of its construction will coincide with an analysis of its material factors, the means employed to attain the end. Finally, to complete the analysis of essential nature, certain properties, each of which indicates a special necessity for the good use of the doubt of discussion, will be enumerated.

a. Formal elements of the doubt of discussion

Because the doubt of discussion is a transformation or reinstatement of the natural doubt of admiration, the determination of the former's formal constituents offers little difficulty. Admiration and sustained cogitation are the elements common to both. The fact that the doubt of admiration is *generated spontaneously* upon the presentation of something strange and unaccustomed is sufficient to distinguish it from the *reflex, artistic* doubt of discussion, the generation of which is subject to voluntary control and depends upon the use of artificial devices calculated to set off intellectual wonder and cogitation. To some extent this difference has been indicated in the terminology employed to designate each kind of doubt. Thus the doubt of admiration has been called *natural*, to signify that it is a property flowing from the very nature of the human intellect. On the other hand, the doubt of discussion has been classified as *methodical*, to indicate that its genesis is to be attributed not to nature alone but to art imitating nature. The point to be stressed, however, is not so much the differences

between these two doubts as their similarities. The doubt of discussion imitates the doubt of admiration and is ordained to produce the latter's formal constituents, admiration and cogitation, two natural psychological operations of the human mind. Hence the psychological realities involved in both processes of doubt are specifically the same and all the properties which have been indicated as belonging to the doubt of admiration belong also to the doubt of discussion.

Unfortunately this fact has been subjected frequently to a great deal of obscurity because of the false identification of the term " methodical " with " fictitious " and the subsequent distinction of fictitious from " real." As a result methodical doubt has been liberated from the necessity of conforming to its exemplar, the doubt of admiration, which is admittedly real, and has been given free rein to plunge ahead in a search for a medium, as it should, or to back up and trample upon truths which can never be the proper objects of doubt.

This much at least should be clear; real doubt obviously is not fictitious doubt in the sense of pretended doubt, and both the natural doubt of admiration and the methodical doubt of discussion are real or sincere processes of doubt falling upon an as yet uncertain medium of demonstration in science or of order in wisdom. Consequently, the identification of methodical with fictitious or pretended doubt is impossible.

Nevertheless there is a sense in which fictitious may be applied to methodical doubt. Every methodical doubt has art for its principle and for this reason it is a fiction in the sense of being something made or fashioned. Moreover, some methodical doubts admit of a secondary and insignificant fictional character in so far as the doubt in question may involve an element of pretense. Such a doubt arises when one who has certitude of a truth acquired in one way abstracts from this certitude and institutes an investigation to establish the same truth through a different medium in order to acquire a greater certitude by adding another argument or by uncovering a scientific medium to prove a conclusion derived from another source. In this case the doubt's fictional element is purely negative, for even

though the truth may be considered as something yet to be demonstrated, still it is never really doubted; rather it serves throughout the investigation as a positive directive norm, the goal to be attained.

Strictly speaking, therefore, this element of fiction which reflects back upon the already acquired truth is purely accidental to methodical doubt, which must be aimed forward to an unknown medium. Moreover, fiction in the sense of pretense is limited to investigations in which the processes of doubt are induced by a subject who already knows his conclusion to be certain. It is not present in inquisitions concerned with conclusions known in a confused and imperfect way. The essential nature of the doubt of discussion is something positive, a real, sincere doubt governed by definite methodological rules based upon the nature of the human intellect, and falling not upon what is already known to be certain, but necessarily upon some unknown medium of demonstration or of order.

b. Material elements of the doubt of discussion

i. In general

The formal constituents of the doubt of discussion, admiration and sustained cogitation, guarantee its proper use. Its fruitful use, however, depends to a great extent upon the material elements, the means utilized to excite and to sustain its exemplar, the doubt of admiration. Hence the question involved here is properly one of methodology.

a. Opinions of others

Aristotle was a pioneer in the investigation of logical methods, an " inquiry in which it was not the case that part of the work had been thoroughly done before, while part had not; nothing existed at all." [78] Therefore it was necessary for him to point out that previous philosophers of nature had proceeded in a rather naive manner. In common with all latter-day phi-

[78] Aristotle, *On Sophistical Refutations*, c. 34, 183 b 15-184 b 8.

losophers the first ones " began to philosophize due to their wonder." Their admiration, however, was a gross and palpable process, for it was directed at the " obvious difficulties." These early investigators were travelling uncharted paths searching for truth with their natural intellectual equipment and basing their reasoning processes on facts of immediate experience. Since they were first, they could not draw upon the opinions of previous philosophers. Since they were born hundreds of years too early, they lacked the advantages of Aristotle's art of inquiry, such great advantages that Aristotle once took time out from his lectures to remind his students of their indebtedness to him. Because of his discoveries his contemporaries and successors in the investigation of truth no longer had to rest content with having their wonder excited by obvious difficulties. Now they could manufacture their own, thanks to the means he had given them " to raise searching difficulties on both sides of a subject," an accomplishment that would enable them " to detect more easily the truth and error about the several points that arise." [79] The method belongs to that part of logic which is called dialectics or topical reasoning.

β. Probable premises

The immediate purpose of this kind of reasoning, as Aristotle conceived it, was to enable one to argue from probable premises and to acquire the facility of avoiding self-contradiction when one is attacked in argument. For the most part probable

[79] Aristotle, *Topics*, I, c. 2, 101 a 35-36. The treatment of dialectics has been extended to include more than is necessary for the establishment of the material elements of *dubitatio discussionis*. Because Aristotelean dialectics is concerned primarily with probable reasonings it necessarily involves an element of doubt. Consequently completeness of treatment demands that some consideration be given to it. To avoid useless repetition, however, the expedient has been adopted of working the treatment of dialectics into the body of the article at those points where its work of preparing the mind for the generation of science is most obvious. The more fruitful use of dialectics (e. g., in metaphysics and theology as the backbone of the way of negation and excess—cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 2, a. 3, and q. 6, a. 2, and *Contra Gen.* I, c. 8—in the study of immaterial substances and as the method employed to attain true similitudes of the divine substance) is beyond the scope of this article.

premises were opinions that were generally accepted, i. e., by every one, or by the majority, or by the most notable and illustrious of the philosophers. Such a method, says Aristotle, is obviously useful for mental gymnastics because it enables one to argue more readily and easily about any subject proposed for discussion.

A second use for the method is to enable the arguer to meet his opponents on the common ground of their own opinions and convictions, a tête-a-tête made possible by the counting up of the opinions held by most people followed by a selection of weapons in the form of those probable premises which strike one's fancy. A third benefit of dialectical proficiency, which flows from its primary use, is an accurate description of Aristotle's own way of opening and carrying on a philosophical discussion. It is this use of the dialectical method in philosophical investigations rather than in casual encounters with debaters which must be considered before the material elements of the doubt of discussion may be determined.

The generally accepted opinions of others constitute the basic and most frequently used means of raising searching difficulties on both sides of a philosophical question; but they are not the only means of inducing processes of doubt offered by the art of dialectics. It is to the *elements* of dialectics that one must go to discover these other means.

First of all, it is necessary to distinguish the subject, the materials, and the elements of topical reasonings.[80] " The subjects on which reasonings take place are problems." [81] In the *Topics* a dialectical problem is defined as " a subject of inquiry that contributes either to choice and avoidance, or to truth and knowledge, and that either by itself, or as a help to the solution of some other such problem." [82] For the purpose of generating arguments (and this is the primary purpose of dialectics) the problem " must be something on which either the common people hold no opinion either way, or the masses hold an opinion contrary to that of the philosophers, or the philosophers to the

[80] Aristotle, *Topics*, I, c. 4. [81] *Ibid.*, 101 b 16. [82] *Ibid.*, I, c. 11, 104 b 1-3.

masses, or each of them among themselves." [83] When it is used for this purpose of producing a syllogistic argument in the mind of an opponent, dialectics shies away from those subjects which border too closely upon the sphere of demonstration, or are too far removed from it, "for the former cases admit of no doubt, while the latter involve difficulties too great for the art of the trainer." [84]

Such conditions, however, need not be verified when questions proper to the various sciences are examined dialectically. In this case the proposition, which the demonstrator states didactically by affirming or denying it, may be turned into a dialectical problem by phrasing it as a question.[85] Once stated, however, the indifference of the dialectician to either part of a contradiction, regardless of the truth or falsity of the side selected, comes into play.[86] This indifference to the truth or error of the proposition chosen demands that the subject of a dialectical argument be stated as a question and in this the dialectician differs from the demonstrator, who must assume true premises.[87] It is this indifference to truth or falsity which permits the dialectician to construct difficulties to be doubted on either side of a question in preparation for a scientific demonstration.

A difference between the demonstrator and the dialectician more fundamental than the diverse mode of stating the subject is to be found in the quality of the propositions used in the reasoning. The philosophical proposition must be true, that of the dialectician needs only to be probable.[88] The dialectical proposition

consists in asking something that is held by all men or by most men or by the philosophers, i. e., either by all, or by most, or by

[83] *Ibid.*, 3-5.
[84] *Ibid.*, 105 a 3-5.
[85] *Ibid.*, c. 4, 101 b, 29-35.
[86] *Prior Analytics*, I c. 1, 24 a 20-25; cf. St. Thomas, *Posterior Analytics*, I, l. 4, and l. 19.
[87] *Ibid.*
[88] *Topics*, I, c. 14 105 b 30; St. Thomas, *Proemium* to *Post. Anal.*

the most notable of these, provided it be not contrary to the general opinion . . .; dialectical propositions include views which are like those generally accepted; also propositions which contradict the contraries of opinions that are taken to be generally accepted, and also all opinions that are in accordance with the recognized arts.[89]

In the process of inducing doubts such propositions enjoy frequent use. Examples will be given when the application of the doubt of discussion in the various sciences is considered.

γ. Study of likenesses and differences

Probable propositions constitute the proximate matter of topical reasonings; the terms of the propositions are the remote matter or the elements. In dialectics they are four of the five predicables, genus, specific difference, property, and accident. Of the means devised by Aristotle to supply topical reasonings two, namely, the discovery of the likenesses of things and the investigation of all differences, are concerned in a special way with these four elements.

The purpose of the study of likeness is to establish a generic community among objects belonging to different species, and among objects generically the same to discover peculiar and identical attributes.[90] This examination has a threefold utility: (1) in inductive arguments " because it is by means of an induction of individuals in cases that are alike that we claim to bring the universal in evidence "; (2) in hypothetical reasoning, for it is a general opinion that among similars what is true of one is true also of the others; (3) in defining, for it is on the basis of similarity in individual cases that the genus of the object is determined; moreover, different objects when examined from the point of view of likeness frequently reveal a common note, and " if we render as the genus what is common to all the cases, we shall get the credit of defining not inappropriately." [91]

[89] *Ibid.*, I, c. 10, 104 a 9-15.
[90] *Topics*, 1, c. 13 and c. 17.
[91] *Ibid.*, I, c. 18, 108 b 9-32.

8. The use of common intentions

By combining these elements, the common intentions of reason, in accordance with the rules governing the discovery of differences and likenesses, the dialectician constructs his propositions. Because these logical intentions are equivalent in extension to the totality of real beings which fall under the consideration of the mind according to the modality of the intentions, the dialectician's reasonings are coextensive with those of the philosopher.[92] They differ in this, that the latter demonstrates the real properties of being, whereas the dialectician reasons from principles derived from logical intentions which are extraneous to the nature of things.

The propositions of dialectics may be utilized in the various sciences by the dialectician himself proceeding according to the rules governing his own science or they may be borrowed by the metaphysician to deduce certain proofs.[93] In either case the propositions are constructed from the common logical intentions of genus, difference, property, predication, contrariety, etc. Thus the metaphysician uses these elements to dispute against those who deny self-evident principles and to demonstrate them to the extent that this is possible.[94] Metaphysics may use these common intentions in its own right, for its own formal object extends to all being, both real and logical. Particular sciences, however, may not use logical intentions in this way, for their objects are determined to particular kinds of real being from which their principles are derived, and to which they are limited.[95]

Any concluding that is done in the particular sciences from principles involving logical intentions is the work of the dialectician, whose special function is to use his principles to deduce probable conclusions. Thus in psychology by utilizing the principle that contraries belong to the same subject the dialec-

[92] St. Thomas, *Metaphysics* IV, l. 1.
[93] John of St. Thomas, *Curs. Phil.*, I., Log, II P. Q. l, *De Logica*, a. 5.
[94] *Post. Anal.*, I. l. 19.
[95] *In Lib. Boethii de Trinitate*, Q. VI, a. 1 c.

tician may conclude to the fact that hate resides in the concupiscible appetite because its contrary, love, is known to belong to this subject.[96] Because the medium, contraries belong to the same subject, is based upon the nature of the contrariety of concepts, any attempted resolution of the conclusion to its principles leads the investigator away from the intrinsic nature of the subject and terminates his inquisition in a logical principle. In other words, he ends where he began, for the motion of his discourse is circular from one common logical intention to another. It is only in so far as this discourse is considered from the point of view of the rules by which it is directed that it may be called scientific.[97]

Considered from the point of view of the material to which these logical principles are applied, the inquisition cannot be terminated by resolution to proper principles, for the medium is extraneous to the subject. Consequently, demonstration is impossible and the inquisition of reason which is ordained to the discovery of a proper medium endures.[98] Nevertheless by virtue of the fact that the logical principle which serves as a medium establishing a community between the two other terms is true and correctly applied, a probable conclusion may be drawn by the dialectician in questions proper to a particular science.

In this analysis of the principles and the uses of dialectics three factors were emphasized, namely, the use of common opinions as propositions, the construction of probable arguments on the basis of principles concerned with the predicables,

[96] John of St. Thomas uses this example to illustrate the use of *Logica Docens* in the particular sciences. Compare, however, St. Thomas' use of the same example in *Post. Anal.*, I, l. XIX (Vives). Strictly speaking, the example is applicable only to John of St. Thomas' third use of logic or the proper use of *Logica Utens*, when the dialectician proceeds to prove probable conclusions in the particular sciences. St. Thomas in *De Trinitate*, q. VI, a. 1, in treating of the use of logical principles in other sciences states: Hic modus procedendi non potest competere proprie alicui particulari scientiae, in quibus peccatum accidit, nisi ex propriis procedatur. Convenit autem haec proprie fieri in metaphysica et logica, eo quod utraque scientia communis est, et idem subjectum quodammodo habent.

[97] John of St. Thomas, *Curs. Phil.*, I, Log. II P. Q. 1 *De Logica*, a. 5, ad 2um.

[98] *De Veritate*, q. XV, a. 2 ad 3um; *De Trinitate*, q. VI, a. 1.

particularly genus and difference, and finally the use of common logical conceptions as media in concluding to probable truths in the particular sciences. It is principally these uses of *logica utens* and *docens* that dialectics contributes as part of a methodology ordained to perform the valuable service "of raising searching difficulties on both sides of a question."

ii. In particular

Obviously any methodology concerned with the investigation of truth must be based ultimately upon the nature of the human intellect, the cause of logical truth. Consequently, the structure of an artificial method of stimulating inquisition will be regulated according to the nature of the operations of the mind in its search for truth. For the purposes of this article it is convenient to consider these operations under two headings: (1) in so far as they are dependent upon experience; (2) in so far as the intellect gradually acquires perfection by passing from confused and indistinct knowledge to the perfect knowledge of science and wisdom. The linking up of the three methodological factors contributed by dialectics with these general considerations of intellectual operations will constitute the major part of the consideration of the material elements of the doubt of discussion.

a. Experience and the common opinions of others

Aristotle stated briefly the starting point in any consideration of intellectual operations when he wrote:

> Mind is in a sense potentially whatever is thinkable, though actually it is nothing until it has thought. What it thinks must be in it just as characters may be said to be on a writing table on which as yet nothing actually stands written: this is exactly what happens with mind.[99]

The process of actualizing the intellect by its proper object,

[99] *On the Soul*, Bk. III, c. 4, 429 b 30 ff. For proper interpretation of the metaphor "tabula rasa" in terms of active and passive potentiality see St. Thomas, *De Magistro*, Art. 1.

the universal nature of material things, involves the various steps of sense perception, memory, " and out of frequently repeated memories of the same things develops experience, for a number of memories constitutes a single experience." From experience again, " originate the skill of the craftsman and the knowledge of the man of science. . . ." [100]

In the process of acquiring knowledge, then, the intellect is objectively dependent upon experience. Aristotle has seen in the lack of experience a fertile source of error:

Lack of experience diminishes our power of taking a comprehensive view of the admitted facts. Hence those who dwell in intimate association with nature and its phenomena grow more and more able to formulate, as the foundations of their theories, principles such as to admit of a wided and coherent development; while those whom devotion to abstract discussion has rendered unobservant of the facts are too ready to dogmatize on the basis of a few observations.[101]

Experience through intimate association, however, is not always possible, especially in problems of a more abstract nature than those of natural philosophy. There is another alternative to which one may have recourse in order to acquire the necessary inductive facts. When personal experience is lacking the deficiency may be supplied through second-hand experience by calling into counsel the opinions and discoveries of other investigators. Aristotle had a great deal of confidence in the powers of the human mind to grasp truth; individuals might fail, but groups of individuals pooling the results of their investigations enjoyed remarkable success.

The investigation of truth is in one way hard, in another easy. An indication of this is found in the fact that no one is able to attain the truth adequately, while on the other hand, we do not collectively fail, but everyone says something true about the nature

[100] *Post. Analytics*, Bk. II, c. 19, 100 a 5-10. The whole chapter should be read and compared with *Metaphysics* A. 980 a 28 ff. See also the commentaries of St. Thomas on both and *Post. Anal.*, II c. 290 a, 27-30; I c. 31, 88 a, 39-45; St. Thomas, *Metaph.*, IV l. 6 n. 959, *Post. Anal.*, l. 30 (Leonine).

[101] *Generation and Corruption*, Bk. I, c. 2, 316 a 5-10.

of things, and while individually we contribute little or nothing to the truth, by the union of all a considerable amount is amassed.[102]

One who has perused *Physics II*, chapters 3-7, quite thoroughly will lay aside the book convinced that Aristotle entertained no doubts concerning the number and nature of the causes of things. He will be at least mildly surprised to read in the *Metaphysics* that although

we have studied the causes sufficiently in our work on nature, yet let us call to our aid those who have attacked the investigation of being and philosophized about reality before us. For obviously they too speak of certain principles and causes; to go over their views, then, will be of profit to the present inquiry, for we shall either find another kind of cause, or be more convinced of the correctness of those which we now maintain.[103]

The foundations of physics were not tottering when Aristotle wrote this passage, for here the doubt is purely methodical, involving an abstraction from certitude obtained on one score in order to obtain another argument for adhering to the truth. The conclusion of his inquisition, of course, was the discovery through an analysis of many opinions that

even as we have said before . . . all men seem to seek the causes named in the Physics, and that we cannot name any beyond these; but they seek these vaguely; and though they have all been described before, in a sense they have not been described at all. For the earliest philosophy is, on all subjects, like one who lisps, since it is young and in its beginning.[104]

This procedure of conjuring up the shades of the ancients and giving them a hearing in the philosophical court of judgment is part of the general Aristotelean process of inducing doubts, and the opinions which are analyzed, classified, approved, or reprobated belong to the difficulties or *dubitabilia* of a question. The classification of these opinions as points to be doubted is justified on two scores. First of all, they are

[102] *Metaphysics*, Bk. II, ch. 1, 993 b 1-5; see also the epilogue to *Sophistical Refutations*, ch. 34, 183 b 15 ff.

[103] *Metaphysics* Bk. I, ch. 3, 983 b 1-6.

[104] *Metaphysics*, Bk. I, c. 9, 993 a 16-16.

not accepted by the investigator as certain conclusions, but rather as opinions to be analyzed, tested, and weighed carefully to determine accurately their degree of probability. For the philosopher the authority of the one speaking has little probative value; for him it is the weakest of arguments. His interest primarily is in determining the truth of what has been said.[105] The second reason for the acceptance of these opinions as *dubitabilia* follows from the first. The matter to be analyzed in this case is not reality but symbols of reality, the truth of which must be judged by the investigator. Fundamentally, the opinions of others are a substitute for personal experience, and just as sense perceptions and phantasms of reality are objects to be judged and not the immediate cause of intellectual knowledge, so, too, the opinions of others must be submitted to the activity of reason in order that the intellect may exercise its causality.

> The words of the teacher, heard or seen in writing, have the same relation in causing knowledge in the intellect as anything outside the mind has, because from both the intellect takes the meaning.[106]

It is the intelligible content or meaning of the symbols that becomes the object of doubt in so far as the investigator is in some way ignorant of it. And just as ignorance of reality touches off admiration in the philosopher of nature, so too imperfect knowledge of the meaning of others' opinions on the subject induces the same psychological reactions. The process of doubting occurs when the inquirer attempts to interpret the meaning of the words in terms of his already acquired synthesis of knowledge.

> Now the process of reasoning in one who arrives at the cognition of an unknown through personal discovery is the application of general, self-evident principles to definite matters, and proceeding from them to particular conclusions, and from these to others.[107]

Likewise, he who learns through the opinions of others must

[105] St. Thomas, *Physics*, VIII, l. 3; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2um.
[106] *De Magistro*, Art. I, ad 11um.
[107] *Ibid.* See also ad 2um and 3um.

apply known principles to the words in order to pierce through them to their meaning and finally to the reality signified, " for the cognition of principles and not the cognition of symbols causes in us a knowledge of conclusions." [108] It is this application of more general principles to particular matters, a process involving a passage from a general and confused knowledge to a particular and perfect one, that is unknown to the investigator and consequently the cause of his admiration and indetermination to either part of a contradiction.

The assembling of the opinions of others in order to induce a process of doubt concerning their intelligible contents is one of the material elements, a part of the artificial methodology of the doubt of discussion. As such it is ordained not to a display of dialectical finesse but to the ultimate discovery of truth. Patterned after the operations of the mind in its search for a medium of demonstration or order, its proximate end is to supply the necessary inductive facts not already contained in the investigator's experience. Actually it is far more than a substitute for personal experience, for " the words of the teacher have a closer relation to causing knowledge than have the perceivable things outside the mind, inasmuch as words are symbols of intelligible content." [109] The opinions of others are already stamped with the marks of intellectual operations and weighted down with the signposts of a completed discourse of reason. For this reason a critical examination of the opinions of others has been a source of many advantages for philosophical investigators. Aristotle and St. Thomas have graciously acknowledged their indebtedness to their predecessors:

> In the consideration of truth one man is aided by another in a twofold way, both directly and indirectly. He is helped directly by those who have discovered the truth, for, as has been said, although each one of our predecessors has discovered a small segment of truth, nevertheless, the discoveries taken collectively lead later philosophers to a great knowledge of the truth. Indirect aid is afforded insofar as the errors of the early philosophers have given their successors the occasion of exercising their minds in order that

[108] *Ibid.*, ad 2um. [109] *Ibid.*, ad 11um.

through diligent discussion truth might appear more readily. . . . Consequently the Philosopher says that it is just for us to be grateful not only to those who, as we think, have discovered the truth and whose opinions we embrace, but also to those who have expressed superficial views in the investigation of truth, even though we do not follow their opinions, because they too have given us considerable aid in determining beforehand certain mental exercises to be performed in the search for the truth.[110]

Following the intellectual course laid down by predecessors has definite advantages, but they pale into insignificance in comparison with the advantages to be obtained by charting a new course past the obvious shoals with the aid of a map indicating the landmarks and safe channels. Thus far the consideration of the use of opinions has been limited to the process of assembling and analyzing their meaning. There is a further use for them which adds over and above the process of assembling and analysis a definite method of handling their meanings. St. Thomas has given this second use a highly significant name, *dubitationes emergentes*.[111] An approximate translation would read, processes of doubt from which (truth) emerges. This method envisions the lining up of opinions into opposing ranks and pitting one against the other. Pro and Con, Yes and No, Thesis and Antithesis, are various formulae that have been used to designate this process.

An excellent example of the use of *dubitatio emergens* is found in article 1 of St. Thomas' *De Magistro*. First of all a problem is stated: Whether man can teach another and be called a teacher, or God alone? After this eighteen difficulties are proposed denying the ability of men to teach one another and their right to the name of teacher. Holy Scriptures, Saint Augustine's *De Magistro* and *De Libero Arbitrio*, Boethius' *Consolations*, and Plato's *Meno* are drawn upon to build the defenses of the negative side. Then follow six contradictory arguments drawn from Holy Scriptures, the Gloss, Saint Augustine's *Contra Manichaeos*, and Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Master

[110] *Metaphysics*, Bk. II, l. 1.

[111] *Metaphysics*, Bk. III, l. 1, in the discussion of the fourth reason for using doubts in metaphysics.

debater as he was, St. Thomas' statement of these *udbitabilia* constitutes a trenchant and incisive compendium of the historical roots of problems troubling his contemporaries.

> The very words in which he formulated objections are understood only in the light of the history of contemporary error. He fought no windmills; he set up no men of straw in order to knock them down. He dealt with living issues. He was in touch with his age upon all its intellectual wants and aspirations.[112]

Difficulties of the caliber St. Thomas demanded could not be stated without considerable research and diligent deliberation. St. Thomas was sparing neither in scholarship nor concentration, for he was convinced, as was Aristotle, that the solution of the difficulties (*dubitationum*) is the discovery of the truth.

> It is expedient for him who wishes to grasp a certain truth to solve the difficulties (*dubitationes*), for the solution of difficulties is the discovery of the truth, and consequently the reasons contained in contrary opinions are of tremendous value in the attainment of science.[113]

Because his *De Magistro* was given as a public disputation which was regulated by ironclad rules of procedure, St. Thomas did not immediately sift the stated *dubitabilia* in order to extract the true from the false; rather he entered upon the presentation of his own teaching on the subject. In this he departed from the Aristotelean philosophical method which completed the statement of difficulties with arguments for or against the expressed opinions. Nevertheless, his own response in the body of the article was definitely molded on the pattern of "*dubitationes emergentes*." As a matter of fact the first part of the response is given over to a further statement of difficulties in more universal matters. The question of the acquisition of knowledge is shown to be intimately connected with the problems of the eduction of natural forms and the generation of habits. Two divergent schools of thought on these questions are pitted against one another, one insisting that all forms are

[112] Br. Azarias, *Essays Educational*, D. H. McBride & Co., Chicago, 1896, p. 89.
[113] *Nichom. Ethics*, Bk. VII, l. 2; *In Lib. de Caelo*, I, l. 22.

derived from a separate form; the other, that forms are innate in the subject. A refutation of the errors of these opinions follows, and thus by solving the difficulties St. Thomas prepares the way for the introduction of Aristotle's "middle course between these two positions." Upon this foundation St. Thomas built the edifice of his doctrine, for the middle term was already evident in the solution of the difficulties.

β. Probable reasoning and the perfection of knowledge

In his response St. Thomas completely unravels the skein of the problem, strips it of all its accidental tangles, and reveals the single thread that enables the student to view the question in its entirety and in all its ramifications. Expert teacher, he leads the minds of his students step by step from ignorance to perfect knowledge with the facility and deftness of an experienced guide. There are no sudden, blinding flashes of genius to thrill the student at the expense of leaving his mind uninstructed. Nor is there any attempt made to cram a ready-made conclusion into a disorderly mind as an overcoat is jammed into an overstuffed trunk by a last-minute packer. The teacher's function is to teach; the student's to learn. But first the teacher himself must learn, and when he has done that his teaching becomes a matter of intelligently presenting what he has learned in the manner in which he has learned it.

Hence one man is said to teach another because the teacher proposes to another by means of signs the discursive process which he himself goes through by natural reason, and thus the natural reason of the pupil comes to a cognition of the unknown through the aid of what is proposed to him with the aid of instruments.[114]

In the genesis of knowledge reason must pass from the imperfect state of potency to the perfect state of act not immediately but mediately and gradually.

And because to know something indistinctly is the medium between pure potency and perfect act, therefore when our intellect proceeds from potency to act that which is confused rather than what is distinct occurs to it first of all. But then there is complete science

[114] *De Magistro*, Art. I, corp.

in act, when the mind arrives through resolution to a distinct knowledge of principles and elements. And this is the reason why confused things rather than distinct are known to us before anything else.[115]

Confused knowledge as distinguished from perfect knowledge implies that what is known contains within itself potentially and indistinctly something else which is the subject of further rational investigation. Now in intellectual knowledge

> the fact that universals are confused is clear, because the universals contain within themselves their species in potency; and he who knows something in a universal knows that thing indistinctly . . . for he who knows animal does not know irrational except potentially.[116]

In passing from the state of potency to the act of confused knowledge the intellect takes its first big step in the direction of science and wisdom, and in taking the step the intellect leans heavily upon a sturdy crutch, the process of constructing arguments based upon common characteristics. The form of this argument is simple enough, A : B : : B : C. The following concrete example, as calm is in the sea so is windlessness in the air, was given by Aristotle to indicate the usefulness of this process in uncovering the generic note that must be given first in every definition.[117]

By constructing an argument employing such a proportion and then pitting against it another argument based upon the differences of the objects compared a further purification of the confused concept can be made. This process envisions the inducing of a second doubt upon the first construction based on similarities, which of course is only probable and therefore subject to a real doubt, the correction of its hastily drawn synthesis by the new inductive facts discovered through an examination of differences, and finally an inquisition in which the doubt of reason falls upon a possible medium to synthesize

[115] *Physics*, Bk. I, l. 1.
[116] *Ibid.*
[117] *Topics*, Bk. I, ch. 17, 108 b 24-26.

the newly acquired knowledge. An example of the use of this method has been given by St. Thomas in his analysis of one of the proofs given by Aristotle to the fact that the confused knowledge of universal wholes is prior in us to the cognition of particulars in the intellectual order. Aristotle's argument stated that just as a sensible whole is more known in sense knowledge, so too the universal, an intelligible whole inasmuch as it contains its inferiors as potential parts, is more known to the intellect. Against this St. Thomas urges the obvious fact that the use of whole in the argument is equivocal and consequently " whole " cannot be used as a middle term. However, *dubitatio emergens* has not backfired on Aristotle this time. St. Thomas let him rest in peace by salvaging the parts of his argument and using them as the material parts of a new construction built on a more solid foundation, a new middle term which takes into account the differences between a universal and an integral whole.

> An integral whole and a universal whole have this common feature, that both are confused. For just as he who has apprehended a genus does not know the species distinctly but only potentially; so too he who has just seen a house does not yet know how to distinguish its parts. Consequently, this same ratio of confusion, which is the cause why a whole is prior known to us, is preserved in both wholes. Obviously then, the philosopher's argument is based upon the common ratio, confused, and not composed.[118]

When the intellect's construction has safely withstood all the attacks of adverse arguments, and reason stands convinced that it has knowledge which is at least probably adequate to reality, the process of perfecting this knowledge continues. An investigation of the proper principles of the thing follows, and it is here that the doubt of discussion really goes to work. Now the inquisition of reason is directed toward the discovery of a medium, a bridge which will enable the intellect to span the chasm between confused and distinct knowledge.

Science is the goal of the inquiry and consequently the thought of the searcher must be cast in the rigid mold of a

[118] *Physics*, Bk. I, l. 1.

demonstrative syllogism. The conclusion is already known to some extent, as a fact of experience or with that imperfect knowledge in which a particular is known in its universal. In the latter case the conclusion is known beforehand in its principles as an effect is known to pre-exist virtually in its cause.[119] It is the work of the premises of the syllogism to bring the cause, the principle, into contact with the conclusion in order that the causality of the principle in generating science may be exercised. Premises, however, are not just picked out of the air; they have to be sought diligently. In this search the process of inducing doubts through arguments based on principles derived from the common conceptions of reason plays an important psychological role.

From the point of view of logical relations the subject and predicate of the conclusion contain within themselves the basis for affirming or denying the inherence of the latter in the former. The contents of both concepts must be examined minutely to reveal this medium. Likewise, considered from the point of view of generating science in the investigator, the middle constitutes the precise point at which the conclusion is subjected to the causality of the more universal principles contained in the premises. The all-important thing, then, is to unearth this medium by digging deeply into the intelligible contents of the major and minor terms, a task which requires the complete, undivided attention of the mind. It is here that probable arguments render one of their most valuable services in forcing the mind to consider these terms and these alone.

An example of the use of such an argument will be helpful in grasping its precise function. In his consideration of the question, "Whether the goodness of the will depends upon the eternal law," St. Thomas argues in the *Sed contra*:

> Augustine says that sin is any deed, word, or desire against the eternal law. But malice of the will is the root of sin. Therefore, since malice is *contrary to goodness*, the goodness of the will depends upon the eternal law.[120]

[119] St. Thomas, *Post. Anal.*, Bk. I, l. 2, at end.

[120] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 19, a. 4, *sed contra*. (Italics mine.)

By virtue of an application to malice and goodness of the common logical principle that contraries are concerned with the same subject, St. Thomas linked together goodness of the will and the eternal law. Any attempt to resolve this principle back to its source takes the mind away from the things considered and brings it back into the realm of the intentions of reason. Moreover, the fact that any conclusion at all was reached other than the general one that goodness and malice are concerned with the same subject can only be attributed to St. Thomas' theological knowledge formulated in St. Augustine's definition. In other words the conclusion is known not by reason of the middle term but by reason of something extraneous to it. Hence the conclusion is probable and the conjunction of subject and predicate is still subject to doubt. Nevertheless, since the definition of sin is true, and the logical principle and its application to the particular matter are true, the conclusion possesses a high degree of probability, an encouraging sign for a wearied investigator, if nothing else. The chasm has been spanned—tentatively, of course; and even though reason has not constructed any massive concrete bridge to make the crossing, still it can use this single cable to swing back and forth in its examination of the subject and the predicate.

Arguments of this kind do far more than merely establish a probable nexus between two concepts. By their very nature they serve as psychological forces impelling the reason to continue the search for a rational medium of demonstration, a medium which will stand the test of resolution to the ultimate term, the understanding of principles in the light of which the conclusion may be judged.

Whenever the inquisition of reason does not lead to the ultimate term, but reason persists in the inquisition itself, namely when the inquirer remains indifferent to either part of a contradiction—and this happens when reason proceeds through probable principles— . . . , then the rational process is distinguished from demonstration. And in this way one can proceed rationally in every

science, in order that from probables the way to necessary conclusions may be prepared.[121]

Thus, while reason persists in the inquisition, admiration and cogitation continue to exercise their causality on the mind.

The same effect of focussing the attention of the mind on the search for the medium may be induced by using probable arguments which lead to conclusions opposite to the ones already known in a non-scientific manner. In considering the question, whether hatred is caused by love,[122] St. Thomas establishes the affirmative as a probable conclusion based on the authority of St. Augustine. Against this conclusion, which is being subjected to scientific examination, St. Thomas urges: One of contraries is not the cause of the other. But love and hatred are contraries, therefore etc. There is plenty of work to be done in solving a difficulty of this sort, and the work has to be done on nothing else than the concepts hatred and love which contain the much-desired medium.

It is not always necessary to have recourse to logical intentions to produce this effect, for the use of common principles of real being in argumentation leaves the mind partially indetermined and persisting in its inquisition. Arguments of this kind are likewise dialectical " not because they proceed from logical terms, but because they proceed in the manner of logic, namely from commons and probables, which is proper to the dialectical syllogism." [123]

An example of such an argument is found in Aristotle's proof that physics treats of nature in both senses of matter and form. The principle employed as the medium of this syllogism is common—art imitates nature.

If on the other hand art imitates nature, and it is the part of the same art to know the form and the matter up to a point (here two examples are given) . . . if this is so, it would be the part of physics to know nature in both senses.[124]

[121] *De Trinitate*, q. 6, a. 1.
[122] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 29, a. 2.
[123] *Physics*, Bk. III, l. 7.
[124] *Physics*, Bk. II, ch. 2, 194 a 21-26.

3. Properties of the Doubt of Discussion

The doubt of discussion is characterized by the following properties, each of which indicates a special necessity of inducing processes of doubt in scientific investigations. First, in forcing the mind to focus its attention upon the *dubitabilia* of a question and in impelling a rational inquiry by arousing admiration and a sustained cogitation, this doubt paradoxically gives to the mind that freedom of thought necessary for concluding truly. The difficulties surrounding a problem, both those that arise from subjective causes as well as those which flow from the very nature of the problem, were likened by St. Thomas to bonds encircling and enchaining the intellect. That the intellect may recover that liberty of movement and impartiality of judgment required for an objectively true discussion, these chains must be burst asunder. Delivery demands that

> just as he who wishes to break a corporal bond must first of all inspect the bond and the manner in which it has been forged, so too he who wishes to solve the difficulties (dubitationes) must first examine all the difficulties and their causes.[125]

Doubt is more frequently regarded as a bond enslaving the mind than as the force which breaks these bonds asunder. The picture of doubt as an enslaving chain, of course, is perfect provided that the background is moral activity. For in this setting human actions must cease when doubt makes its appearance. Doubt decked out in the garb of a liberator is definitely out of place here. But it is right at home in the setting of speculative activity. A confusion of doubt's role in these two orders results in tragedy. When doubt arises men must stop acting and start thinking, not vice versa.

Ultimately all of doubt's powers in freeing the mind are to be attributed to one of its parts, admiration. As an act of the mind admiration is to be found as the starting point in every rational investigation, for " it is due to their wonder that men began and now begin to philosophize." There is an element of

[125] *Metaphysics*, Bk. III, l. 1.

fear in admiration, because "he who is amazed shrinks at present from forming a judgment of that which amazes him, fearing to fall short of the truth, but inquires into the future." [126] Once more the garb of the liberator will fall from the shoulders of doubt, if this fear in intellectual admiration is confused with the fear of admiration in the appetites: the latter is a passion, a species of fear closely allied to stupor, both of which are concerned with some evil that has assumed tremendous proportions in human estimation. He who is overcome by admiration or stupor "both fears to judge at present and to inquire into the future." [127] For one who fears the truth, then, or who cannot endure the task of thinking, admiration of the appetites is the death of intellectual life.

Secondly, the doubt of discussion has the advantage of orientating the mind by establishing the goal of the inquisition and putting the mind on the road to that goal. One who has undertaken a search for the truth without first considering the *dubitabilia* may be likened to a traveller who has undertaken a journey without knowing just where he is going.

> And this is so, because as the end of the journey is that which is intended by the one travelling, so the exclusion of doubt is the end which is intended by the one seeking for the truth. But it is clear that he who does not know where he is going cannot directly get to any definite place except by chance. Likewise, neither can any one directly look for truth unless he has first examined the difficulties.[128]

Finally, the doubt of discussion makes it possible for the investigator to recognize his goal when he has attained it. Of course, it remains within the realm of the possible, the hazardously possible, for a philosopher to arrive at the solution of his problem without having examined the *dubitabilia*. Most frequently, however, his is the sad plight of the tourist who has reached his destination, fails to recognize it, and hence doesn't know whether to go sight-seeing or to arrange for more transportation.

[126] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 41, art. 4, ad 5um.
[127] *Ibid.*
[128] St. Thomas, *Metaphysics*, Bk. III, l. 1.

Just as from the fact that one does not know exactly where he is going, it follows that when he arrives at the place which he sought, he doesn't know whether he should sit down and take a rest or keep right on going, so likewise when someone does not know the difficulties, he cannot know when he discovers the truth, because he does not know the end of his inquisition, the solution of the difficulties.

On the other hand one who has doubted often and well has no trouble in recognizing his goal " which is clear to him who first learns the difficulties," [129] the signposts on the road to truth.

In the light of these statements the following assumes axiomatic proportions:

For those who wish to investigate the truth it is necessary to doubt well before they go to work. . . . And this because the later investigation of the truth is nothing else than the solution of the prior doubts.[130]

B. Particular Considerations

1. *The Use of Methodical Doubt in the Particular Sciences*

This dictum may be applied in all its rigor within the limits of the particular branches of the philosophical disciplines. He who wishes to investigate the truths of logic, physics, psychology, ethics, and politics has full freedom to apply the tests of doubt to all the conclusions of these sciences. There is a certain amount of restriction placed upon him, however, by reason of the fact that each science has its own proper questions, responses, and disputations.[131] Proper questions in the various sciences are concerned only with the propositions or premises from which a conclusion is demonstrated of the genus subject and with those conclusions which flow from the principles of the science. In regard to the latter, namely, the conclusions, the scientist must be prepared to answer all questions and to enter into disputes with those who throw doubt upon them. Not all his premises, however, may be questioned with the expectation of a scientific answer. Those basic truths of a

[129] *Ibid.* [130] *Ibid.* [131] *Post. Analytics*, Bk. I, l. 20.

particular science which must be assumed from a superior science are excluded, for no science can demonstrate its own principles.

> There is a limit, then, to the questions which may be put to each man of science; nor is each man of science bound to answer all inquiries on each subject, but only such as fall within the defined field of his own science.[132]

If a disputant with a geometrician goes outside these bounds " he will be at fault, and obviously cannot refute the geometrician except accidentally." [133]

Since the process of inducing doubts is in a very real sense an argument with one's self as the opponent, the consideration of the use of *dubitatio discussionis* in the particular sciences is limited to an examination of the method of doubting employed in the discovery of conclusions proper to each science. Thus qualified, the analysis given above of the nature and formal elements of the doubt of discussion may be applied here. That Aristotle and Saint Thomas did apply such a doubt is evident to any one who has examined their scientific tracts. At every stage of the logical development of a science, with the introduction of every new investigation, the opinions of the ancients were examined, the difficulties of the question were stated, and not infrequently one or more dialectical arguments were used either to point out the way to a possible solution or to separate the true from the false opinions. Because of its obvious general application the following text was selected to illustrate the use of the doubt of discussion in the particular sciences.

In approaching a particular ethical problem concerned with the nature of continency, St. Thomas comments on Aristotle's text:

> The philosopher lays down the mode of proceeding. And he says that it is necessary to proceed in this matter as in other discussions,

[132] Aristotle, *Post. Analytics*, Bk. I, ch. 12, 77 b 6-9.
[133] *Ibid.*, l. 10-12.

namely, that, after we have posited those things which seem probable . . . , we must first induce processes of doubt (inducamus dubitationes), and thus we shall show all those things which are especially probable about these subjects; and if not all, because it is not within man's power that nothing should escape his mind, we shall indicate the greater part of, and the most important of, them; for, if in any matter the difficulties are solved, and some probables are left as if true, the question has been sufficiently determined.[134]

An examination of the inquisition that follows reveals that the method employed includes:

a. assembling the best and most authoritative opinions on the matter.
b. the statement of proper questions, i. e., objective difficulties concerned with the various causes of continency.
c. the use of both sophistic and dialectical arguments based on common principles, real and logical.
d. the focussing of doubts upon these probable arguments in order to separate the more probable ones. The statement of Aristotle on this phase of the process is interesting: "Of such kind are the difficulties that arise; some of these points must be refuted and others left in possession of the field; for the solution of the difficulty is the discovery of the truth."[135]

Moreover the text of St. Thomas indicates that this method has not been devised for this one instance due to the particular contingencies of ethical problems. Rather, it is here applied "as in other discussions." There is a difference, however, in the use of opinions in ethics and in the other philosophical disciplines. As a general rule, arguments from authority are the weakest kind of arguments in philosophy. Nevertheless a certain gradation of value is to be found in the philosopher's acceptance of authoritative opinions. In those sciences, for example, mathematics and natural philosophy, whose subject matter possesses a more or less rigid necessity and is capable of perfect demonstration, opinions have little or no probative value and their use is confessedly preparatory rather than

[134] *Nich. Ethics*, Bk. VII, l. 1.
[135] Aristotle, *Nich. Ethics*, Bk. VII, ch. 8, 1146 b 6-8.

demonstrative. This is not the case, however, in the moral sciences, whose matter, human acts, virtues, goods, etc. are decidedly contingent because of the element of free choice which necessarily enters into each human act.

The general principle regulating the type of certitude to be sought in the various sciences has been stated by St. Thomas: "The mode of manifesting truth in each science must be convenient to that which is subjected as matter in that science." [136] Now just and honorable acts, the matter of ethics, are not considered to be the same concrete kinds of acts in every instance nor in every place. There is considerable divergence of opinion in regard to their nature and to their origin, in convention or in rational nature. Moreover, the secondary matter of ethics, external goods, does not receive the same evaluation by all men and not even by the same man at all times. Because the matter lacks universality and necessity, therefore

> we must be content in speaking of such subjects and with such premises to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most part true and with the same kind of premises (we must be content) to reach conclusions no better.[137]

On the principle that each man judges the things he knows and of these things he judges well, the opinions of just men carry a great deal of weight in moral matters.

> We should take our estimation of human goods not from the foolish but from the wise; just as it is the task of a person whose sense of taste is in good order to judge whether a thing is palatable.[138]

Finally, an examination of Aristotle's solution of the problem's difficulties reveals that the inducing of doubts is a continued process, that is, it is not limited to the beginning of the investigation but continues to accompany the mind throughout the discourse, a guarantee of sustained interest and a check against the possibility of concluding too hastily on insufficient

[136] *Nich. Ethics*, Bk. I, l. 3.
[137] Aristotle, *Nich. Ethics*, Bk. I, ch. 3, 1094 b 13-1095 a 13.
[138] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 2, a. 1 ad 1um.

evidence. Thus, this doubt fashioned at the beginning of the rational inquiry and carried through the whole discourse is truly a doubt of discussion molded according to the pattern of the natural doubt of admiration.

2. Use of the Doubt of Discussion in More Universal Matter

The same process of inducing doubts has been employed by Aristotle and St. Thomas in the establishment of the first principles in particular sciences, an application of methodical doubt in more universal matter. An example of this use is to be found in the first book of Aristotle's tract *On the Soul*. After his statement of the difficulties involved in the determination of the mode of inquiry proper to psychology, Aristotle began his consideration of the nature of the soul. He opened the examination with the following words:

> For our study of the soul it is necessary, while formulating the problems of which in our further advance we are to find the solutions, to call into council the views of our predecessors who have declared any opinion on the subject, in order that we may profit by whatever is sound in their suggestions and avoid their errors.[139]

The reasoning involved in such an undertaking belongs to that part of the art of dialectical argumentation which is concerned with the establishment of first principles in the various sciences.

> For it is impossible to discuss them at all from the principles of the particular science in hand, seeing that the principles are the *prius* of everything else! It is through the opinions generally held on the particular points that these have to be discussed, and this task belongs properly, or most appropriately, to dialectic; for dialectic is a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries.[140]

To this use of methodical doubt may be applied the literal sense of Aristotle's dictum: "We should enter the chambers

[139] Aristotle, *On the Soul*, Bk. I, ch. 2, 403 b 20-23.
[140] *Topics*, Bk. I, ch. 2, 101 a 37-101 b 5.

of knowledge through the portals of doubt . . . by making preliminary examination of the difficulties to be solved." [141]

3. *The Use of Doubt of Discussion in Most Universal Matters*

The following text appears at the beginning of St. Thomas' commentary on Aristotle's discourse to manifest the principles of metaphysics. It is a continuation of the enumeration of the qualities of doubt considered above:

On account of these reasons it was Aristotle's custom in almost all his works to preface his inquisition or determination of truth with *dubitationes emergentes*. But in the other books he placed his doubts one by one before each one of the determinations; here, however, he lays down his doubts, all of them, at once. The reason for this is that, because the other sciences consider truth in a particular way, it pertains to them to doubt about the individual truths in a particular way, but this science, just as it is ordained to a universal consideration of truth, so too universal doubt of truth pertains to it.[142]

Although the primary purpose of this passage is to explain Aristotle's placing all the points to be doubted at once instead of treating of them at different stages of the development of the tract as was done in the particular sciences, the reason assigned for this procedure, " to metaphysics pertains universal doubt of truth," raises the question of the limitations of methodical doubt. Are the basic presuppositions necessary for all scientific knowledge among those truths which can be made the object of doubt? In other words, is the general rule, " for those who wish to investigate truth it is necessary to doubt well before they start their inquisition," of universal application or does it admit of exceptions?

From the texts of St. Thomas the following *dubitabilium* may be constructed:

For those who wish to investigate truth it is necessary to doubt well before they start their inquisition.

[141] Silvester Maurus, *Aristotelis Opera Omnia*, Vol. IV. Metaphysicorum, book III, lecture 1. (Quoted in R. E. Brennan O.P., *General Psychology*, p. 5.)

[142] St. Thomas, *Metaphysics*, Bk. III, l. 1.

But this science, metaphysics, is ordained to a universal consideration of truth.

Therefore, to Metaphysics falls the task of doubting universally of truth.

The texts are definite. Saint Thomas insists that universal doubt has its place in the consideration of truth under its most universal aspect. But what is the nature of this doubt?

a. Not a sceptical doubt

Scepticism is the state of mind of one who denies all possibility of attaining any truth and certainty. For him both of these are mere illusions. The extreme of this position is represented in the doctrine and activity of Heraclitus' disciple, Cratylus, whose conversations were reduced to a frantic wave of the finger because he doubted that he existed long enough, if he existed at all, to answer any questions. This state of mind has been epitomized in Cicero's statement of Chius Metrodorus' dictum:

I deny that we know, whether it be a question of our knowing something or knowing nothing. Furthermore, I deny that we know just what it is to know or not to know, and by no means do we know whether something or nothing exists.

St. Thomas insists that such a doubt is impossible, for:

1. There is one principle which cannot be doubted really but only vocally. In discussing the principle of contradiction established by Aristotle as the most certain of all principles to which demonstrations are reduced as to an ultimate starting point (*Meta.* Bk. IV, ch. 3, 1005 b 18 ff.), St. Thomas points out the impossibility of mentally adhering to the contradictory of this proposition.

It is impossible for anyone to think that the same thing can be and not be at the same time, even though certain ones have maintained that Heraclitus held this opinion. It is true, of course, that Heraclitus said this; nevertheless he could not think so. For it is not necessary, that whatever someone says, must also be so conceived in his mind.

Continuing, St. Thomas points out that the impossibility of mentally adhering to both of these contradictories is based upon the fact that

in thinking something to be and not to be at the same time, one will have at the same time contrary opinions. And therefore contraries will be simultaneously inhering in the same subject, which is impossible.[143]

2. The principle of contradiction is

naturally first in the second operation of the intellect, namely, the act of composing and dividing. Nor can anyone understand anything according to this operation, unless he has first understood this principle.[144]

Hence this principle is presupposed to every judgment including that of universal scepticism.

3. Further, the very admission of universal doubt contradicts its universality, and the words used in expressing this doubt may be turned into an argument against this position.

. . . in this way (argumentatively) it can be shown that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be; but only if he who denies this principle on account of some difficulty says something, that is, signifies something with a name. But should he say nothing, it is foolish to argue with him who uses no reason in speaking. For such a one . . . who signifies nothing will be like unto a plant.[145]

b. Not a methodical positive doubt

A methodical positive doubt is a state of mind of one who, convinced for some reason of a certain truth, abstracts from the certitude he has in order to instigate a scientific investigation of the very foundations of his conclusion. Such is the state of mind of a theologian, who under faith firmly adheres to the truth of God's existence but induces doubts in order to discover a rational medium for a scientific demonstration. He prefaces his consideration of the matter with the question,

[143] *Metaphysics*, Bk. IV, l. 2. [144] *Ibid.* [145] *Ibid.* at end.

" Does God Exist?," advances arguments to the contrary, and then proceeds to investigate philosophical principles which may be used in proving the proposition from inductive facts. During the inquisition he considers the truth in question as scientifically uncertain until a demonstrative medium has been uncovered. Father Montagne, O. P., proposes an interesting description of the state of mind of such a doubter.

A doubt of this kind is possible and capable of solution provided that it is placed upon a particular truth. In this case there are, as it were, in the man who doubts two persons: the first excites the doubt and asks the question; the second furnishes as props to the first truth certain other truths—facts or principles which the doubt has not fallen upon, and which the two persons accept equally, and in the light of which it is possible for them to solve all the difficulties that have been proposed. Continuing, he points out that such a doubt cannot be levelled against the fundamental principle of thought, for in this case " all truth has been cast into question, and consequently the one who would propose such a problem would not be able to find in himself another person whose role would be to hold in reserve and to furnish him with certain principles to be employed in the solution. Such a doubling up of persons, necessary however if the problem is to be solved, becomes impossible." [146]

One may discredit this account as highly imaginative; nevertheless the figurative construction, " *Les deux personnages*," has a solid foundation in St. Thomas, for whom the conflict, pictured personally above, takes place between the interior and exterior reasons.

In distinguishing the different kinds of common principles St. Thomas points out that the common conceptions, dignities, or axioms have something in common with the other principles of demonstration (*petitio* and *suppositio*) and something peculiar to themselves. The common element is that all are evident in themselves.

But it is proper to these principles (dignities) that not only is it

[146] " Le Doute Methodique Selon St. Thomas." Montagne, O. P., in *Revue Thomiste*, Vol. 18 (1910), pp. 441-442.

necessary for them to be *per se* true, but also it is necessary that they be seen to be true. For no one can think their contraries.[147]

With this property of the axioms as a fundament, St. Thomas distinguished them from petitions and suppositions, which can be confirmed by *exterior reason*, i. e., by some argumentation. But the common conception of the soul is not related to external reason, because it cannot be proved by any argumentation; but to that reason which is in the soul, because by the light of natural reason it is immediately made known. The fact that it is not related to exterior reason is clear, because no syllogism can be constructed to prove the common conceptions of the soul.[148]

For St. Thomas exterior reason has several concrete significations, but it is clear that in this text argumentation or demonstrative syllogism is signified. Consequently, *petitio* and *suppositio* have some sort of demonstrative medium through which they may be proved. These are the principles of particular sciences which, even though they cannot be demonstrated in their own science, since they are prior to everything else, nevertheless are capable of demonstration by a superior science or at least of manifestation through probable arguments. When methodical doubt is focussed on these truths, the doubt, of course, falls upon an unknown medium. In such cases a positive methodical doubt is a useful, legitimate instrument for guiding the mind in its inquisition.

It is clear also from the text that the cognition of the dignities or axioms pertains to the interior reason, for these truths are known immediately by the light of natural reason, that is, they are made known by the power of the active intellect. In this case the active intellect is not regarded

as the intellective potency itself, but as a certain habit (understanding) by which man from the power of the active intellect's light naturally knows indemonstrable principles.[149]

[147] *Posterior Analytics*, Bk. I, l. 18.
[148] *Ibid.*
[149] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 51, art. 1.

Because axioms are not known through exterior reason, the proximate objective cause of certitude in their regard cannot be a medium of demonstration, but is the very truth of the proposition itself; subjectively, the cause of certitude is the nature of the active intellect as it is informed and perfected by the habit of understanding. From this it is evident why a common conception cannot be contradicted nor submitted to a positive doubt by the interior reason; for it is repugnant that one and the same nature, the intellect which embraces as true such a principle, should deny its own nature's proper perfection, the discovery of truth, by denying or doubting really the truth it has grasped.

Certain things are so true that their opposite cannot be grasped by the intellect, and therefore they cannot be opposed by interior reason, but only by exterior reason, which is through the voice.[150]

In summary: A universal sceptical doubt proposes to abstract from the certitude already possessed of the very fundaments of knowledge in order to institute a scientific investigation concerning them. Since it is universal it must embrace every truth; since it proposes to doubt, it must doubt something, either the truths themselves or an extrinsic demonstrative medium. Now certain truths lack a medium, and consequently the truths themselves must be doubted. But, as has been shown, the common conceptions, axioms, or dignities cannot be doubted. St. Thomas was not asking the metaphysician to do the impossible when he stated that metaphysics employed universal doubt in its inquisitions.

One who professes to doubt positively of all truth is confronted with the following alternatives: (1) Either he must admit that his doubt is insoluble and in this he commits himself to the impossible position of waving his finger like Cratylus; or (2) he may attempt to escape universal scepticism, as did Descartes, at the intolerable cost of a flagrant contradiction, namely doubting the power of the active intellect to know

[150] *Post. Anal.*, Bk. I, l. 18.

truth, and then admitting the truth of a proposition advanced by this doubtful faculty; or (3) he must realize the impossibility of maintaining his position and abandon it in favor of self-evident principles concerning the foundations of human knowledge, the very entrance to the mansions of philosophy.[151] There is but one medium between scepticism and dogmatism, contradiction.

Unfortunately some have been willing, even eager, to take this last road to knowledge. Those who have taken it seem to have spent most of their time trying unsuccessfully to escape its consequences. Others have seen clearly the foolishness of embracing a contradiction at the beginning of philosophy and then dogmatizing their doubt into a universal principle. To escape this foolishness they did not become Aristotelean dogmatists, rather they fooled everybody including themselves by making contradictions the very essence of things and thought.

c. Methodical negative doubt

From this analysis it should be clear that, when St. Thomas affirms that universal doubt concerning truth pertains to metaphysics, he is not advising a metaphysician to approach his subject matter by constructing a positive doubt concerning the basic principles of all philosophy. But the question still remains unanswered; just what kind of doubt is possible in metaphysics? Briefly stated, the answer is, this doubt may be classified as a methodical, negative doubt. " Negative " indicates that the mind in its investigation never abstracts from the power of the human intellect to discover truth, from the fact of one's existence, nor from the certitude of the principle of contradiction. The basis for this congerie of propositions which cannot be doubted positively is a distinction placed upon the principle of

[151] Sicut circa ipsum introitum domus, qui omnibus patet et primo occurit, nullus decipitur, ita etiam in consideratione veritatis; nam ea, per quae intratur in cognitionem aliorum, nota sunt omnibus et nullus circa ea decipitur; huiusmodi enim sunt prima principia naturaliter nota ut non esse simul affirmare et negare, et quod omne totum est maius sua parte, et similia. *Meta.*, Bk. VIII, l. 1.

contradiction. Objectively considered, this principle is the objective evidence of a thing expressed as a judgment; subjectively, it is logical truth, which demands the existence of a knowing subject capable of grasping the truth. Modern Scholastics have called the power of the mind to know truth *prima conditio*, the existence of a knowing subject, *primum factum*, and the principle of contradiction, *primum principium*. The arguments of the ancients establishing the principle of contradiction as indubitable are valid likewise for the fact and the condition, for these two are contained implicitly in the former.

In order to understand the nature of doubt when qualified as negative, one must recall that there is an order among the dignities. St. Thomas teaches that the principle of contradiction is first in this order:

> all demonstrations reduce their propositions to this principle as to the last opinion common to all; for it is by nature first and the dignity of all dignities. . . . The reason for this is that, since the operation of the intellect is twofold: one which knows quiddities . . . and the other which composes and divides; in both operations there must be something which is first . . . (in the first act of the intellect the concept of being is first) . . . and because this principle, it is impossible to be and not to be at the same time, depends upon the understanding of being . . . this principle is first by nature in the second operation of the intellect.[152]

Secondary dignities, inasmuch as they lack a medium of demonstration, cannot be the object of a positive doubt; nevertheless there is a sense in which they may be doubted, not as the doubt falls upon the proposition but precisely as it falls upon an external medium, probative but not demonstrative.

> For the first philosopher attempts to manifest them in the manner in which this can be done, namely by contradicting those who deny them, through those media which must be admitted by the ones denying, and not through more known principles.[153]

Thus indirectly by reduction to the first principle, the principle of contradiction, a process involving the indication of the

[152] *Metaphysics*, Bk. IV, l. 6. [153] *Post. Anal.*, I, l. 20.

absurdity of their contradictories, these dignities may be manifested to be true. The methodical doubt that is employed is concerned with the means that make this reduction possible.

The principle of contradiction, the *primum factum*, and the *prima conditio* do not admit of such a doubt, for there is no prior principle to which they may be reduced, nor any medium which does not presuppose their truth. Thus the impossibility of any external direct proof is based on the fact that any attempted argumentation necessarily depends upon these truths for its own truth, and consequently begs the question.[154] In a very broad sense they may be subjected to a negative methodical doubt and be proved *quasi experimentaliter* in so far as the mind attempting to doubt discovers that this is impossible.

Hence, the statement of St. Thomas that universal doubt pertains to metaphysics must be qualified in each instance according to the material upon which the doubt falls. The portals of doubt are spacious, perhaps even inviting to some. But it is necessary to keep always in mind that there are many portals, not one, save by analogous unity. To attempt to force an entrance into the mansions of science and wisdom by using indiscriminately any door at all is to expose oneself to the danger of running into a blank wall or getting lost in a blind passageway.

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[154] *Meta.*, Bk. IV, l. 6.

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

BY JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

Translated from the Latin by

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CHAPTER II *

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE GIFTS AND THE VIRTUES

1. The existence of the Gifts of the Holy Ghost is certain from the texts of Scripture adduced in the foregoing chapter.[1] They are

* OUTLINE OF CHAPTER II:

I. THE GIFTS AND THEIR SUPERNATURAL CHARACTER (1)
- A. Proof from Scripture (2-3)
- B. Credence, Necessary Concerning Gifts Found in Both Christ and the Faithful
  1. According to the opinions of some theologians (4)
  2. According to the doctrine of John of St. Thomas (5)
     a) Corroborated by Saints and Scholastics (6)
- C. Difficulties concerning these supernatural gifts (7)
  1. Relative to their being habits
  2. Relative to their being distinct from the theological and moral virtues

II. THE GIFTS AS HABITS
- A. Stability of the gifts (8)
  1. As principles of acts (9)
  2. Connaturalizing the soul with the supernatural order (10)
- B. Objection: The Gift of Prophecy a transient motion (11-12)
- C. Reply: The Gifts of the Holy Ghost
  1. Abiding principles (13)
  2. For the appraisal and judgment of divine things (14-15)
  3. Not for the manifestation of the Spirit as the charisms, but as principles necessary for salvation through the motion of the Holy Ghost (16)

III. THE GIFTS AS DISTINCT FROM THE THEOLOGICAL AND MORAL VIRTUES
- A. The Virtues
  1. As acquired (17)
  2. As infused, both theological and moral (18)

supernatural and infused, beyond the reach of human achievement. Coming down from heaven as divine benefactions, they are given to men through the grace of God and through His Spirit. The supernatural character of other graces, faith and charity for ex-

B. The opinion of Scotus
1. The identifying of the Gifts and the Virtues (19)
2. His opinion concerning the Gifts in the intellect and the theological virtues (20)
3. His lack of an opinion about the Gifts in the will (21)
C. The doctrine of St. Thomas on the distinction between the Gifts and the Virtues (22)
1. Theological conclusion
a) The distinction between the Gifts in the intellect and Faith and Hope (23)
i) An objection: Diverse gifts with Faith and vision (24)
ii) Reply: Permanency of present gifts (25)
b) The distinction between the gifts and Charity (26)
c) The distinction between the gifts in the will and the corresponding virtues (27)
2. Argument from the nature of the Gifts (28)
a) The distinction from the virtues of both the gifts in the intellect and those in the will (29)
b) The basis of the distinction in the new regulative impulse of the Holy Ghost (30-31)

IV. The Objections and Replies (32)
A. The first objection (33)
1. Reply (34-35)
2. First resumption (36)
3. Reply (37-38)
4. Second resumption (39)
5. Reply (40)
B. The second objection (41)
1. Reply (42-43)
2. First resumption (44-45)
3. Reply (46-47)
4. Second resumption (48)
5. Reply (49-52)
C. The third objection (53)
1. Reply (54-55)
2. First resumption (56)
3. Reply (57-59)
4. Second resumption (60)
5. Reply (61-64)

[1] Cf. paragraphs 2 and 4.

ample, is proved from similar texts of Scripture, the sole font of men's knowledge of such graces. Moreover, from the fact that Scripture affirmed that faith and charity were bestowed by God, St. Augustine could prove against the Pelagians the supernatural character of these graces. In this same way, therefore, it may be inferred that the Gifts of the Holy Ghost are supernatural.

2. The basic fact that Scripture treats of the Gifts of the Holy Ghost as supernatural is easily established. The gifts found in Christ [2] were described by Isaias as coming from the Holy Ghost: *And the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom, and of understanding*, etc. . . . *and he shall be filled with the spirit of the fear of the Lord.*[3] Appropriate only to supernatural and infused gifts, this text cannot be applied to acquired virtues in the natural order. Hence only at the price of destroying the faith may anyone deny that these gifts in Christ were gifts of grace, and therefore supernatural. Moreover, the gifts in Christ and in others are essentially the same. Ascribed to others as well as to Christ, these same gifts are said to be given through the Spirit as gifts of God. For the Spirit *shall fill him with the spirit of wisdom and understanding*,[4] while *to one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom and to another the word of knowledge, according to the same spirit*,[5] as St. Paul affirmed. These three gifts, wisdom, understanding, and knowledge, are supernatural, since they are given through the Spirit. It may be noted, however, that the Apostle is writing of the charisms, which, though supernatural, can be had without sanctifying grace.

3. These gifts are likewise described in the book of Ecclesiasticus with the addition of fear and counsel, or prudence as it is called. *The fear of the Lord is a crown of wisdom, filling up peace and the fruit of salvation, and it has seen and numbered her, but both are the gifts of God. Wisdom shall distribute knowledge and understanding of prudence, and exalts the glory of those who hold her.* Wisdom and fear are called gifts of God, and knowledge and understanding are said to be derived from wisdom. All are supernatural gifts. Fear, moreover, according to this same passage, is the beginning of wisdom, the root of wisdom, while love drives out

[2] Cf. IIIa, q. 18, a. 5.
[3] *Isaias* xi, 2.
[4] *Ecclesiasticus*, xv, 5.
[5] *I Corinthians*, xii, 8.
[6] *Ecclesiasticus*, i, 22-24.

sin. It surely could not do this unless it were supernatural and could dispose to justification.

That the gift of fortitude is infused and supernatural is derived from a passage in the book of the Maccabees, *for the success of war is not in the multitude of the army, but strength comes from heaven;*[7] and from the Forty-third Psalm, *for they did not get possession of the land by their own sword; neither did their own arm save them, but Thy right hand and Thy arm and the light of Thy countenance;*[8] as well as in Exodus, *the Lord is my strength and my praise.*[9]

Likewise, the gift of counsel finds mention in the Psalms, *thy justifications are my counsel.*[10] Of the works of counsel, St. Paul wrote: *Now concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord, yet I give a counsel as one having obtained mercy from the Lord;*[11] and it is written in the Gospel according to St. Matthew, *Not all can accept this teaching; but those to whom it has been given.*[12]

Finally, concerning the spirit of the gift of piety there is the text: *Train thyself unto piety. For bodily training is of little profit, while piety is profitable in all respects, since it has the promise of the present life as well as of that which is to come.*[13] This passage can refer only to supernatural piety, to which is annexed the promise of eternal happiness. Nor can that text be so aptly understood of the virtue of piety as it is of the gift of which Isaias wrote. To this furthermore can be added the words of Job, *Behold piety itself is wisdom.*[14] Thus many read the Greek text, among whom may be noted St. Augustine, although the Vulgate has *Behold the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom.*[15]

4. As may be inferred from the foregoing paragraphs, it is a matter of Faith that the seven gifts which were in Christ were supernatural, since Isaias expressly and literally wrote of Christ. It is also a matter of Faith that these supernatural gifts were given to others. For although Origen[16] insinuates that this sevenfold

[7] *I Maccabees*, iii, 19.
[8] *Psalm* xliii, 4.
[9] *Exodus*, xv, 2.
[10] *Psalm* cxviii, 24.
[11] *I Corinthians*, vii, 25.
[12] *Matthew*, xix, 11.
[13] *I Timothy*, iv, 8.
[14] *Job*, xxviii, 28.
[15] Sermon III *de Tempore*, *MPL*, XXXVIII.
[16] Homily VI on *Numbers*, *MPG*, XII, 668 and Homily III on *Isaias*, *MPG*, XIII, 227. Cf. translation of St. Jerome, *MPL*, XXIV, 910.

power descended upon Christ alone and Tertulian [17] would seem to agree with him, nevertheless, it seems that these authors are writing only in a comparative sense. They are rendering more forceful the significance of the words of the Prophet, *And there shall rest upon him, etc.*, by affirming that these gifts did not descend upon others in that fullness or with that permanence with which they were in Christ, in whom that sevenfold Spirit remained without interruption from the instant of His conception. Some more recent authors are of the opinion that it is a matter of faith that Christ had the seven supernatural gifts; that others have them is for them not a matter of Faith, but only a most certain opinion, whose contrary is temerarious, since it is against the common opinion of the Fathers and the Scholastic theologians. This opinion is advanced by Lorca in his disputation on the question of the gifts.[18] Martinez affirmed in his commentary on St. Thomas [19] that to deny the presence of the gifts in the faithful, if not temerarious, is at least proximate to error.

5. Nevertheless, I am of the opinion that the fact of the presence of the Gifts of the Holy Ghost in the faithful and of their supernatural character is so much a part of the Faith that the opposite would be heresy. For in the texts cited, with the exception of that from Isaias, Sacred Scripture makes express mention of the gifts as they are in the faithful. It is written in Ecclesiasticus, *He shall fill him with the spirit of wisdom and of understanding*,[20] and in the Book of Wisdom, *I have called and the spirit of wisdom came upon me*.[21] Of the gift of understanding it is written, *a good understand-*

[17] *Contra Judaeos*, c. 9, *MPL*, II, 623.

[18] Disputation 25 on question 68 of the First of the Second Part of the *Summa Theologica*. Peter de Lorca, 1554-1606, Cistercian theologian, later Superior General of his Order in Spain and intimate of Philip III, was the author of Commentaria and disputations in I-IIae, II-IIae and IIIa partem Divi Thomae, Compluti, 1614-1616. Cf. Hurter, *Nomenclator*, 3e Edit., III, p. 392.

[19] First difficulty on I-IIae q. 68, a. 1. Joannes Gonzalez Martinez, Doctor at Complutensis, was a bitter opponent of Thomistic doctrines. He is not to be confused with Joannes Martinez, Dominican Rector of the College of Alcala, when John of St. Thomas was there, Prior at Madrid, Toledo, Segovia, who succeeded John of St. Thomas as confessor to Philip IV. Cf. P. Beltran de Heredia, O. P., *La Enselanza de Sto. Tomas en Alcala, La Ciencia Thomista*, T. XII, 1915, p. 407-408, and Antonius, *Bibliotheca Hispana Nova*, Madrid, 1788, t. II p. 563.

[20] Cf. *Ecclesiasticus*, xv, 5.

[21] *Wisdom*, vii, 7.

ing to all who do it.[22] The other texts adduced expressly witness the fact that the gifts, such as fortitude, fear, and piety, are in the faithful.

There is also to be found evidence that the Church confirms this doctrine since in the hymn of the Holy Ghost occur the words: "Thou are seven-fold in gifts" and again, "give to Thy faithful who trust in Thee the sacred seven-fold."[23] It is certain, therefore, that these sacred gifts are gratuitously given by the Holy Ghost, since they are begged for from God, and prayer, according to St. Augustine, is "a most clear testimony of grace." They are supernatural because they are called sacred and special gifts of the Holy Ghost. Who would claim that the Church would ask for gifts for the faithful which would not be given to them?

6. The common consent of saints and Scholastics agrees with this. They write of these gifts as being the most evident of the gifts given to the faithful. For example, St. Augustine,[24] St. Ambrose,[25] St. Gregory,[26] St. Jerome,[27] St. Cyril,[28] St. Cyprian, or the author who wrote concerning the important works of Christ,[29] and many other saints agree in this teaching, while all the Scholastics concur, following Peter Lombard[30] and St. Thomas.[31]

7. The supernatural character of the gifts and their presence in the faithful is a certainty. Difficulties may arise, however, on

[22] *Psalm* cx, 9.

[23] At Terce of Pentecost and in the Sequence of the Mass for Pentecost. Cf. A. Byrnes, O.P., *Hymns of the Dominican Missal and Breviary*, St. Louis, 1943, pp. 138 and 144.

[24] Sermon XVII *De Sanctis*, *MPL*, XXXIX, 1525; *II De Doctrina Christiana*, c. 7, *MPL*, XXXIV, 39; *I Sermon on the Mount*, *MPL*, XXXIV, 1234.

[25] *III De Sacramentis*, c. 2. *MPL* XVI, 434; *In Psalm* cxviii, 8, *MPL*, *XV*, 1207; *I De Spiritu Sancto*, c. 20, *MPL*, XVI, 740.

[26] *I De Moralibus*, c. 12, *MPL*, LXXV, 544; *II De Moralibus*, c. 36, *MPL*, LXXV, 592. *Commentaria in Ezechiel* XIX, *MPL*, LXXVI, 1153.

[27] *Commentaria in Isaias* XI, *MPL*, XXIV, 144.

[28] *Lib. II in Isaias*, *MPG*, LXX, 310.

[29] *Liber de Cardinalibus Operibus Christi*, *MPL*, CLXXXIX, 1653. In the Migne Patrology this work is attributed to Ernaldus Bonaevallis, Abbot, d. 1156. "Vir fuit non obscurae famae," though the name of this contemporary of St. Bernard of Clairvaux is all but lost. Ernaldus' work was attributed to St. Cyprian even after the death of John of St. Thomas. Cf. edition Nicholai Rigalt, p. 393, Paris, 1648.

[30] *III Sententiarum*, d. 24.

[31] I-II, q. 68.

two points. The first concerns the genus of these gifts. The question turns on their position in the category of habits as well as on their distinction from the charisms, which are given in a transient manner. Since it is not absolutely certain from Scriptural evidence that the gifts are distinct from the virtues, a second difficulty arises in distinguishing these gifts from the theological and moral virtues, both infused and acquired.

The Gifts of the Holy Ghost are Habits

8. The Gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits and not merely acts or dispositions given in a transient manner like the light of prophecy and the other charisms. This is the common opinion of Scholastics, who follow St. Thomas. There are some, however, as Lorca notes, who think that these gifts are not habits but merely certain special acts of virtue.

The fundamental reason for considering them habits is the testimony in Sacred Scripture that they are given in a permanent fashion. Isaias affirms that *The spirit of the Lord shall rest upon Him, the spirit of wisdom and knowledge*, etc.[32] Concerning the same Holy Spirit, through whom these gifts are given, it is noted in the Gospel according to St. John *he will dwell with you, and be in you.*[33] Therefore, these gifts have a state of permanency.

9. My second point is that these gifts are given for operations similar to those functions for which virtues are established in the intellect and will. This is quite evident in the case of wisdom and knowledge, fortitude and piety, for these gifts have operations and acts of cognition; while fortitude, piety, and fear elicit acts of principles of action. Wisdom and knowledge, for example, elicit acts of cognition; while fortitude, piety and fear elicit acts of volition. As virtues, wisdom and fortitude are habits which elicit their own proper acts. Therefore, as gifts, wisdom, as well as knowledge, fortitude, and the rest may be called habits, since they too are principles eliciting their own proper acts.

10. My third point is that these gifts are given so that a man may operate with a certain connaturality toward things divine, and, moved by an impulse of the Holy Ghost, as St. Thomas teaches,[34] he may, as it were, have contact with divinity. Now, no one can

[32] *Isaias*, xi, 2. [33] *John*, xiv, 17. [34] I-II, q. 68, a. 3; II-II, q. 45.

be rendered connatural to divine things—no one can be in a measure spiritualized and deified—unless he is properly disposed by a permanent and habitual inclination. An ability which a man enjoys in a transient sort of way does not bring with it that special ease of connaturality. It does not dispose a man to execute new acts with the naturalness which the stability of a habit provides. Since, then, the Gifts of the Holy Ghost bring a special connaturality to divine things and a certain ease in responding to the impulse of the Holy Ghost, they must be habitual and permanent dispositions.

Briefly summarized, the reasoning of St. Thomas is as follows: the gifts dispose a man to obey the instigation and impulse of the Holy Ghost, just as the moral virtues dispose his appetite to obey the reason. Hence, since the moral virtues are habits because they dispose the appetite to obey reason, the gifts must be habits disposing a man to follow and to obey the impulse of the Holy Spirit.

11. However, there arises an objection to this conclusion on the grounds that prophecy is not a habit but a light given in a passing manner to the prophet, as St. Thomas proves.[35] Yet it furnishes a principle which elicits the knowledge of the prophecy. Since in this life a man does not have a clear knowledge of the principles from which prophetical knowledge is deduced—the vision of the divine essence, the source of prophetical knowledge—it is evident that the principles of the act need not be a habit. Likewise, the gifts of the Holy Ghost do not of themselves suppose a permanent principle of knowledge from which they are derived. They are given for a man to follow the impulse of the Holy Ghost just as the moral virtues are given so that he may follow reason, as St. Thomas asserts. In the inference that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits like the moral virtues there seems to be an erroneous argument of similarity. Using the same logic, the opposite conclusion should be reached. The moral virtues follow the dictates of reason, as manifested through the habit of prudence or synderesis. The gifts, for their part, follow the dictates of the Holy Spirit as manifested through an impulse. That impulse is evidenced, not through a habit, but through a passing act, as is clear in the case of prophecy.

Hence to obey this impulse there is no need for an habitual disposition. The appetite needs a habitual disposition to obey

[35] II-II, q. 171, a. 1.

reason. Reason in turn is disposed through the habit of prudence containing the seeds and principles of all the virtues. But it is not so with the gifts. The impulse of the Holy Ghost in which the principles and directive forces of the gifts are contained is not manifested in an habitual but rather in a transient manner. Therefore, just as prophecy is not given as a habit since it does not presuppose habitual knowledge of its principles, so neither are the gifts of the Holy Ghost habits, since they do not assume that their principles are known through a habit but through an impulse.

12. This fact is confirmed in the other graces "gratis datae," such as the working of miracles, the grace of healing, in which habits are not established in the soul, but actual motions suffice.[36] The same would apply then to the Gifts of the Holy Ghost, for whose exercise an actual divine motion without an infused habit would suffice. Further evidence for this is derived from the fact that the Apostle enumerates the utterance of wisdom and the utterance of knowledge among the graces "gratis datae" which are given in the same Spirit. Yet from the very text the argument is derived for the existence of the gifts. The gifts then are graces "gratis datae," and hence not habits.

13. In reply, it must be conceded that the prophetic light is given only transiently and not as a habit, for the reasons alleged by St. Thomas and cited above.[37] The Gifts of the Holy Ghost, on the other hand, postulate in the soul principles permanently known by which they are regulated. Though the gifts are directed by the Holy Ghost, the purpose of His impulse is not to manifest the truth of objects, either intellectually or imaginatively conceived, as is the case with prophecy. According to St. Augustine, even an impulse which the human mind unknowingly receives is sufficient. There is required merely an interior movement, a divine stimulation, by which God moves man to the immediate experience of tasting and seeing that the Lord is sweet. Thus God becomes deeply rooted in souls and makes them connatural with divine things. These supernatural objects are known in this life through faith, which is an abiding habit, determining in a way both charity and the Gifts of the Holy Ghost.

By this connaturality and intimate union to things divine, a man is made capable of penetrating more profoundly divine things and

[36] II-II, q. 177 and q. 188.

[37] Cf. paragraph 11, note 35.

the mysteries of Faith, of judging according to either secondary or ultimate causes, and of taking practical counsel in his actions. In this way the four gifts are formed in his mind. The gift of understanding is for the penetration and proper appraisal of things divine. The gifts of wisdom, science, and counsel are for judging concerning divine things, according to either ultimate and proximate causes or the norms of practical action.

The impulse which moves to the formation of such knowledge attains to the principles upon which it is founded, either through faith in this life, or—more permanently—through the beatific vision in the next. There is no comparison here with prophecy and its relation to the things prophesied, since prophecy is not founded upon faith nor regulated by it in the formation of its knowledge. For although prophecy is usually found in the faithful it may be found in others, Balaam, for example. The purpose of prophecy is the formation of a vision either in the intellect or in the imagination. It engenders certitude through an imaginary representation, with definite lineaments. Yet its object may not be seen intuitively, for the gift can coexist with faith. It is not necessary, then, for the formation of the image in prophecy that the principles of the vision be clearly seen. For the objects of prophecy are contained in the vision of the divine essence as their principle. They are, therefore, communicated in an extrinsic light, by which the prophecies are manifested without regress to their principle.

14. The Gifts of the Holy Ghost are not given for the formation of any vision, either in the intellect or in the imagination, concerning matter pertaining to faith. They are given rather for the appraisal and judgment of these things according to an habitual principle. For example, man may discern the credibility or the suitability of some mysteries of faith and attain a correct estimate of them. He knows that these mysteries are worthy of belief and should not be doubted because of any mere appearance of error. Then too he has a sort of connatural experience of them and a taste of divine things which is acquired through charity. From this connaturality, the gift of wisdom judges of divine things, as St. Thomas teaches.[38] Prudence gives counsel in actions and according to a correct estimation of things to be believed, while the gift of understanding penetrates these matters of faith.[39]

[38] II-II, q. 45.

[39] Cf. II-II, q. 8, a. 2.

15. In heaven, where faith no longer remains, and in the soul of Christ, in whom there was no need for faith, the gifts bring about the penetration and the judgment of supernatural things outside the beatific vision. They are not ordained to the judgment of the credibility of such things. Rather they are ordered to the judging of the appropriateness of divine things to human and created needs. They proceed from a savor, a taste, and a connaturality to supernatural things, which shall be explained later. The divine impulse, therefore, moves to the further knowledge and ordering of those things known essentially through faith. The case of prophecy is not the same. For the purpose of prophecy is the formation of a vision concerning things whose principles do not appear in the vision.

For this reason, the gifts are given as habits while prophecy is not. Since the aforementioned gifts are habits, the gifts in the sensitive appetite, such as fortitude, piety, and fear, are likewise habits.

At the same time it must be admitted that these gifts are perfected and increased from a sort of illumination given through rapture of prophecy. This, however, is not an essential postulate of the nature of the gifts but a superabundant light. The gifts are absolutely necessary for salvation, while this enlightenment is not.

16. In reply to the second objection, or confirmation of the first as it is called, it should be noted that [40] prophecy and the other gifts "gratis datae" are given for the manifestation of the Spirit. They can be founded upon principles higher than themselves and to which they do not attain. For this reason they require a light or a divine motion given in a transient manner, not founded upon nor contained in the vision of the principles. On the other hand, the Gifts of the Holy Ghost, like charity to which they are annexed, are necessary for salvation. Hence, like charity, they are regulated through principles known by faith. Yet they are aroused, brought to consciousness, and made ready for action by a special impulse of the Holy Ghost. It may be concluded, therefore, that they can be granted as habits, in a permanent fashion, just as faith and charity.

The citation from St. Paul, *To one through the spirit is given*

[40] Cf. II-II, q. 89, a. 3, ad 3.

the utterance of wisdom, and to another the utterance of knowledge,[41] undoubtedly has to do with the charisms. These are given for the manifestation of the spirit. The grace of manifesting the Spirit is not given to all, for all are not given the ability to utter such words. Nevertheless, the wisdom and knowledge which underlie these manifestations are gifts of the Holy Spirit.

The Gifts Differ from the Theological and Moral Virtues

17. The Gifts are habits which differ from both the theological and moral virtues. There is no doubt that they differ from the acquired virtues, which are of the natural order, since it has been established that the Gifts are supernatural. While the acquired virtues of the natural order could be found in a state of pure and integral nature, the Gifts could have no place there, since they are supernatural. From their separability, then, the distinction of the virtues and Gifts may be inferred.

18. The distinction of the infused virtues and the Gifts of the Holy Ghost, however, provides no little difficulty. These infused virtues are both moral and theological—a basic point of agreement for all.

19. In his famous opinion relative to this difficulty, Scotus[42] maintains that the Gifts are not distinct from the virtues but are substantially the same as the virtues. They are called gifts merely because of a particular designation or office. This opinion numbers among its adherents Gabriel,[43] Palacios,[44] and others among the more ancient writers. Among the more recent authors may be included Lorca[45] and Vasquez.[46] The latter holds that both opinions may be considered probable, and cannot determine which is the more true—though he considers St. Thomas' arguments of little efficacy and attempts to disprove them.

[41] *I Corinthians*, xii, 8.

[42] *In III Sententiarum*, d. 34.

[43] *In III Sententiarum*, d. 34, a. 2. Gabriel Biel, d. 1495, nominalist professor at Tübingen, author of *Super Quatuor libros Sententiarum*, Monte Ferrato, 1532.

[44] Palacios, Michael de † c. 1600, professor of philosophy and theology at Salamanca, author of *Disputationes theologicae in IV Libros Sententiarum*. Cf. N. Antonio, *Bibliotheca Hispana Nova*, Madrid 1783, vol. II, p. 143. Hurter, *Nomenclator*, Ed. 3, vol. III col. 143. Vigouroux, *Dictionaire de la Bible*, IV, col. 1962.

[45] *In III Sententiarum*, d. 25, men. 2.

[46] *In III Sententiarum*, d. 89, c. 1 and 2.

20. Furthermore, Scotus does not admit that the infused moral virtues are distinct from the acquired virtues, nor are they superadded to them. Yet, it cannot be denied that the Gifts of the Holy Ghost are infused, for that is the evident meaning of Scripture and the consent of the Church bears it out. By antonomasia, these habits are called Gifts, since they are given in a special way by the Holy Ghost—poured forth by God so that a man may be filled with the Gifts of the Holy Ghost and it may be said of him: *And the spirit of the fear of the Lord shall fill him,*[47] or *You shall fill him with the spirit of the Lord, of wisdom and understanding.*[48] In Scripture, being filled with the Holy Ghost indicates the infusion of supernatural gifts.

Since these statements cannot be denied, it would seem difficult for Scotus to explain what sort of habits these gifts really are. Of the seven gifts, some pertain to the intellect: wisdom, knowledge, understanding, counsel; and some are in the will: fortitude, piety, and fear of the Lord. Of the first four Scotus has a facile explanation, since he thinks that they pertain to the theological virtues. Moreover he does not think that wisdom is an act of the intellect, but of charity, inasmuch as it gives a savor and a taste of faith, or a sort of delectable knowledge. From another point of view he reduces wisdom to hope, since by wisdom the soul delights in God as He is in Himself and as He satisfies human aspirations.

Moreover, he reduces the gifts of knowledge and understanding to faith, since it is within the province of faith to penetrate and judge of the things which it believes. Even Father Suarez [49] considers it neither evident nor certain that the gift of understanding is a supernatural gift completely distinct from faith, although he favors the distinction of the virtues and gifts. How certain this fact actually is will be evident from the argument against Scotus.

Scotus gives no decision on the gift of counsel, yet he might have reduced it to faith, since faith is practical and capable of being a counsellor.

21. To what infused virtue Scotus reduces those Gifts of the Holy Ghost which pertain to the will—fortitude, piety, and fear of the Lord—I have no idea. He does not reduce them to theological

[47] *Isaias*, xi, 3.
[48] *Ecclesiasticus*, xv, 5.
[49] *I de Gratia*, lib. 2, c. 19, n. 11.

virtues, since the acts of fortitude and fear can neither be acts of charity or hope nor elicit them. They cannot be identified with the acts of the acquired virtues of fortitude, fear, and piety, since the gifts are supernatural and infused by the Holy Ghost and hence transcend the natural order. Furthermore, according to Scotus the acts of piety and fortitude cannot be infused, since he denies that there can be any such thing as an infused moral virtue. To what virtue, then, do these acts belong, and from what virtue do they proceed?

Scotus would perhaps deny that the Gifts of the Holy Ghost are supernatural and infused, but this is contrary to Scripture. Or perhaps he would care to affirm that the acquired virtues are infused into a just man merely as an accidental addition—and hence called gifts. Then, these gifts would have no place in the soul of a man proficient in moral virtue, nor would such a man receive the Gifts of the Holy Ghost when he was raised to the supernatural order. All this is absurd. For the more perfected a man was in the acquired virtues, in that proportion he would lack them by infusion, while the less proficient and sinners would not lack them, precisely because they were sinners.

22. Whatever Scotus' opinion may be, the doctrine stated here is that of St. Thomas.[50] In the *Book of the Sentences* he distinguishes the Gifts of the Holy Ghost from the virtues, expressly mentioning the infused moral virtues. This is the opinion of the disciples of St. Thomas and of theologians in general, who are mentioned by Suarez in the place already cited [51] and by Montensios and Martinez [52] and others in their commentaries on this question. Authority for this distinction may be found in St. Gregory.[53] He clearly distinguishes the theological virtues and the Gifts of the Holy Ghost from the moral virtues. This distinction rests upon a twofold argument. The first is a theological deduction from Scripture. The second, somewhat *a priori*, proceeds from the proper and formal nature of the gifts themselves.

[50] Cf. I-II, q. 68, a. 1; *In III Sententiarum*, d. 34, 1, 1.

[51] *Op. cit.*, c. 15 num. 9.

[52] In I-II, q. 68. Ludovicus Montensios, Doctor at Complutensi, called the "clear doctor," taught for 36 years and died in 1621. He was the author of *Commentaria in I-II Divi Thomae Aquinatis*, 2 vols., Compluti 1621-1622. Cf. Antonius, *Bibliotheca Hispana Nova*, Madrid 1788, II, p. 435.

[53] *II De Moralibus*, c. 36, *MPL*, LXXV, 593.

23. The Gifts which pertain to the intellect—wisdom, knowledge, understanding, and counsel—cannot be identified with the theological virtues, nor can the other three Gifts, which are related to the sensitive appetite, be identified with the moral virtues. Therefore, the Gifts are distinct from the virtues.

The proof of the principle establishing this conclusion rests upon the fact that neither all the Gifts nor any one of them can be identified with faith and hope. This in turn rests upon the hypothesis that it is a matter of faith that the Gifts were found in Christ Our Lord. To resolve this hypothesis we have the witness of Isaias: *And a flower shall rise out of his root. And the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding.*[54] Since Christ had the beatific vision He could have neither faith nor hope. Hence the gifts in Christ are definitely distinguished from faith and hope. The Gifts, moreover, which are in the faithful are of the same nature as those which were in Christ, since, from the same text of Isaias in which the gifts are ascribed to Christ, the Fathers of the Church and the theologians have concluded that they are present in the faithful. From the fact that seven gifts are enumerated there, seven Gifts of the Holy Ghost are attributed to the faithful. On the basis of this same text the office of the Holy Ghost is said to be sevenfold. Therefore, just as in Christ the gifts were distinguished from the virtues, so they are distinct in the faithful.

24. The only rebuttal to this argument can be found in the assertion that in Christ the gifts of wisdom, understanding, and knowledge are distinct from faith, while in the faithful they are identified with faith and hope. It may be alleged that in Him infused knowledge is identified with charity, while in the faithful, during this life, the Gifts cannot be distinguished from faith and hope. However, gifts similar to those in the soul of Christ will be given to the souls in heaven.

All this presupposes, of course, two kinds of gifts. There are those in us which are identified with faith, and those which are not the same as faith, as those in the soul of Christ, since there could be no faith in the soul of Christ.

25. This rebuttal is completely without basis in fact. No conclusions may be drawn concerning the Gifts unless they have their

[54] *Isaias*, xi, 1 ff.

source either in Holy Scripture or in the Fathers of the Church. Nowhere in Scripture are two kinds of gifts mentioned, one type for this life and another for heaven. That is a pure fiction. It is brought forward to defend an opinion which should be completely rejected, since it can be defended upon no other pretext. Furthermore, if the gifts in this life and those of heaven differ, it would be necessary that present gifts should be done away with in the future life. It is certain, however, that holy fear will remain in heaven, since it has been said, *The fear of the Lord is holy, enduring for ever and ever.*[55] And of wisdom, it is said, *It is glorious and never fades away;*[56] while of piety St. Paul affirms *That is profitable in all respects, since it has the promise of the present life as well as of that which is to come.*[57] Therefore, the piety of this life will not cease in heaven. The same may be said for the other gifts according to the statement of St. Ambrose: [58] "The Holy Spirit, glowing with the full breathing forth more abundantly upon those heavenly spirits." These seven gifts are surely none other than the ones which we have in this life. The same gifts, therefore, which we have here below will remain in heaven. If they cannot be identified with faith and hope in heaven, neither can they be identified with faith and hope in this life.

St. Paul's statement that *knowledge will be destroyed*[59] may seem to contradict this. But it is commonly applied to that part of knowledge which is purely material to the reasoning process, merely the reflection upon the phantasms, and not a part of the habit of knowledge itself.

26. Once it has been proved that the gifts related to the intellect are not identified with faith and hope, it naturally follows that they cannot be identified with charity either. Nor should the other gifts be made one with the moral virtues. Charity cannot be the same as wisdom, since undoubtedly wisdom is substantially and intrinsically an act of the intellect—for to be wise is to know. Men are called wise who understand and judge correctly. *Who is wise and will keep these things, and will understand the mercies of the Lord.*[60]

In mentioning Wisdom, Scripture describes it as an illumination

[55] *Psalm* xviii, 10.
[56] *Wisdom*, vi, 13.
[57] *I Timothy*, iv, 8.
[58] *I de Spiritu Sancto*, c. 20, *MPL*, XVI, 740.
[59] *I Corinthians*, xiii, 8.
[60] *Psalm* cvi, 43.

or a light: *I chose to have her instead of a light, for her light cannot be put out.*[61] In that same chapter the spirit of wisdom is ascribed to understanding: *I wished and understanding was given me: and I called upon God and the spirit of wisdom came upon me.*[62] St. Augustine affirmed that " wisdom pertains to reason and reason alone can receive it." [63]

To reduce wisdom to charity and to an act of the will, because it is described as a tasting or savoring, would entail the destruction of the essence of wisdom, whose act obviously is related to understanding and knowledge. This understanding is had with a pleasantness or suavity for either of two reasons. First, there is the delight which accompanies contemplation, especially when that contemplation proceeds through the highest causes. This delight is found even in that wisdom which is not a gift, but a savoring knowledge acquired by human power. Secondly, although the gift of wisdom is formally in the intellect, it presupposes an act of charity by reason of which a man has a love for divine things and experiences in himself some manner of loving union with God. Through this experience of divine things he is able to judge of them—but this is the burden of a later article.

27. Likewise, the gift of counsel cannot be identified with faith, despite the fact that it too is practical. Certainly the gift of counsel was found in Christ according to the enumeration of Isaias [64] and yet in Christ there was no virtue of faith. The other gifts which are related to the sensitive appetite, fortitude, piety, and fear, might seem to be easily reduced to the corresponding virtues, perhaps to fortitude, piety, or the worship of God—which would seem to embrace the reverential fear. These gifts in the sensitive appetite, however, are directed by the gifts in the intellect—wisdom, knowledge, and counsel. For that reason they are distinct from the moral virtues, which are regulated by prudence. The gifts are higher than prudence, which regulates the moral virtues. They do not even have the same moral aspect. For morality depends upon a regulative principle; if that principle is varied the moral aspect is changed correspondingly and consequently the very nature of the virtue.

28. The second argument to establish the difference between

[61] *Wisdom*, vii, 10.
[62] *Ibid.*, vii, 7.
[63] Sermon 3 *de Tempore*, *MPL*, xxxviii.
[64] *Isaias*, xi, 2.

the gifts and the virtues proceeds from the very nature of these gifts. The Scriptures record that these gifts are given to the faithful as "breathings" through a special divine inspiration and movement of the Holy Ghost. If the gifts were not in us through a special inspiration of the Holy Ghost it would be foolish to call them "breathings" and not to use the same name for the other virtues. Inspiration or divine movement has a two-fold purpose: either to enable a man to follow the command or rule of reason, or to follow a higher principle, the divine impulse. This latter is higher than human reason and higher than anything understood according to merely human capacity.

When God moves us to follow the commands of reason and the rules of acquired and infused prudence the result is human virtue regulated at that level of morality which parallels a humanly prudent manner of acting. If God moves the soul to follow a command and rule higher than that of prudence, a rule which is measured by the scope of the Holy Ghost alone, then other habits on a loftier moral plane than mere human virtue are demanded. These are called the Gifts of the Holy Ghost. Some of them reside in the intellect, whose function it is to measure and direct; others are rooted in the will and they prepare for the intellectual gifts and follow them.

29. The formal distinction founded upon the different illuminations of the divine light is more readily understood in the case of the gifts which reside in the intellect. For under the aegis of Divine Wisdom there comes a spirit of understanding, *holy, one, manifold.*[65] This understanding is in itself one, but manifold in its participation. From this same divine wisdom are derived infused knowledge, prophecy, faith, and many other illuminations essentially diverse. In enumerating these latter, first place goes to the gifts which have as their purpose the consideration of the mysteries of faith and divine things. They proceed from a hidden impulse of the Holy Ghost affixing and uniting the soul to Himself. They make the soul understand and judge rightly concerning the mysteries of faith according to our love and experience of things divine, and also in accord with their own essential suitableness.

In the exercise of these gifts, mystical theology is founded. By the affection and fusion of man to the divine, his perception in-

[65] *Wisdom*, vii, 22.

creases, as if through an internal experience—according to St. Paul: *Do you seek a proof of Christ who speaks within me?* [66]

By reason of this interior illumination and experience of divine things and the mysteries of faith, the soul thus stirred is further inflamed to pursue the life of virtue in a way which far transcends the tendencies of those virtues themselves. He now follows a higher rule and measure, under the interior impulse of the Holy Ghost, whose illuminations are his standards of faith.

This exchange of standards engenders new moral aspects and dimensions. There is a decided difference in the pursuit of the divine ultimate when it is regulated by human zeal and industry, or even by the infused virtues, and when it is formed acording to the rule and measure of the Holy Ghost. For example, although the forward progress of a ship may be the same, there is a vast difference in its being moved by the laborious rowing of oarsmen and its being moved by sails filled with a strong breeze. We read in the Gospel of St. Mark that Our Lord saw *his disciples straining at the oars.*[67] They were making progress in the way of the Lord only at the expense of great labor, since each was proceeding by his own power and industry through his own ordinary virtues. However, when the Spirit fills the soul interiorly, and measures it by His rule, then without labor and in a new-found freedom of the heart the soul moves rapidly like a sail filled with a breeze. The Psalms testify to this: *I have run the way of thy commandment when thou didst enlarge my heart;* [68] and again: *Thy good spirit shall lead me into the right land.*[69]

30. From all this it follows that the gifts are distinct from the virtues with a diversity over and above that founded on a difference of divine influx in the order of efficient causality. For even the theological and infused moral virtues as well as prophecy and the other charisms proceed from a divine influence and are divinely infused on the part of efficient causality. The gifts are, moreover, distinguished from the virtues by their very nature. They have a very different regulative principle and measure, and in the order of morality an object measured by a higher rule differs from the same object when it is measured by an inferior principle.

[66] *II Corinthians*, xiii, 3.
[67] *Mark*, vi, 48.
[68] *Psalm* cxviii, 32.
[69] *Psalm* cxlii, 10.

Cajetan [70] notes quite pointedly in this connection that there is in the soul a threefold principle moving it to good, that is, according to a moral rule and not only efficiently. The first principle is the human mind endowed with the natural light of reason and prudence. The second is the human mind adorned with the light of grace and faith, but still limited to its human capacity, zeal, and industry. The third is the human mind as it is impelled by the impulse of the Holy Ghost. This new impulse not only moves it efficiently. It also rules over the human mind and directs it to actions far exceeding human capacity and the meager standards of human industry and zeal. In this manner the unction of the Holy Ghost teaches us all things.[71] Motions proceeding from the first principle are in direct relationship to the acquired virtues. Movement under the aegis of the second principle corresponds to the infused virtues. Human activity sponsored by the third principle is linked in a relationship to the gifts, measured and moving upon a higher plane.

31. Hence in those gifts pertaining to the intellect there is not merely a diverse illumination or infusion of light in the order of efficient causality. There is in addition, by the impulse of the Spirit, a diverse formal mode of knowing as well. The truth of the mysteries of faith springs not only from the testimony of God revealing or in virtue of a light manifesting a particular truth. Adherence to the truth is now mystically fortified by a loving experience of the supernatural, and a union with God. For this reason the gifts are called both wisdom, or knowledge, or counsel, and likewise the spirit of wisdom, the spirit of counsel, and the spirit of knowledge. The name of spirit is applied to a " breathing " which is an affectious disposition of the will. It connotes an affection for knowledge and for counsel, a loving and mystical wisdom, loving and mystical knowledge, and counsel. These are special virtues of the Spirit.

In his explanation of the passages of Holy Scripture in which the force and spirit of the gifts is revealed, St. Thomas has striven to make clear the distinction of the gifts and the human virtues.

Finally, these virtues and spirits of virtues, these enkindlings and illuminations of the Holy Ghost, presuppose grace and charity.

[70] *Commentaria in I-II*, q. 68, a. 1.
[71] Cf. *John*, ii, 27.

They are found only in the soul in the state of grace, since they are founded upon loving union of the soul to God.

32. To amplify the foregoing explanation of the gifts it will prove useful to consider and confute those opinions opposed to the teaching of St. Thomas. These objections may be formulated under two headings. First, there is an opinion which strikes at the foundation for St. Thomas' distinction between the virtues and the gifts. With this opinion the present objections and replies are concerned. Secondly, some objections attempt to prove that the gifts do not have acts which are distinct from the acts of the theological and infused virtues. They allege further that the diversity of the gifts is not sufficiently explained. These latter objections will be dealt with in the articles devoted to each particular gift.

The Objections Against the Arguments of St. Thomas [72]

33. The first objection proceeds from the teaching of Duns Scotus. It affirms that there is no convincing argument by which the difference between the gifts and the theological and moral virtues may be proved. Consequently, it maintains that no such distinction should be made.

If any argument could prove this distinction it would be the one advanced by St. Thomas. He argues that whatever is moved is moved in proportion to its disposition for receiving motion, its obediential power. A man can be moved either through reason—to which the virtues in their human mode dispose him—or through a higher mover—God. Therefore, it is necessary that he be disposed to receive the divine motion proceeding from the inspiration from God.

According to the present objection, even this argument is not convincing. The conclusion of St. Thomas, then, cannot be entertained. The weakness of the argument arises from the fact that even through the theological and moral virtues—faith, hope, love, and penance—man is moved towards justification by divine motion and inspiration. With His Grace, God touches the heart of a man through the illumination of the Holy Ghost in such a way that it

[72] For the sake of clarity many of the paragraphs of the sections have been rearranged. The secondary numbers given are those of the Vives Edition, 1885.

cannot be said that the one receiving the inspiration does absolutely nothing.[73] Yet for a man to follow and obey this motion, this inspiration, this illumination of the Holy Spirit, no special gifts are required. The theological and moral virtues are sufficient. If the gifts are not necessary for following this inspiration and illumination of the Holy Ghost, the whole argument of St. Thomas fails. For he insists that a man needs special gifts other than the virtues to be disposed to be moved easily under the inspiration and motion of the Holy Ghost.

34. The reply: There can be no doubt that some illumination and inspiration of the Holy Ghost is necessary for the theological and infused moral virtues. However, this illumination which is ordered to salvation and is a prerequisite for justification is of two kinds. The first kind is an imperfect and general sort of motion. The second is perfect and altogether special.

Although the entire supernatural order may be called special in contradistinction to the natural order, yet even within the supernatural order there are both common and special helps in matters pertaining to salvation. The theological virtues together with the other divine assistance ennobling the intellect cannot sufficiently penetrate and know all things conducive to salvation. Faith of itself serves only to bring about a consent to things revealed by God. Although it is elevated above the natural order, faith alone is not sufficient to penetrate and to know the suitability and foundation of the truths believed. It cannot know to what extent they are worthy of belief, or how deeply they should be impressed upon the heart. Nor can reason and human argument penetrate and judge supernatural mysteries. Although the credibility of the mysteries can be proved with evidence, nevertheless, even when convinced of the credibility of the things of faith, the mind is not sufficiently attracted either to believe them, to adhere to them, or to act upon them. An interior, spiritual impulse is required to move a man to believe, love, and act upon the things of faith.

35. (36) This situation becomes apparent when anyone is tempted by doubts in matters of faith. At first he is not easily quieted. Then suddenly he finds such complete serenity that it seems to him that those same things are so certain that nothing could be more sure. In that case there is more than a penetration

[73] Cf. Council of Trent, session 4, chapter 5. Denziger 794, 814.

and understanding of the things of faith; there is the spirit of understanding, a spiritual, loving understanding.

In the story of St. Cecilia it is recorded that her husband, Valerian, when he stood before Pope Urban, saw the old man holding in his hands a tablet upon which was written: One God, One Faith, One Baptism. When the old man asked him, "Do you believe this?," Valerian cried in a loud voice, "There is nothing more truly to be believed." What could have moved Valerian to understand so suddenly that there was nothing more truly to be believed? There must have been some interior impulse and illumination of the Holy Ghost enkindling in him a love for those mysteries whose fire enlightened his mind so that he could say that there was nothing more truly to be believed.

That is not an uncommon experience. Yet the source of this serenity, the cause of such understanding and counsel, the root of this quieting of temptation from the fear of God, is not known. Although the source is unknown, it must be the Spirit, *who breathes where He will, and you hear His voice and you do not know where it comes from or where it goes.*[74]

36. (34) Though it is evident that a motion, an illumination and an inspiration are required from all the infused virtues, the objection might be advanced that St. Thomas is not concerned in his proof with all the illuminations and inspirations of the Holy Ghost. He refers rather to an inspiration and divine motion productive of a particular and extraordinary effect superior to the virtues. This is evident from the proof he takes from Aristotle's *Eudomian Ethics*: [75] "For those who are moved according to a divine instinct, there is no need to take counsel according to human reason." This is the text commonly cited by those who would infer that the gifts perfect a man to higher acts than the acts of the virtues.

If this is admitted, a more pressing objection may be urged against St. Thomas from his doctrine in another place.[76] There he teaches that the gifts are the common endowments of all who have charity, and that they are necessary for salvation.[77] Yet these

[74] Cf. *John*, iii, 8.
[75] *XII Eudomian Ethics*, c. 14, 22 (1248 a 32).
[76] I-II, q. 68, a. 5, ad 1.
[77] *Ibid.*, a. 2.

extraordinary movements are inspirations to unusual works which exceed the virtues. Such unusual acts are not to be found in all the just. Many live in simplicity according to a prosaic life devoid of extraordinary activities. Therefore, these extraordinary works are not necessary. Indeed, the mere observance of the commandments, by acts of virtue, suffices for salvation. If then the Gifts of the Holy Ghost are given for extraordinary works, they are not necessary for salvation. But if they are necessary, then they are not distinct from the virtues.

37. There are two aspects of the question about extraordinary works being necessary for salvation. Works may be ordinary or extraordinary either on the part of the works themselves or on the part of the one performing them. In itself, an act may not be out of the ordinary. Yet a soul subject to deficiencies, confronted with obstacles and enemies and hostile forces may not attain to all the requisites for salvation. Hence, absolutely speaking, extraordinary works are not required for salvation. Remarkable things need not be revealed to the soul, nor need it perform unusual deeds. However, if such works are accomplished the operation of the Holy Ghost shines forth more brightly in them. For example, if anyone, in the spirit of fortitude, not only approaches his enemies unafraid but unarmed slays a thousand of them with the jawbone of an ass as Samson did, he has been inspired by the Holy Spirit and gives evidence of the acts of the Gifts of the Holy Ghost.[78]

38. Such actions are not absolutely required for salvation. Yet there are acts, related to the same object and material of the same virtues, which are extraordinary and special because of the agent's infirmity and deficiencies. Fulfilling the commandments is, of course, sufficient for salvation. But if that observance is to be full and complete, the Holy Ghost must help the soul in the midst of so many obstacles and defects. Human reason and the virtues do not suffice, unless an impulse of the Holy Ghost supplementing human infirmity and conquering all difficulties is added. *The good Spirit shall lead me into the right land.*[79]

39. It might be objected that there are some who could attain salvation without these difficulties and impediments. Adults who die immediately after baptism, or those who die as soon as they

[78] Cf. *Judges*, xv, 15. [79] *Psalm* cxlii, 10.

come to the use of reason would not meet them. Therefore, even under the subjective aspect of personal deficiencies in accomplishing extraordinary works the gifts are not necessary for salvation.

40. It may accidentally happen that someone may be saved without having actually exercised the gifts. The occasion for their exercise might not be present, just as the opportunity for the exercise of the virtues may be wanting. Nevertheless, it is not right to conclude that absolutely and essentially speaking the virtues are not necessary for salvation. No more so, then, is it logical to conclude that the gifts are not necessary. Accidentally, for want of opportunity, the gifts and virtues may not be used. However, there remains an habitual inclination—found even in children—and a promptitude of the soul for carrying out these movements of the Holy Ghost should the occasion demand.

41. The second objection: As alleged by St. Thomas and the theologians, the fundament for distinguishing the gifts from the virtues is not specific and essential. Therefore, the gifts are substantially virtues. The inference is evident. For if the gifts and the virtues differ only accidentally, they are substantially the same.

The objection fortifies its premises that the gifts and virtues differ only accidentally from the fact that they differ only on the part of the efficient cause, that higher mover to whose touch the Gifts of the Holy Ghost dispose. But the order of efficient causality is extrinsic and accidental, not formal and substantial. Now evidently different efficient causes can produce the same effect. For example, fire may be produced by another fire, by the rays of the sun, or by spontaneous combustion.

42. Reply: The gifts and virtues do not merely differ accidentally. The gifts differ from the virtues both from the point of view of the mover or the efficient cause, and from the point of view of the regulative principle and measure. In distinguishing the gifts from the virtues by means of their definition, St. Thomas [80] affirms that in the definition of virtue the words "a quality by which a man lives rightly" mean a right living according to the limitation of reason. By this phrase he distinguishes the definition of virtue from the definition of the gifts. In the latter definition the notion of right living should be understood as right living according to a divine measure which is above human capacity. Therefore,

[80] I-II, q. 68, a. 1, ad 3.

the disposition mentioned in connection with a man being readily movable by the Holy Ghost is not to be understood as limited to the efficient movement, but as applying to the regulating and measuring principle as well. Under this aspect the gifts are similar to the moral virtues, since the virtues dispose the rational sense appetites to obey reason. Reason functions as the moving and regulating principle of the virtues. As habits the virtues are dispositions through which the will is disposed to be obedient to reason. The reason, in turn, moves the will by presenting and delimiting its object. The good as measured by reason, then, is the formal object of the virtues.

43. (46) Similarly, the gifts are habits or dispositions of the intellect and the will. They dispose these faculties to follow the impulse of the Holy Ghost, who regulates and delimits the objects of the gifts. His ordination constitutes the formal object of the gifts and specifies the good and the true according to the standards of divine illumination and not according to the standards of human reason. From it, as from an enkindling breath, which is an affection for divine things, there is born a more intimate penetration of the supernatural and a total dependence upon God. The Psalmist admonishes, *Cast thy care upon the Lord and he shall sustain thee; he shall not suffer the just to waver for ever.*[81]

Where reason adorned with virtues may fluctuate and fail, it is God's own counsel to cast one's cares upon the Lord. His Spirit nourishes, sustains and guards the faithful lest they fail. For His gifts are their nourishment and their sustenance.

44–45. (42–43) The claim has been made that the superior mover in the matter of the gifts is not in the efficient order but in the formal order. However, even if this moving principle were in the formal order it would follow that the gifts are merely higher types of virtues. It would be illogical to conclude that the gifts are not virtues. Moreover, St. Thomas asserts that the gifts are dispositions necessary for the action of the mover. But if this mover is in the order of formal causality, no such disposition is required. For, over and above its own nature, a receiver required no special disposition to render it passive to a new form. Therefore, in proving that the gifts are dispositions, St. Thomas necessarily involved the order of efficient causality. Consequently, he was advancing an

[81] *Psalm* liv, 23.

accidental and not an essential difference between the virtues and the gifts.

46. (47) In response to the latter part of this argument it should be noted that the superior moving principle referred to brings about a virtue higher than the limitations of reason will allow. Broadly speaking, it may be called a virtue, as St. Thomas concedes, since it is a good habit. However, it is called a gift, in contradistinction to the virtues, because it is above anything due to human reason.

47. (48) Moreover, a virtue is a disposition moved and regulated by reason. It is specified and delimited by its object and not merely by its efficient cause. The will is thus disposed to its object according to the regulation of the reason. By the name " mover," then, is meant the formal cause regulating and specifying. In the specification of this cause some disposition is necessary. Such a disposition is not for the introduction of a form; it is a habit in the soul. Since reason may fail to perform the specification properly, the motion and impulse of the Holy Ghost enters into the soul.

48. (44) However, according to some there seems to be no reason why the theological and moral virtues themselves do not suffice for the higher motion of the Holy Ghost. The gifts are concerned with the same matter as the infused virtues, for example, the gift of fortitude and the infused virtue of fortitude, counsel and infused prudence, understanding, knowledge and faith. All deal with these matters within the supernatural order. A new virtue is not required, therefore, that a man be moved in a higher way. All that seems to be necessary is a more intense and more perfect mode of acting in the same virtue. It has already been admitted that heroic and common virtues, the purgative virtues and those of the soul which has been tried do not differ except according to the more and the less. Why then cannot the same be maintained with regard to the virtues and the gifts? The spirit of fortitude by which Samson killed a thousand men with a jawbone, although more excellent and strengthened by a more perfect assistance from God, would not differ, then, from the virtue of fortitude by which many soldiers conquer in battle.

49. This final resumption under the second objection is not valid. The disposition even of the infused virtues does not suffice for the reception of the motion of the Holy Ghost. Distinct habits are

[62] I-II, q. 68, a. 1.

required, since the Gifts of the Holy Ghost are given to supply for the deficiency of human reason, even when it is adorned with the virtues. Since, therefore, the virtues are limited and specified by the good as regulated and attained through human reason, whatever disposes to acts and accomplishments superior to reason demands another habit outside the limits and specific nature of human virtue.

A further consideration must be entertained. Whatever exceeds human nature goes beyond it either by reason of the supernatural character of the matter at hand, the object of the action, or by reason of superiority in the mode of acting. Supernatural things attained in this life are measured by human limitations and actions. They are apprehended and desired according to human capacity. Supernatural goods are known through faith; through prudence and the other moral virtues direction is given to supernatural acts. However, because of the limited essence of these virtues, the intellect does not penetrate the mysteries of faith, except in an imperfect manner and according to the analogy of natural things. In many respects, therefore, the understanding of those things is deficient. The soul requires either a theological argument, which is subject to a thousand opinions, fallacies, and defects, or it requires a light, a celestial impulse, by which it may be directed by the Holy Ghost.

50. Likewise, infused prudence, moderating and judging actions in the supernatural order, fails in many respects if it proceeds and judges only according to the capacity of human reason. Its deficiency must be supplied by a divine impulse and motion which directs and regulates it. It is fitting, then, that there be in the will and in the sensitive appetites a disposition proportionate to the movement of the Holy Ghost. Human reason according to its own manner of acting cannot operate on such a plane. The divine impulse must supply what is lacking in the process of the human reason, even when that reason is helped and augmented by the infused theological virtues. Moreover, by ennobling the sensitive appetite to obey and follow a higher divine impulse, the gifts compensate for the deficiencies of the moral virtues, which incline a man towards good, but only according to the limitations of human reason.

51. Furthermore, the gifts and the virtues deal with the same objects. And, of course, only a more intense and perfect act and not a new virtue is required so long as the action remains within

the limits of human powers and attainments in the supernatural order. However, the example adduced of the heroic, purgative virtues of the tried soul does not remain within the bounds of human reason. Certainly some higher power than any human virtue is necessary for a man to be moved beyond the merely human manner of acting and to be directed to acts in which human reason fails. The impulse of the Holy Ghost must fill the breach when human reason can go no further. This special assistance is called a gift both because it is gratuitously given to raise the faculty to the supernatural order and because it supplements the deficiencies of the faculty.

52. This is the doctrine of St. Thomas.[83] He distinguishes the matter from the manner in human actions. The acts of the virtues are performed in a human manner and in this respect the gifts surpass the virtues. For it is connatural to human nature to perceive divine things only according to an image found in creatures and in the darkness of analogy. Thus faith proceeds. However, the Gift of Understanding so illuminates the mind concerning the things that have been heard that a man receives a foretaste of the beatific vision. St. Thomas,[84] therefore, distinguishes the gifts from the infused virtues. For although the infused virtues are substantially divine gifts their mode of acting is human and inferior to that of the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

53. The third objection: It sometimes happens that even in the theological virtues a thing is done which is beyond the common and ordinary manner of proceeding. Yet in that case there is not required any gift higher than the virtue itself. Furthermore, the theological virtues are superior to the gifts[85] and hence no gift is more powerful than they. Gifts are not necessary, therefore, because of any extraordinary work in the sphere of the theological virtues.

The fact of unusual occurrences in the sphere of the theological virtues is proved by the existence of a faith which moves mountains, to which St. Paul referred,[86] and a charity so great that it overcomes death. These virtues, at least, involve extraordinary actions.

[83] *In III Sententiarum*, d. 34, q. 1, a. 1.
[84] *Ibid.*, ad 2.
[85] I-II, q. 68, a. 8.
[86] Cf. *I Corinthians*, xiii, 2.

The statement that the virtues are sufficient for their own acts is evidenced by the fact that no works of faith or charity are so perfect and excellent that faith and charity themselves are not equal to them. Of faith it is said, *it is like a grain of mustard seed,*[87] *and you will say to the mountain, remove from hence, and it will remove.*[88] This is not a gift of the Holy Ghost distinct from faith. Nor is that charity which *gives its body to be burned* [89] a gift distinct from the charity greater than which no one has than he *who would lay down his life for his friends.*[90]

54. It must be admitted, in reply to this argument, that there are extraordinary actions even in the sphere of theological virtues. For this very purpose, there are gifts corresponding to the virtues: Understanding corresponds to Faith,[91] the gift of Fear to Hope,[92] and the gift of Wisdom to Charity.[93]

While the gifts are superior to the moral virtues, they serve the theological virtues by supplementing them. The theological virtues join the soul to its ultimate end, while the gifts serve to move it and lead it to that end. *Thy spirit shall lead me into the right land;* [94] *His wind shall blow and the waters shall run.*[95]

Come, O south wind, blow through my garden and let its aromatical spices flow.[96] This flowing is related to motion toward an end, and not to the rest or quiet in it. The gifts have a certain essential superiority over the virtues which are concerned with the means to the end. For the gifts move men in a higher way in the very things in which these virtues fail.

55. (57) However, the gifts cannot be essentially superior to the virtues which join the soul immediately to God.[97] For motion of the Holy Ghost, to which the gifts are subservient, has as its purpose union with God as the last end. Therefore, the gifts corresponding to the theological virtues help them with their proper object and certain allied matters.

For example, the Gift of Understanding is given for the penetration of the mysteries of faith and divine things. Yet this penetra-

[87] *Matthew*, xii, 31; *Luke*, xiii, 19; xvii, 6.
[88] *Matthew*, xvii, 19.
[89] *I Corinthians*, xiii, 3.
[90] *John*, xv, 13.
[91] II-II, q. 8 and 9.
[92] *Ibid.*, q. 19.
[93] *Ibid.*, q. 15.
[94] *Psalm* cxlii, 9.
[95] *Psalm* cxlvii, 18.
[96] *Canticle of Canticles*, iv, 16.
[97] I-II, q. 68, a. 8.

tion is not an immediate and complete understanding. Attaining to the credibility of mysteries, it judges their appropriateness or the meaning of articles by discerning them from errors. Furthermore, it determines the interpretation of Scripture—*he opened their minds, that they might understand the Scriptures.*[98] The Gift of Knowledge is bestowed so that the soul may attain to the causes of the credibility of mysteries and their inner consistency. It disposes and prepares the mind to believe more firmly. The Gift of Fear is concerned with one's own nothingness. It subjects the soul to the divine eminence and restrains the soul to its proper proportions so that it will not be presumptuous but rather prepared to be wholly dependent upon God. Wisdom judges according to the savor of divine things, and it discerns supernatural things in the love of God.

All these gifts serve the virtues. They assist them by preparing for acts of virtue, not by arousing the theological virtues to an essentially more perfect act. No works of faith and charity are so perfect that they cannot in essence be accomplished by those virtues. But the object can be dealt with more perfectly when the virtues are assisted by the gifts. For the virtues are not sufficient to dispose and prepare themselves with respect to that object. Therefore, the gifts should be distinguished from the theological virtues, since although they are concerned with the same object, they do not view it under the same formality or light.

56. (54) Another objection may be raised concerning other virtues: fortitude, for example. When Samson killed a thousand men this deed exceeded neither the sphere nor the essence of the virtue of fortitude. Fortitude inclines a man to sustain difficulties and attack danger wherever that attack is evidently justified either by human reason or by an impulse of the Holy Ghost. However, it requires a special help when the work is great and extraordinary. But it is one thing to need an extraordinary help and quite another to require a special virtue or habit. The ordinary virtue together with the extraordinary assistance should suffice for the task. How then can it be shown that extraordinary tasks require a Gift of the Holy Ghost distinct from the virtues?

This is especially true since unusual works happen but rarely and are done by only a few. There is even less reason, then, to

[98] *Luke*, xxiv, 45.

postulate special habits in all the just. Nor is there a satisfactory answer in the claim that the works are above the limitations of human reason. Even when a man is moved to these special actions, he is moved according to right reason, although it has been illuminated by an impulse of the Holy Ghost. Therefore, the gifts are not superior to the human reason when that reason is illuminated by the Holy Ghost. In other words, the ordinary virtues together with a special help are sufficient.

57. (59) There are some things which exceed the measure and essence of human virtue as judged by the rule of prudence, in matters attainable by human procedure and reasoning. The formal and specific essence of the moral virtue is taken from the rule and measure by which it is judged—for morality is nothing other than a measure of things to be done. It is certain, then, that wherever there is a variation in the morality and the measure, there is a corresponding change in the virtue. Reason clothed with virtue but confined to the light and direction of a merely human manner of proceeding cannot offer a rule of life comprehending the totality of means to salvation. *For the thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain.*[99]

In many things, therefore, men should give themselves into the hands of Divine Prudence to be ruled by its impulse, which is a higher and more certain and more comprehensive measure than their own reason. For human difficulties arise either from the multitude and the magnitude of the objects or from the nothingness and infirmity of the person who is unable to comprehend all the details of life even in the natural order. The Gifts of the Holy Ghost alone can lead him to this comprehension.

58. (60) Great and unusual deeds can be accomplished by human effort and industry. Even in a theological virtue which presupposes supernatural faith, there may be more intense works of virtue, exceeding the limits and essence of human moral virtue. Such acts, even within their own proper sphere, require a more excellent grace and a more perfect assistance from God. Yet even in the supernatural order they are always founded upon human reason and limited by human industry.

There are, moreover, great and extraordinary works which despite one's own effort and diligence are unattainable. They require

[99] *Wisdom*, ix, 14.

an impulse superior to human direction and effort. That impulse constitutes a higher morality and regulative principle. To that morality should correspond a principle in the will which inclines it to the new and higher standard. According to human standards, Samson would have to be judged temerarious in attacking a thousand men with only the jawbone of an ass. By the same standards, it would have been judged wrong for him to break down the columns of the building to kill himself and others. The same might be said in the case of St. Apollonia who threw herself into the fire. According to the higher rule, however, these actions are judged good. Therefore, there is a distinct moral aspect.

59. (58) Furthermore, extraordinary help of a kind that varies the morality of an act is not given as connatural to virtues which are specified by a diverse moral rule. Nor is this help such that it lifts the virtues out of their own sphere of morality. Then it would be neither proportionate nor connatural to the soul. If this help is to be given proportionately and connaturally, new habits in the soul transcending the morality of ordinary virtues are required. These habits are called the Gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Of course, even in extraordinary work a man is moved by his reason. His reason must be regulated by a rectifying principle transcending the scope of human effort, even in the supernatural order. This regulative principle varies the morality of the virtues subject to it.

60. (55) Finally, it may be argued that if the gifts are given for extraordinary actions above the common rule of reason and of human virtue, it is not within a man's power or judgment to act through these gifts when he chooses. Experience testifies that men do not act according to the gifts every time they wish. Therefore, they act through the gifts as through the charisms like prophecy, which is not a habit but a transient grace.[100]

Men are instruments of God moved by Him to actions to which of themselves they are not suited. To this action of an instrument, St. Thomas [101] compares the works of the gifts. Through them men passively receive divine things and are moved by the Holy Ghost rather than move and act of themselves. *Whoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God.*[102] St. Thomas [103] uses this

[100] II-II, q. 171, a. 1.
[101] I-II, q. 68, a. 3, ad 2.
[102] *Romans*, viii, 14.
[103] I-II, q. 68, a. 1.

testimony to prove that the Gifts of the Holy Ghost are found in the faithful and make them amenable to the movement of the Holy Ghost. Therefore, those gifts are not enduring habits in the faithful. They are passing graces when given for miraculous purposes. If they are given to the faithful as habits then they do not exceed the essence and limitation of ordinary virtues.

61. (62) Some think that the acts of the gifts, especially in exterior matters, are miraculous acts, not under the control of men. To the rejoinder that reason has no need for habits to perform these actions—since habits can be used at will—they reply that this is understood of habits which are subject to reason and regulated by common rules.

If this were the case, St. Thomas [104] would have proved in vain that there are no habits of prophecy and miracles, because men do not have the power of prophesying and of working miracles at will. Against him it might be alleged that there might be habits of prophecy and miracles. For, according to these theologians, there could be habits outside the subjection of reason and common rules which could be used at will.

However, according to the testimony of St. Thomas [105] the Gifts of the Holy Ghost are given as habits not as an impulse moving the soul but for a special obedience by which the soul is subject to the motion of the Holy Ghost. This obedience and disposition which is a preparation for habitual subjection to the Holy Ghost should remain constant in the faithful. However, its exercise depends upon a motion and actual impulse which is not within the power of man. It is in his power, however, to be always prepared to obey, to be docile to the Holy Ghost. *My heart is ready, O God, my heart is ready. I will sing, and will give praise with my glory.*[106] It is not within human power to arouse and to excite that glory, yet the heart of man may be prepared to sing in harmony with God's movements. Being subject to Him is the greatest chant, since *In Thou is my song forever.*[107]

62. (64) When St. Thomas compares the motion through the Gifts of the Holy Ghost to the motion of an instrument, he does not apply it in all its aspects. Rather, he uses it from the point of view that a man needs the actual impulse of God to perform

[104] II-II, q. 171, a. 1 and q. 178.
[105] I-II, q. 68.
[106] *Psalm* ci, 2.
[107] *Psalm* lxx, 6.

any actions. Through the gifts he performs works exceeding his own power. For the same reason other supernatural things are said to be as instruments in the faithful. Indeed all creatures are said to be as instruments of God. They depend upon His actually moving them. But men are not called instruments because they are purely inanimate and merely serving ministerially. For in lesser creatures there is no principle eliciting actions as a principal cause nor is there operation through an intrinsic principle. There is only a principle ministerially serving the motion of the principle agent, so that the whole is moved by another.

63. (65) The final statement is that men are rather in the position of passively receiving divine things than in the position of moving themselves. Of course, they are voluntarily passive and obedient to the divine motion. To be obedient and passive in this way is not precisely to be like something inanimate. It is rather to operate actively by receiving divine things by being led by the same Spirit.

64. (66) Finally, other difficulties about each gift might be raised against this doctrine. In the case of the intellectual gifts it might be argued that their essence does not differ from that of faith. Moreover, it may be alleged that these in the will do not differ from the other virtues. It is not expedient here, however, to explain the nature and difference of each gift. That will be done in the subsequent chapters.

(To be continued.)

BOOK REVIEWS

Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth. By Eric Frank. New York: Oxford University Press, 1945. Pp. 182, with index. $2.50.

Dr. Frank has tried to carry water on both shoulders, and much philosophical understanding and religious truth has been spilled in the attempt In the hope that a discussion of the problem envisaged in the title of this "philosophical study . . . might contribute toward a clarification of our present difficulties," Dr. Frank has addressed an appeal to modern "understanding that finds itself in search of a faith." His vigorous notation of philosophical trends leaves little doubt that difficulties exist, but his conciliation of the "conflict between religion and philosophy" is inadequate.

However, Dr. Frank has produced many aphorisms and even whole passages which are remarkably perspicuous. His refractions of truth are in striking contrast to the opinions of many modern philosophers and his unhesitant intuition of the errors of both Positivism and Idealism place him in a position to appreciate a truly synolistic approach to philosophical problems. His judgments are substantiated by profuse annotations which evidence his wide acquaintance with philosophical literature.

Dr. Frank offers allegiance to no school and no individual philosopher is recognized as his pedagogue. Whether he sits in the shadow of Emmanuel Kant or walks toe to heel behind Soren Kierkegaard cannot be definitely determined from these pages. But there can be little doubt that his judgments suffer from an inherited epistemological myopia and that his steps are guided by naturalism in its frustrated perfection. Although his intellectual genealogy may be uncertain, his present contribution to the heritage of human learning may be described, at least by an allegory. Precedent for these Bryn Mawr lectures now compiled in book form may be found in the "Advice from a Caterpillar" in the fifth chapter of *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.* With a mushroom as his rostrum, the caterpillar engaged Alice in scintillating dialectic. However, he offered her little consolation in her distress at being only three inches high, for he was of no greater stature himself. As a reward for Alice's patient attention, the caterpillar made the parting comment that if she were to eat of one side of the perfectly round mushroom, she would shrink, if she ate of the other, she would grow. With even less than a "spontaneous feeling" of faith to guide her in her quandary, Alice chewed a piece of the mushroom she had taken in her right hand. The effect was disastrous. Her chin was so close to her shoe tops that she could scarcely nibble a bit

from the other side of the mushroom. When she had swallowed the second morsel she grew—distorted.

The dialectic of these essays is circular, self-contradictory, and futile. The reader is as likely to be stunted by specious philosophical principles as to thrive because of the surcharging of his ethico-religious consciousness. For, while the imperious assurances of a vague and generic religious faith become more peremptory, the very fundaments of credibility in religious truth are being undermined by a latent Kantian antinomy. Confronted with numerous uncanny contradictions, a cautious reader will have as much difficulty in eliminating the errors from the author's really worth-while statements as he would in anathematizing a dream or excommunicating a ghost. Of a few of these errors, therefore, he would do well to be forewarned.

The first of these six essays treats of *The Nature of Man*, the "proper study" of modern philosophy. This initial step in the resolution of the "conflict between philosophy and religion" begins with a historical conspectus of the damage wrought to the concept of man by both the natural sciences and the "empirical knowledge of history." From the time of the discovery that man is not the master of the universe until the promulgation of the contemporary theory that he is a slave of animal instincts, the generally accepted interpretation of human nature has become progressively more incompatible with any ethico-religious notions. As a result, religious tenets are considered a threat to the progress of science and a subterfuge of philosophers too timorous to take their destiny in their own hands.

To this modern attitude Dr. Frank's first essay opposes a series of arguments calculated to dethrone man's own estimate of himself by pointing out to him the limitations of his sovereignty in thought and action. The practical experience of his created existence, his moral limitations, and the biological phenomenon of death should so impinge upon man's vaunted regency of all things that he would come to realize his "final limitation which makes even the concepts of religion appear to him in a new light." This type of argumentation is valid and useful, as evidenced by St. Augustine's conversion of England many centuries ago, but it may be easily vitiated by internal contradictions and a recourse to "concepts of religion" which are confused and inadequate.

Contradictions and adulterated religious ideas abound in these pages. For the idea that religious belief is "a childish delusion that serves to satisfy man's emotional needs" modern man is expected to substitute a "spontaneous feeling" which "is precisely what in religion is called faith." Moreover, according to the doctrine of this essay, for a man to appreciate the limits of his created existence he must come to realize that "the particular historical situation" into which he is born constitutes his "unalter-

able fate by which his free will is impaired. . . ." Even man's natural faculties are said to be limited by their "historical moment" since "the rational supposition of a truth that, once established by reason, remains one and the same at all times and for all men, is contrary to the facts: veritas emporis filia." All this confusion concerning human nature is based upon the unwarranted assumption that "the fundamental fact from which all philosophy has to start in its interpretation of man is neither thought alone nor nature alone, but the dialectical conflict of the two, their irreconcilable antinomy." If man's free will is impaired, his intellect ordained to a chimera called truth, and his whole being on the rack between thought and nature, how can God be "felt"? If such is the state of human understanding for an evangelizer it seems far-fetched indeed to expect modern philosophers to subscribe to religious concepts in "the quintessence of their truth" and "their full philosophical meaning, which remains valid even for the modern intellect."

To this modern intellect as it "puzzles over the origin of the idea of God," Dr. Frank addresses his second essay, *The Existence of God*. The "proof" this essay offers is at once commonplace and false. Since "modern man, who no longer has faith, will never be convinced of God's existence through such artificial and complicated argumentations" as have been the stock in trade of philosophers for centuries, this essay proposes in a new form what may be called the argument from folly. For, as Holy Scripture points out, it is only in the heart of a fool that the "real proof of God" is formulated as "the agonized attempt to deny God."

The arguments of philosophers are reviewed and rejected in these pages, because "they merely transpose the act of faith into the medium of rational thinking." The cosmological argument is labelled as without merit because Positivists would be unwilling to take the "step from a contingent and relative world to an unconditioned cause . . . to leap into the unkown Absolute." The argument from design is found inadequate because it naively omits the possibility of "blind forces" which are ultimate realities for so many moderns. The ontological argument, however, receives partial approbation, principally because the author has failed to grasp its fundamental philosophical principle. Moreover, Pascal, James, and Kierkegaard are found worthy of benign treatment since "they recognized the fact that the existence of God cannot be proved to the modern sceptic who no longer believes in God."

When all these arguments have been found wanting the argument from folly remains, for it is based on the "fundamental epistemological fact: The heart has its reasons which Reason does not know." Although pure subjectivism is rejected, the crude emotional proof offered can have no other source. Moreover, the object of this argument from folly can be no more than man's fictional wrestling with his own concepts. The argument

from "the agonized attempt to deny God" offers neither proof nor conviction, since it would offer no certitude to "modern man, who puzzles about the origin of the idea of God," unless he were first firmly to believe that God had created a race of schizophrenics.

The fallacy of this argument is both metaphysical and methodological. The logical vice of *ignoratio elenchi* is apparent in the transition from an attempt to prove God's existence to a consideration of his intimate nature; the metaphysical error flows from a misunderstanding of the primary principles of human reason.

Moreover, in this essay the author fails not only as a seer but as a scholar. The meaning of at least one question is completely distorted. Wrenched from its context in the *Contra Gentiles* a garbled passage which refers to entirely different matter is alleged as a preface to St. Thomas' demonstrative proofs for the existence of God. Such a gross misinterpretation brings suspicion upon all the annotations to the generalizations of these essays.

The third essay, entitled *Creation and Time*, is on the whole the most satisfactory of the series. It elaborates the point, not often emphasized, that "our modern concept of history, no matter how rationalized and secularized it may be, still rests on that concept of historical time which was inaugurated by Christianity." To substantiate this contention the concepts of creation and time are subjected to a brief review. Much entangled phraseology is employed to explain these concepts, and at times it seems that the author has negated the very position he would establish. Moreover, like St. Augustine, the author seems to understand the notion of time until he attempts to explain it. Such statements as man's "apprehension of the present is merely the consciousness of an absence of the present, of transitoriness" and "time is the outgrowth of our imagination; therefore the soul is essentially connected with time" do little to clarify notions of time, which are already quite confused. Finally, it is only a faulty notion of creation that the author could view as a concept which, "although it cannot rationally explain the riddle of human existence, serves to point to it and to make man aware of it."

Certainly the full theological concept of creation has not been delineated in these pages, but if the exposition here given "keeps alive in man a sense of his own mysterious place within that creation," it will have accomplished a function not altogether futile.

Whatever good may have been achieved in the previous essay is destroyed by the fourth brief treatise, on *Truth and Imagination*. For "the concept of creation, in spite of its religious and philosophical importance, proves to be an idea of imagination," and "imagination, under the influence of our emotions and practical interests, makes reality appear in a fashion not in keeping with sober experience." But imagination, according

to the doctrine of this essay, must not be spurned as deceptive or wholly inferior to reason. For " in terms of imagination " a man must express his relation to God, since all rational knowledge, " even the most elevated, always remains a form of human existence, which as such differs essentially from its objects." If " essentially " is here taken as distinguished from the concept already contained in a " mode of human existence," this statement constitutes a denial of the basic principle of human knowledge: the form of the intellect is identical with the form of the object. If by " essentially " is actually meant " existentially," the statement is redundant and inconclusive. From this it is apparent that the fundamental error of this essay is the utter confusion of what a man knows with the way he knows it. So long as this critique of knowledge attempts to anticipate the act of knowing, no consistent notion of ideogenesis can be worked out.

Without injustice to the author, it cannot be denied that there are statements in this essay which express certain aspects of the truth, but since no consistent explanation of the relation between imagination and truth can be extracted from these pages, this entire essay must stand under the censure of integral truth.

With his usual mastery of effects and tenuous contact with their causes, Dr. Frank offers an essay on *History and Destiny*, which is a melange of historical observations and religious misconceptions. Heterodox theological notions such as would confuse Providence with that part of it called Predestination and would even mistake Christ for the Third Person of the Most Holy Trinity are not apt to give a reliable explanation of historical phenomena, however ably these latter may be described. Dr. Frank's description of the " opposition of Caesar and Christ " is admirable. Yet if this opposition is merely the " symbolic expression " of the " polar tension between religion and reason," it is deprived of the very substance of its being. Christianity may be said to have introduced ideas whose vitality is felt even in rationalism and naturalism; Christ may be lauded as the protagonist in " events that were to shake the world to its foundations " and His greatness may surpass human narration; but such encomia are merely a subtle way of taking up stones against Christ not for His good works but for His claiming to be divine. Eulogies of Christ's mission and its effect are no more than deceptions if the Son of God is considered as another prophet of the " Jewish-Christian religion."

Moreover, if the " problem of history and destiny is identical with that of freedom and necessity," Dr. Frank cannot hope for a satisfactory solution by sidestepping the problem of God's necessary efficiency in every act of human freedom. The subterfuge of a " belief in the creative freedom of the human spirit " in no way gives to man a proper understanding of " the fact that whatever he may do of his own free will is at the same time an ultimate necessity." Although he protests that " freedom, in so

far as it is truly creative and effective, must consist solely in the recognition of a superior necessity and in obedience to its law," Dr. Frank leaves unexplained God's initiative and consummation of human acts. In this he leaves unsolved the problem of history and destiny.

In the final essay of this series, entitled *Letter and Spirit*, the reader is presented with ideas which he cannot renounce " even if they are not substantiated by objective facts." The reader will have little difficulty in believing that no objective fact could corroborate the statement that " freedom of will does not mean only choice between given possibilities, rather it means the very creation of such possibilities." Yet he need not agree with this nor many of the other propositions alleged in this essay.

In this treatise the metaphor of the letter and spirit used by St. Paul " in formulating the ultimate secret of Christianity " receives its obviously proper exegesis but several of the conclusions derived from this explanation are without foundation. For example, the term " letter " used in obloquy is certainly misapplied to the " objective canon and strict dogma of the Catholic Church." Moreover, the terms " sovereign volition," " spiritual freedom," and " free personality " are no less confusing than such statements as: " God as spirit is essentially personality."

Throughout this essay, as at times in other essays, Dr. Frank has, perhaps unwittingly, usurped the function of a theologian. The consideration of realities not in their proper formalities but as a " cipher of the Absolute " is not " the perennial task of philosophy " but the proper sphere of theological inquiry. However, theology's " faith seeking understanding " must be based on a solid foundation. The interpolation of a few supernatural concepts into a naturalistic procedure merely confuses the source and direction of both philosophy and theology. " Throughout these lectures, belief has proved to be the ultimate ground of fundamental concepts " yet " at the bottom of faith, there is doubt." Faith based on supernatural grace gives certitude, faith and admixture of doubt based on natural understanding gives only opinion. Modern man is not likely to turn to such opinion for a solution of " the conflict between philosophy and religion." Opinion, therefore, is offered to modern man as the source of philosophy and the principle of the resolution of the alleged antinomy between faith and science.

Philosophical fallacies and religious misconceptions, however, are not the only errors of this " philosophical study." There are mistakes in the literary and scholarly apparatus. The annotations are not always accurate, for example part of note four in Chapter Four is not correct, while note two of the same chapter misconstrues the structure of the articles of the *Summa Theologica*. Grammatical errors are surprisingly numerous—first person plural pronouns run rampant and unidentified throughout. Despite " numerous changes " with a view to publication, the literary style of these

essays still has on the gingham edged with taffeta it wore to Bryn Mawr. The devices of rhetoric and logic which are employed are the ordinary instruments of those who, as Aristotle asserts, prefer " to seem to accomplish the task of a wise man rather than to accomplish it without seeming to do so."

The task of a wise man is certainly not accomplished in these essays. For all their profession of religious truth the general tenor of these essays may be described as materialistic, in so far as that term implies a judging of the greater by the less. For faith " must come to terms " with science and philosophy is made the arbiter of all truth. Both as lectures and as essays these treatises on philosophy may have been of polemic value against certain notions of " modern man," but they cannot fail to cause confusion in the mind of any reader who expects a consistent presentation of truth.

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BRIEF NOTICES

Thomistic Bibliography: 1920-40. By VERNON J. BOURKE, Ph.D. St. Louis, Missouri: The Modern Schoolman, 1945. Pp. viii + 312, with indices. $3.00.

Undoubtedly, this is one of the most valuable works for the student of Thomism to appear in this country during the war. It is designed to carry on the work of the *Bibliographie Thomiste*, which was edited by the French Dominicans, P. Mandonnet and J. Destrez. It follows the divisions of this work: I. Life and Personality of St. Thomas; II. Works of St. Thomas; III. Philosophical Doctrines; IV. Theological Doctrines; and V. Doctrinal and Historical Relations. An Introduction explains the rationale of the bibliography, the method of using it, and gives a chronology of the life of St. Thomas as well as a chronological list of his writings. The items in the bibliography appeared during the years 1920-40, although in some important instances the compiler has wisely included works of a later date.

A Survey of Catholic Literature. By S. J. BROWN and T. MCDERMOTT. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1945. Pp. 249, with index. $2.50.

The authors have attempted the huge task of conveying in a limited space a notion of the vast riches of Catholic literature. In accomplishing this task, they cover the field several times, first from the strictly bibliographical standpoint, then by a brief historical survey from the beginning of the Christian era to the present. Part Two covers the Ages of Faith—Medieval literature, and Old English, Scottish and Irish literature. Part Three makes a sharp transition to North and South America. The work concludes, in Part IV, with a more detailed survey of the Catholic literary revival in France, England, Ireland, and the other European countries.

The book will probably be considered unscientific by scholars and too factual by the general reader. The authors have chosen an extremely broad definition of literature, which relieves them of the burden of judging the works from a literary viewpoint. Nevertheless, such a general survey is of worth, especially in listing the important Catholic authors of countries whose literature is unknown to us in translation; perhaps it may arouse a demand for translations of some of these authors.

Poland and Russia. The Last Quarter Century. By Ann Su Cardwell. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1944. Pp. ix + 251, with Appendices and Index.

According to Thucydides facts carry their own judgment and the art of the historian is that of precise statement. Mrs. Cardwell endorses this view and in her recounting of Polish-Soviet relations reduces her personal interpretative remarks to a minimum. In this instance, at least, the facts speak with a surprising eloquence. The greater part of the book deals with the war years, in which Poland has been almost without interruption the battleground of armies and the debating ground of diplomacy. In time to come, Mrs. Cardwell's work and the documents with which she gives it authenticity may assume rightful place as history. Here and now, in the yet unsettled conditions of our time, they are polemic, a powerful plea for Poland, an indictment of Soviet Russia.

The God of Love. By J. K. Haydon. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1944. Pp. 200. $2.25.

In this work the author of *The God of Reason* has attempted to build a gangplank into the Bark of Peter. This is not the usual book of apologetics; it does not have a general appeal, for the author has in mind a definite reader group, of which the typical member is the modern man who "stands where Pilate stood, in despair of knowing the truth, in doubt of there being any absolute truth." For this reason it would be unjustifiable to criticize the book apart from this intention.

Nevertheless, it may be pointed out that the book's potential effectiveness suffers from the streamlined presentation demanded by the limitation of space. Such problems as: Man and His World, The Existence of God, Natural Religion, The Failure of Philosophy, The Failure of Civilization, Revelation Probable, The Resurrection, and The Church, are discussed within the limits of two hundred pages. More than half the book is dedicated to the task of clearing the ground, removing old habits of thought and prejudices, disposing the reader for the more theological and scriptural part on the quest for the God of Love. Throughout, Mr. Haydon's scientific background is skillfully utilized; he exposes many of the half truths of modern science which hold captive the pragmatists of our day. There are few places in the book where the reader is not under the strain of following sharp argumentation. Probably *The God of Love* would attract more readers to the Bark of Peter if the author had made his gangplank more commodious by building into it a better treatment on the theological virtue of charity.